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 III 
A STRUCTURED APPROACH TO MALWARE DETECTION AND ANALYSIS IN DIGITAL 
FORENSICS INVESTIGATION 
Saeed AlMarri 
 
ABSTRACT 
Within the World Wide Web (WWW), malware is considered one of the most serious threats 
to system security with complex system issues caused by malware and spam. Networks and 
systems can be accessed and compromised by various types of malware, such as viruses, 
worms, Trojans, botnet and rootkits, which compromise systems through coordinated 
attacks. Malware often uses anti-forensic techniques to avoid detection and investigation. 
Moreover, the results of investigating such attacks are often ineffective and can create 
barriers for obtaining clear evidence due to the lack of sufficient tools and the immaturity of 
forensics methodology. This research addressed various complexities faced by investigators 
in the detection and analysis of malware. In this thesis, the author identified the need for a 
new approach towards malware detection that focuses on a robust framework, and 
proposed a solution based on an extensive literature review and market research analysis. 
The literature review focussed on the different trials and techniques in malware detection to 
identify the parameters for developing a solution design, while market research was carried 
out to understand the precise nature of the current problem. The author termed the new 
approaches and development of the new framework the triple-tier centralised online real-
time environment (tri-CORE) malware analysis (TCMA). The tiers come from three 
distinctive phases of detection and analysis where the entire research pattern is divided into 
three different domains. The tiers are the malware acquisition function, detection and 
analysis, and the database operational function. This framework design will contribute to the 
field of computer forensics by making the investigative process more effective and efficient. 
 IV 
By integrating a hybrid method for malware detection, associated limitations with both static 
and dynamic methods are eliminated. This aids forensics experts with carrying out quick, 
investigatory processes to detect the behaviour of the malware and its related elements. The 
proposed framework will help to ensure system confidentiality, integrity, availability and 
accountability. The current research also focussed on a prototype (artefact) that was 
developed in favour of a different approach in digital forensics and malware detection 
methods. As such, a new Toolkit was designed and implemented, which is based on a 
simple architectural structure and built from open source software that can help investigators 
develop the skills to critically respond to current cyber incidents and analyses. 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
Malware is an intrusive malicious code that accesses computer system information without 
permission from the client. The role of malware is to infect computer network securities by 
obtaining unauthorised access to the network and distributing the malicious codes in the 
network. Currently, the internet is facing several problems related to malware, which 
ultimately hampers the security of computer networks. Malware is considered a global threat 
that has worked its way into all known parts of the worldwide computer industry. According 
to the Internet Security Threat report (by Symantec) published in 2016, over nine mega 
breaches were reported (a breach with over 10 million records is considered a mega 
breach), where total exposed identities by malware jumped 23% to 429 million that year.  
The malware industry is growing and compromising computer securities across the globe by 
penetrating internet securities. Malware is not only damaging computer network systems; it 
is also a business entity for making profits. The developers of malware intrusion systems 
can potentially earn considerable amounts of money by developing malicious entity codes. 
The role of malware developers is to develop malicious codes and transform them into 
malware programs. Malware developers do not create new suspicious malware each time; 
rather, they create new variants of existing malware and spread them throughout the internet 
shadow economy (Schipka, 2007). Variants of existing malware can be easily spread across 
internet securities. As stated in a report by Kaspersky Labs (Kaspersky 2014), there were 
2,205,486 variants collected during an analysis of malicious activities across the globe in 
2015 Q2. 
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1.2 Definition of Malware 
Malware is software that includes instructions for performing unwanted actions in computer 
networks by placing vulnerable malicious codes across them. Malware is a combination of 
the words ‘malicious’ and ‘software’, which describes intrusive activities in the computer 
environment in computer terminology. Malware codes usually obtain access without user 
consent and damage the computer network by spreading malicious codes (Kramer & 
Bradfield, 2008). 
1.3 Problem Overview and Motivation 
Malware is intrusive software that conducts unauthorised, malicious activities on a system. It 
can be easily deployed into any system, causing longer disruption and damage. Malware 
poses a real, extensive threat, and it has created a buzz in the field of digital forensic 
science (Kramer & Bradfield, 2008). In the most pertinent situations, malware targets and 
attacks financial institutions or the banking industry, as well as other systems dealing with 
monetary assets both online and offline. Cyber criminals can create a script that targets 
customers and enterprises dealing with these financial institutions, creating a sense of 
insecurity amongst users (Yin et al., 2007). A comprehensive list of different types of 
malware would include Trojans, viruses, worms, rootkits, botnets, phishing, spam, spyware, 
keyloggers and logic bombs.  
Traditional countermeasures used for detecting malware include signature-based methods 
or recognising anomalous behaviour specified by a rule or a function (Florencio & Herley, 
2011). However, these traditional methods have flaws and challenges, thus making it difficult 
to obtain effective and efficient results during an investigation. Given the significant increase 
in malware attacks and exposure resulting in loss of confidentiality, integrity and availability 
of data (Florencio & Herley, 2011), the need for a new formalised approach to collect, 
analyse and mitigate malicious content in systems must be addressed.  
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Several reports have mentioned various problems addressed by malware investigators while 
detecting malware itself or related malicious activities. Some of these are as follows: 
a) There is always a challenge in gathering and analysing large chunks of data for 
obfuscated malware or malicious code, as these procedures are usually time-
consuming and costly and require different techniques (BITS, 2011); 
b) Detection becomes complicated when an illegitimate activity employs sophisticated 
tools and methods (Schweitzer, 2002; Ye et al., 2010); 
c) Added complexity arises when the same data are present over a large network or in 
various computational systems, especially when the detection is performed with pre-
existing forensic tools, pre-defined malware detection systems and limited durations 
at workstations (Han et al., 2009); and 
d) When numerous systems or parties are involved in the same crime, the analysis of 
independent digital data during the investigation can result in the loss of 
indispensable correlated evidence. This occurs due to the incapacity of digital 
forensics to craft correlations between multiple malware cases. It is exceptionally 
difficult to detect malware and to obtain accurate data because of numerous 
obfuscation techniques used by the programmers (Hunt & Slay, 2010).  
Such problems can be addressed by focussing on various digital forensic techniques 
currently used to extract, gather and analyse malware-infected systems. Moreover, there is 
the opportunity for a new framework technique that focuses on typical features of malware 
activity, and which is capable of accumulating sufficient forensic evidence against the 
perpetrator and formulating it for presentation in a court of law. This framework should be 
able to optimise the needs and requirements of a robust investigation, and it should 
eliminate the associated challenges in malware detection and digital investigation to provide 
a cost-effective approach in the field of digital forensics. 
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1.4 Research Aim 
This research was focussed on designing a framework that can help digital forensics experts 
to detect and analyse malware, and address the current challenges faced by investigators. 
The framework design is intended to help forensics experts carry out a quick, investigatory 
process to detect the behaviour of malware and its related elements. The proposed 
framework will also aid in assuring system confidentiality, integrity, availability and 
accountability. To propose the new framework, comparative research and analysis was 
undertaken using existing tools to address existing deficiencies in malware detection; 
however, to ensure that the analysis is comprehensive, the framework works with both 
manual and automated processes to detect threats and warn the system.  
1.5 Research Objectives 
The goal of the research was to optimise the research paradigm for malware analysis and to 
improve the investigatory experience by employing an active approach to detect malware 
programs. With this in mind, the researcher divided the objectives into two phases: Phase 1 
focussed on developing a robust framework for malware analysis and detection, while Phase 
2 involved developing an artefact as a prototype for an anti-malware Toolkit to assist 
investigators in systematic detection and analysis.  
The objectives for Phase 1, developing a new framework, were as follows: 
a) To conduct an extensive literature review of the different trials and techniques 
associated with malware detection and to identify the parameters for developing the 
most efficient tools for a live system; 
b) To conduct extensive market research to understand the precise nature of the 
software/system requirements. Conceptual and contextual methods were used to 
gather information, followed by an extensive analysis of the report; and 
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c) To generate a new, effective framework to analyse the behavioural characteristics of 
the malware family and the mechanics of its operation. The complete observation of 
malware was exhibited in a controlled environment. 
The objectives for Phase 2, developing the Toolkit, were as follows: 
a) To develop a malware detection Toolkit, comprised of a simple structural prototype 
built from open source software, to help investigators develop skills to critically 
respond to current cyber incidents and investigations. The development should be 
reflected by the information gathered from Phase 1; and 
b) To perform extensive testing of the Toolkit by experienced end users to gather real-
time execution results.  
1.6  Research Questions 
The following research questions were set: 
a) Is it possible to develop an effective malware detection system by investigating the 
behavioural characteristics of existing malware?     
b) How can we develop a quick, inexpensive investigatory process to cultivate the 
parameters for developing the most efficient malware detection tool? 
c) Is it possible to identify traces of malicious code using a three-phase (three-tier) 
methodology against the sophisticated data stored on multifunctional machines? 
d) Is it possible to deploy a solution in the form of a framework suitable for all dynamic 
environments in the field of malware detection and analysis? 
e) Is it possible to justify both static and dynamic methods in anti-malware technology? 
1.7 Structure of the Thesis 
In this chapter, the context, problem statement and aims and objectives of this research 
have been clearly presented.  
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Chapter 2 covers the literature review, whereby it discusses and justifies the scholastic work 
undertaken by various authors in the field of malware, including methods of detection and 
analysis. This chapter contains the current deficiencies, bottlenecks and challenges in 
running the current frameworks and tools. Chapter 2 also illustrates the needs and 
challenges faced by investigators in the field of malware detection. 
Chapter 3 defines the research methodology for conducting the study and analysis. It 
identifies the precise problem statement for the study undertaken, presents the associated 
gaps in the research, and elaborates on the research objective by using a distinctive 
research methodology. Various methods and processes were selected based on the current 
requirements, objectives and problem statement discussed. 
Chapter 4 defines the market research and analysis. Two different approaches were 
selected in the chapter – a questionnaire and interviews. The questionnaire was designed 
with a view to developing a new framework for malware detection and analysis, which 
involves a novel approach to digital forensics and research. The interviews were conducted 
with a view to gathering results for developing an artefact, or Toolkit, necessary for 
implementation and testing. 
Chapter 5 defines the new framework for malware detection as well as a comprehensive 
explanation. This chapter describes a new approach (model) called the triple-tier centralised 
online real-time environment (tri-CORE) malware analysis (TCMA) method, which was 
developed as part of the current research and, as such, is a contribution to the field 
Chapter 6 defines the artefact development (Toolkit). Within this chapter, it is the author’s 
intention to develop an artefact that reflects the critical functionalities of the proposed 
framework, as outlined in Chapter 5 – a malware analysis Toolkit, which is simple in 
structure yet sufficiently robust using integrated open source malware detection software 
tools. 
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Chapter 7 discusses the results and observations on the testing of the Toolkit. This chapter 
illustrates the testing attributes used to deploy a successful functional Toolkit. Moreover, it 
presents the theoretical and practical implications faced during the implementation and 
testing phases. 
Chapter 8 evaluates and concludes the research. It provides a summary of the findings and 
quantifications for completing the defined aim and objectives of the research.  
 
  
 8 
CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Overview 
This chapter clarifies and presents the most recent scholastic work done by various 
researchers in the field of IT security and malware’s detection, analysis and associated 
software. The articles presented in this chapter were selected from reputable journals and 
conferences. The intention of the author was to first collect information on malware 
investigative procedures, methodologies on detection, current malware tools and related 
implications; then, study it thoroughly; and finally, analyse it. Next, the results of this process 
were to be utilised to develop a robust and reliable framework, providing a novel approach to 
the field of computer forensics and security. Gaining insights into the malware industry 
provides a better understanding of the current environmental scenario in areas of concern 
and associated potential risks. Special consideration has been given to the malware 
detection architecture in order to gain a clear picture of related pros and cons of both the 
static and dynamic methods. During the study, some practical implications were also 
highlighted, such as the difficulty with implementing some current methods/tools in malware 
detection techniques.  
2.2 Introduction 
With the increase of internet and technology usage, users are finding that they need to 
secure their valuable data and information in a protected way. The increased use of sharing 
confidential content through the internet potentially opens a door for hackers to steal 
protected data. Once a digital crime is committed, it is often then up to digital forensics 
experts to intervene. Part of a digital forensics team’s responsibility is to monitor digital 
crimes occurring online. Forensics teams tend to follow a step-by-step methodology to 
detect online crimes, such as data theft and then provide evidence accordingly (Kent et al., 
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2006). Experts can use contemporary information technology (IT) systems to investigate 
cybercrime. Conversely, attackers use malware, which can be spread widely to target 
computing devices holding valuable data. If the data is encrypted, attackers try to decrypt 
the data. Usually, malware embeds unethical code with the purpose of retrieving useful 
content from computing devices. However, it is often difficult to identify malware containing 
suspicious code designed to infect master machines (Casey, 2011). This is because such 
code is built using standard protocols and encrypted using complex techniques, making it 
hard to detect.  
Although criminals can exploit the computational power of IT systems, forensics experts can 
do so as well, a discipline known as digital forensics. Forensics experts use this 
computational power to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of forensics, which helps in 
preventing and detecting malware activities and related infections from associated systems. 
For a profound analysis, it is necessary to understand the importance of digital forensics 
(John, 2012). 
Digital forensics can be defined as a way to analyse digital media using reliable information 
that can be applied to the investigation of an incident. Computer forensics analysis, also 
termed digital discovery, refers to the process of examining digital-related evidence. An 
analysis is performed on the evidence that was taken at the time of the crime. A computer 
forensics department performs the collection, analysis and investigation of computer-related 
evidence (Tsai et al., 2012). 
To make digital forensics more effective and efficient, it is crucial to understand the crime 
scenario, including both the event and the agents involved in the situation. Many crimes 
involve controlled mechanisms created using malware tools working against a common 
adversary, thereby generating intentional or unintentional extended attacks and threats. 
During the investigation, it is vital for investigators to understand the behaviour of the 
malware being used for these purposes (TzeTzuen et al., 2012). 
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2.3 The Global Impact of Malware on the Digital World 
The expansion of the global digital world has seen a tremendous increase in the number of 
threats and exploited vulnerabilities. The number of malware attacks is increasing every day 
(Casey, 2011; Kent et al., 2006), which makes detection and analysis difficult. As shown in 
Figure 1 (AV-Test, 2015), in a comparison between new malware and total malware in a 
particular year, the global growth of total malware has increased over the past decade. This 
figure highlights the clear trend where a year-on-year doubling, or greater, in the growth of 
malware can be seen. This means that each year, new malware was added, and shows that 
malware reached approximately 400 million in 2015. 
 
Figure 1 The Growth of Malware from 2005 to 2015 Globally (AV-Test, 2015) 
 
When examining the motivation in relation to this growth in malware attacks around the 
world, attacks occur for a variety of reasons, but those related to financial gain are most 
prevalent (Sheriff, 2017). The increase in malware attacks correlates with the on-going 
global growth in internet usage (Figure 2), which, in turn, has grown from the increased use 
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of personal computing and the reliance the global business economy now has on the use of 
computers. Add to this more recent developments gaining popularity, such as using 
smartphones to pay for online merchandise or services and cloud services for personalised 
storage. As these practices have led to increased access to financial information used in 
everyday life, so has the opportunity for criminal activity to take advantage of this (Kaspersky 
Lab, 2014).   
 
Figure 2 The Growth of Internet Usage from 1993 to 2016 Globally (internetlivestats.com) 
 
As the business model of using malware is not a legal one, it makes tracing monetary values 
difficult to assess in terms of financial impact, despite data showing this trend of increasing 
growth. Reliable figures from malware sources are not readily forthcoming with their 
generated incomes, and companies affected by malware are not readily forthcoming with, or 
even able to, provide information on their losses (Intel Security, 2014). However, estimated 
figures of the cost to worldwide business in excess of $1 billion have been attributed to 
cybercrime as a whole with malware being a significant contributor (McAfee, 2013).  
An examination of some of the more high-profile malware attacks that have occurred 
indicates that malware is more widely spread than just for financial gain. Aside from 
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sabotage or purely malicious intent, political reasoning (GhostNet and Red October malware 
attacks) is a common theme, as is environmental reasoning (Shamoon and Slammer 
malware attacks), which were the alleged motivations for targeted distributions of malware 
(Poulsen, 2013; Wangen, 2015).   
With the reliance on computer systems throughout modern civilisation, the vulnerability to 
threat exists. The aforementioned attacks, and ones like them, have the ability to identify 
and target such computer systems with malware and the damage done can be considerable.   
Harmful repercussions of a malware attack are not only limited to downtime losses or the 
loss of sensitive information within the system being attacked. An erosion of society’s trust in 
the internet economy can be considerable, although somewhat immeasurable (Whittaker 
2016), suggesting that a broad social impact can be just as damaging from any attack.    
2.4 Malware Threat and Exposure Analysis 
Malicious software impacts various sectors of society and is typically utilised by vindictive 
parties for personal reasons. Malware empowers individuals who seek to jeopardise digital 
forensics in financial services and engage in criminal activities. Malware inventors may often 
benefit financially from their programs, but on occasion, they may just want to disrupt 
business operations. One case study of malware used for disruption was the use of a Logic 
Bomb attack, reportedly used by a disgruntled computer administrator, resulting in damages 
in excess of $3 million to his company, UBS Systems. He was ultimately convicted on 
evidence from security analysts for implementing unethical security strategies and 
deliberately laid down the financial budget of the company upon the activation of the 
malware (SANS 2007). 
There is an on-going and rapid increase in Advanced Persistent Threat (APT), which is 
defined as a class of malicious activities affecting a growing number of government 
organisations and business associations (Symantec, 2016). As described in the report of the 
Financial Services in Information Sharing and Analysis Centre (FS-ISAC), APT refers to a 
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secretive intent to engage in constant, relentless oversight of an individual, organisation or 
remote country, state, government or military in an attempt to perform malicious activities 
(DTCC, 2014). The report shows that an increasing number of APT attacks have taken place 
since 1986. The major threats involving APT agents are attempts to access and extract data 
that comprise delicate and/or gathered information (DTCC, 2014). Data comprising a variety 
of information types may be extracted, including innovative operations, licensed innovation, 
exclusive business forms, business techniques and/or information relating to individual 
officials. APT allows criminals to gain illicit remote access to host systems, including system 
maps and software alterations. Accessing the systems helps criminals to understand the 
business strategies of an organisation, thereby laying the foundation for possible illegal 
activities. APT consists of progressively malicious system tools that have been specifically 
developed to cause problems for organisations and individuals. For instance, Stuxnet and 
other malware were used to assault Iran’s atomic plants, which may have given political as 
well as financial advantages to the intruders (Websense, 2014). 
Various reports relating to on-going attacks on governments and business organisations 
across the globe have been published (Christie, 2006; DTCC, 2014; Websense, 2014). APT 
activities are carried out to aggravate IT systems, illegally access remote systems, and 
gather sensitive information. The use of spear phishing, an email spoofing fraud, is 
considered an essential methodological approach targeting governments and business 
ventures. The payloads of spear phishing have a direct impact on large business ventures, 
ultimately resulting in attacks on the business’ operations. Often, malware utilises the most 
likely code to take advantage of an organisation’s vulnerabilities; however, APT activities 
capitalise on new custom codes, which go unnoticed to large businesses and interfere with 
or antagonise systems. Engineers associated with APT are aware of loopholes in an 
enterprise’s information security and utilise illicit codes to disable security measures of 
intrusion detection systems (IDSs), antivirus software and other security standards, thereby 
hampering the security of business enterprises (DTCC, 2014; Websense, 2014) 
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Some malware is particularly designed and implemented to disturb the operations of 
industrial control systems (ICSs). The Siemens ICS provided solid proof of the worst effects 
of the Stuxnet worm in 2010, which resulted in crushing sequences affecting the physical 
assets of major industrial solutions, such as gas pipelines, water conveyance and server 
farm environments; furthermore, it resulted in the distortion of industry frameworks. The 
major motivation of this malware was to interrupt the Siemens ICS’s involvement in atomic 
projects in Iran. The features of the worm generated serious concern for operations and 
budgetary administrations (Falliere et al., 2011; Matrosov et al., 2011). With Stuxnet, the 
source code could be adjusted to focus on a more extensive scope of control frameworks in 
any number of discriminating industrial sectors. As previously mentioned, the budgetary 
administration segment has been targeted by ICS malware agencies with the particular 
intention to exploit its vulnerabilities (Falliere et al., 2011) 
Data theft may also be performed to reveal information concerning innovative technology 
and strategic business operations. The main aim behind implementing such unlawful 
activities is to understand the business strategies and sell the company’s research to its 
competitors, thus providing a financial incentive/payback. It is apparent from the examination 
of past and current cybercrimes that the financial industry has been targeted by malware 
(Baker & Goudie, 2010).  A high profile case of this concerned SolarWorld AG, a 
manufacturer of solar products and the largest solar manufacturer in the United States (US), 
who was an alleged victim of Chinese state-sponsored cyber theft when financial, 
production, research and trade-litigation documents were stolen and handed over to 
Chinese state-owned businesses (Wilson, 2017).  The case resulted in the US Department 
of Justice filing 31 criminal counts against five Chinese military personnel (Mickolus, 2015). 
The US Secret Service (USSS) is an essential organisation in the examination of assets for 
the US Department of Treasury as well as its secret resources. The USSS research 
authorities have concluded that the financial sector has been severely affected by malware. 
It collaborated with Verizon and shared cybercrime case reports with them to facilitate the 
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cooperation of the two organisations. The idea behind this synergy was to efficiently manage 
cybercrime threats (Baker & Goudie, 2011). The confidential case report detailed affirmed 
security loopholes in firms that were either Verizon customers or part of the investigative 
ward of the USSS. Budgetary administration firms were the essential focus in 2009 and in 
2010; thereafter, from 2013 to 2016, the emphasis shifted to the entertainment and public 
industries. Breaches related to the entertainment and public industries automatically affected 
the financial sector, as they disrupted the interactions associated with customers and 
reputation, resulting in financial losses. Regulatory controls were also suggested that 
involved new structures for transaction reports and risk management in financial sectors 
(Baker & Goudie, 2010, 2011). 
2.5 The Malware Industry 
Threats related to malware are typically controlled by criminal groups with organised plans of 
action to automate cybercrime. Software companies have developed strategic plans to 
exchange, introduce and remain informed about malicious codes to obtain benefits; 
however, the malware business has generated transmission and support systems to help 
criminals utilise malware successfully (Casey, 2011; John, 2012). Developers of crimeware 
profit from the sale or lease of malware to third-party vendors who then use it to carry out 
identity theft operations and account fraud. Figure 3 (Matrosov et al., 2011) illustrates the 
connection between segments in a common crimeware plan of action. Groups of criminals 
facilitate these tasks and the product is crimeware as a service (CAAS) (Perdisci et al., 
2008). 
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Figure 3 The Malware Industry Process (Matrosov et al., 2011) 
 
The malware industry process itself illustrates the existing sources of threat that need to be 
scrutinised by digital forensics investigators for effective research. The procedure portrayed 
in Figure 3 begins when programming vulnerabilities are sought by offenders in a systematic 
manner. It starts with ‘zero-day’ vulnerabilities, which allow a vulnerable market to be 
identified, indicating greater potential profits for malware inventors (Coviello, 2011). These 
vulnerabilities are sold to criminals in the second step. Criminals engineer malware in an 
endeavour to render systems defenceless and create a range of different malware 
programs, which capitalise on different weaknesses in packs with parts that can be 
methodically introduced.   
An example of this process was seen in the case of iFrame (Jakobsson, 2008), a web 
service technology that assists in creating a specific brand of malware. It allows a user to 
place a URL on ‘Server A’ that shows the content of ‘Server B’. Although this is normally 
done by legitimate users who want to show web content from multiple web servers on their 
server, criminals can take undue advantage of this feature by exploiting the web-based 
vulnerability in the iFrame, and placing their server content and links on the legitimate 
 17 
server. As of 2016, iFrame was still vulnerable and an active exploit (iFrame HTML Security, 
2016). 
Several vulnerabilities are still possible in an unorganised framework long after they have 
been identified and exposed by cyber experts and investigative consortiums. Exploratory 
units may incorporate blends of zero-day and more seasoned assaults. The packs are 
arranged to send gathered information to private facilitators and administrations, and this 
design may be tweaked for a given purchaser (IBM, 2013). Malware creators contact 
potential clients by means of communication media, such as email. They connect with 
malware inventors to generate malware for clients who pay the business sector producers 
through covert ecommerce instalment frameworks. Crimeware operation is illicit, yet the 
danger of criminal indictment for individuals is minimised by the general industry process. In 
placing malware, each attacker’s benefit involves introducing malware components to obtain 
monetary remuneration by exposing a general commercial domain to it (IBM, 2013). Several 
academics have investigated vulnerabilities to malware in different organisations (Provos et 
al., 2007). Moreover, scholars have composed papers on building and identifying 
endeavours that expose a company’s vulnerabilities, which are not viewed as criminal 
activity (ethical hacking) (Jamil & Khan, 2011)  
The relative danger of indictment for this sector is evaluated in Figure 4. It depicts the 
relationship between profitability and prosecution risks for those participating in crimeware 
activities. As each task is relatively isolated and only part of the complete product, the 
exposure each entity has to potential legal action is, therefore, relatively small. It is not until 
the latter stages of the malware process are reached that the risk of prosecution is high, but 
as these stages are reached, the potential to make substantial profit is also encountered, 
thereby making the business model an attractive proposition.   
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Figure 4 Relative Risk Compared with Profit Resulting from Participation in Crimeware 
Activity (Jakobsson & Ramzan, 2008) 
 
2.6 Categorising Malware 
Many different types of malware have been specifically developed, although some have 
even been developed unintentionally (Rieck & Duussel, 2008). Some types of malware 
present in the cyberworld will be briefly discussed with consideration of their impact and the 
destruction they cause to a system. Such malware requires special consideration and 
research, as these are the most common prevailing sources of threat to any system. 
Understanding their existence can provide an edge in designing an effective malware 
detection and analysis framework.  
Every threat has unique attributes that distinguish it from others, making investigations more 
empirical. Presently, malware is becoming more complex and highly technical, incorporating 
various new behaviours and characteristics (Rekhis & Boudringa, 2011).  
a) Viruses, Worms and Trojans: In the field of software education, a virus is defined 
as a self-replicating piece of source code attached to other programs that usually 
requires user intervention to instigate it (Adleman, 1990). Worms are self-replicating 
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source codes that can not only infect a stand-alone computer but can also spread 
through entire networks (Chen & Ji 2007) without user intervention. Worms work by 
detecting and attacking existing vulnerabilities in the system, making them difficult to 
prevent and detect (Chen et al 2003). A Trojan, also called a Trojan horse, is a 
program created to be useful and harmless with an unwanted malicious program 
hiding inside. This is one of the most common types of malware found by 
investigators and is considered responsible for many forms of cybercrimes (Krishan 
et al., 2012). 
b) Backdoor: A backdoor code is a type of malicious program that allows attackers to 
bypass all security measures and controls in the system, making it vulnerable and 
allowing the attacker to gain access without any authentication or valid authorisation. 
The backdoor program is installed by attackers for future unauthorised accessibility 
and malicious activities, making the system completely unsecure for users (Dilkina et 
al., 2009). 
c) Spyware and Adware: Spyware and adware are malicious, unwanted programs that 
perform stealthy and undesired installations and modifications to a system with 
malicious intent (Schultz, 2003). For example, this type of program can show an 
advertisement or hijack sessions on an internet browser, limiting the sites by showing 
unwanted websites on the pages (Lavesson et al., 2011; Qing & Dinev, 2005). 
d) Botnets: Amongst the different categories of malware threats, botnets are one of the 
most widely used for computer crimes. Botnets are groups of malware infected 
computers that can work together to infect other computer systems. Different types of 
attacks use botnet malware. Examples include the malware attacks on Estonian 
banks in 2007 and the attack on Georgian government sites by Russia during the 
Russian invasion in 2008 (Kozlowski, 2014; Stephen & Lee, 2008). A botnet is 
distinct from other types of malware because it is not an explicit malware program 
(Cooke et al., 2005). 
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2.7 Digital Forensics 
Digital forensics and computer forensics both use specific procedures to carry out their 
investigations. Investigating malware through digital forensics requires following a set of 
basic principles and fundamentals. Digital forensics comprises investigations related to all 
digital media, including digital cameras, mobile phones and digital players. In contrast, 
computer forensics involves the analysis of digital devices linked to computers and is a 
subset of digital forensics as a whole. Although this thesis focuses on the threat of malware 
to computer technology and, therefore, concentrates on computer forensics, the term digital 
forensics is frequently used throughout in reference to the branch of forensic science that is 
examined. In addition, the literature regarding the digital forensics process has been 
discussed many times in workshops conducted by forensics research groups (Agarwal et al., 
2011). The fundamental principles remain the same with respect to how criminal 
investigations are executed. In 2001, the digital forensics process was presented in digital 
forensics research workshops, in which experts focused on discussing the methodology of 
implementing the steps involved from identifying an incident to the process of drafting the 
final reports regarding the incident (Rieck et al., 2008). Digital forensics involves several 
internal technical activities at each stage in the investigation. Implementing these basic 
fundamentals is mandatory in investigative agencies and institutions that need to be 
compliant and adhere to the abovementioned specifications. The stages involved in the 
forensic process are shown in Figure 5 (Alink et al., 2006). 
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Figure 5 Stages Involved in the Forensics Process (Alink et al., 2006). 
 
A brief discussion of each stage of this forensic process is provided as follows: 
a) Identification 
Incidents are detected in the identification stage. The incidents are acknowledged based 
on complaints through system monitoring or via any indications implying the need for 
investigation. This stage includes creating strategies related to how the investigation 
should be handled in the subsequent stages (Alink et al., 2006). 
b) Preservation 
Preservation is the first stage of digital investigations in which investigations are 
performed on digital objects before they have been handled for analysis. Case 
management tasks are involved in the preservation category. During this stage, imaging 
of the original data is executed via examining technologies (Alink et al., 2006). 
c) Collection 
Creating a replica of the original digital content is the primary aim in this stage. 
Authenticated hardware and software components are used to perform this task. 
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Collection procedures are executed while keeping in mind the investigations performed in 
the previous stages. Preservation steps are followed so that the integrity of data is 
maintained (Alink et al., 2006). 
d) Examination 
Examination tasks are applied to data collected in the previous stages. Numerous steps 
are carried out in the examination phase beginning with filtering the data. Filtering 
comprises specialised techniques based on database management. Several files in a 
computer belong to different specifications, including some for the operating system and 
some related to the software and the machine’s applications. Digital forensics tools are 
synchronised with databases to extract the most relevant data from the machines. 
Investigated machines may be adjusted at different time intervals so that further 
procedures can be applied. Data from the machines may have been deleted to remove 
the evidence from the sources; and if this is the case, recovery procedures are executed. 
Data recovery performed on deleted data helps investigators to extract valuable content 
from the computer (Richard & Roussev, 2006). Methods used in the examination phase 
may result in changing the state of the data, resulting in a loss of the integrity of evidence 
to be presented in court; thus, step-by-step documentation is mandatory at every phase 
of the investigation to maintain the integrity of data. Encryption and decryption of the data 
are performed in the examination stage. Moreover, examinations are carried out on a 
copy of the original data, leaving the suspicious content untouched (Alink et al., 2006; 
Richard & Roussev, 2006). 
e) Analysis 
In the analysis stage, statistical procedures are employed and data extracted from these 
procedures are used in investigations. Analysis is required to gain in-depth knowledge 
about data objects and protocols, which are also linked. Techniques such as time-lining 
and synchronisation of data objects are commonly used for the analysis. To make 
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suspected data objects logical and comprehensible, data mining techniques are used to 
detect complicated patterns and relationships amongst different data objects. During this 
stage, data mining concepts are related to the digital forensics of the data and analysis 
reports are drafted for further investigations (Alink et al., 2006) 
 
f) Presentation 
In the presentation stage, experts write testimonials based on investigations performed in 
the previously described stages. Documentation is recorded and presented to legal 
authorities (Alink et al., 2006). 
g) Decision-making 
Decision-making is the final stage of malware investigation where presented reports and 
documentation are analysed by legal authorities. The decision-maker can be a judge or a 
jury, if the case is presented in a court of law. Corporate cases are related to corporate 
crimes and evidence is presented to corporate law authorities in the case of an internal 
breakdown of policies (Alink et al., 2006) 
The flow of the process is important for the success of any investigation as it deals with a 
wider point of view concerning the crime scenario. It also assists with gathering evidence 
related to a complete event, examining the actual process of collecting evidence in a 
methodical and systematic manner. Digital forensics investigation is an integrated process 
that requires the collaboration of all stages to ensure effective and efficient outcomes. 
2.8 Efficiency and Effectiveness in Malware Analysis 
Efficiency and effectiveness are the major attributes of malware analysis and need to be 
maintained in each phase of an investigation. Effectiveness helps in identifying important 
aspects of the evidence, thereby resulting in meaningful investigations. Efficiency in digital 
forensics is related to resources that are used to gather the evidence. These attributes are 
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different in terms of their functionality and play independent roles in digital forensic 
investigations.  
With malware developers employing different techniques to deter and hide from analytical 
tools in a bid to remain unseen (McAfee, 2017), along with the increase in malware being 
released (Symantec, 2016), the need to employ the appropriate methodology is paramount. 
Malware investigations can be performed using manual techniques as opposed to 
automated techniques, although these are often regarded as time-consuming in comparison 
(Ayers, 2009). Usually, the performance of an investigation deteriorates if manual 
techniques are carried out on large volumes of data due to the inherent inefficiency of this 
method (Manar, 2016). There is also the use of distributed and service-oriented 
architectures where evidence can only be tracked by correlating the utilised common 
communication. Appropriate tools are required to execute each of the digital investigation 
phases to obtain usable forensic information for further investigations (Vuong et al., 2011). 
Ayers (2009), who carried out research on Encase and the Forensic Toolkit, found that 
manual forensic tools (termed first-generation tools in his work) require a large amount of 
human monitoring, which impacts investigation speeds, costs and error-making. The major 
issue with implementing first-generation tools is that execution and processing speeds are 
very slow. Today’s investigative scenario uses multiple detection methods, which take more 
time and require high-processing systems. Therefore, new methodologies and approaches 
are required for a state-of-the-art infrastructure as manual tools have (or will very soon) 
become obsolete. Thus, special consideration is given by the author in providing an 
approach that carries multiple detection methods on a single platform, keeping the pace and 
flexibility on par with conventional requirements.  
Although large amounts of new malware are developed and released each year (Symantec, 
2016), most of it is a variation on only a very few programs. Techniques such as 
polymorphic reproduction or random crypt seeds are used to produce slight changes to the 
binary code (Iliopoulos et al., 2011), but the underlying malware code remains largely 
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untouched. Analytical tools used to individually investigate each altered malware, albeit with 
slightly mutated binary code, results in inefficiency in its identification and capture. 
Developing solutions that do not individually analyse the same file, even though subtle 
differences may be present, and which determine a behavioural profile instead, result in a far 
more efficient methodology. This has been evidenced with early development already 
delivering considerable time savings (Bayer et al., 2010). 
To improve the efficiency and effectiveness, data representation algorithms can be applied 
to present data so that they can be easily understood by investigators. For querying and 
indexing digital evidence, XML-based prototypes can be used. It is possible to embed data 
into XML using special tools, resulting in significant improvements in the querying process. 
Under this method, a querying language called XQuery is used to improve query handling 
(W3C-online). This provides special resources for investigators so that they can search the 
required data. The main goal of implementing such protocols in the research is to make 
investigators’ work easy when dealing with large data volumes; additionally, the system also 
significantly improves the ability to detect relevant information from the evidence.  
Maintaining data integrity and efficiency in digital investigations is crucial and needs to be 
maintained during each phase. Richard and Roussev (2006) focused on modern methods 
for improving digital forensics and reported that to achieve effective malware detection, data 
must be presented in a specific format and high-level data abstractions must be followed to 
generate significant evidence files. Avoiding customary files is suitable when analysing 
evidence targeting several files together. Modern improvements include writing hash 
signatures and using large-scale hash databases to encrypt data files with a better 
configuration system to perform encryption with less vulnerability.  
To handle large volumes of malware, automated techniques have been developed, which 
rely on artificial intelligence to produce techniques that reason and learn (Han et al., 2009). 
However, as malware detection has become more advanced, the same is true for malware 
itself where techniques to evade automated systems have also been developed. This 
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development of evasive techniques has produced malware that requires run-time studying 
(dynamic analysis), so malware strain behaviour can be efficiently identified and mitigated. 
This behaviour analysis is a more detailed analysis that is not necessarily detected and 
resolved by a single tool (Rieck, 2011).   
Therefore, the automation for the detection and prevention of malware requires a new 
framework; the author of this research proposes a novel framework that utilises an 
automated parallel methodology. Here, parallel methodology signifies a framework with 
multiple methods and tools in any investigative arena. Such a Toolkit is discussed later as 
an artefact for this research.  
2.9 The Malware Detection Architecture 
The architecture associated with malware detection illustrates approaches used for detecting 
bugs (malicious programs) in the system. Previous works describe two approaches for 
malware detection and analysis categorised into static analysis and dynamic analysis 
techniques. In publications such as Gross (2009) and Mukamurenzi (2008), the authors 
mention a hybrid approach, combining both static and dynamic techniques for malware 
investigation. Individual methods possess various advantages; however, combining both 
methods can lead to more effective and efficient malware detection and analysis.   
a) Static Analysis Method 
Static analysis examines the static disassembling code of a program without running any 
executable applications. Basic static analysis will consist of checking the functionality of a 
program such as its signature or behaviour. It is a simple and quick approach, although it 
provides limited information for malware analysis (Justin & Klein, 2011) 
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b) Dynamic Analysis Method 
Dynamic analysis carries out an investigation by running the whole program, mostly in a 
virtual environment – for instance, performing experiments for checking API calls, instruction 
traces, looking for registry modifications, variability in system memory and so on (Alazab et 
al., 2010). In Rieck et al. (2011), the authors used the method of system calls to capture 
traces of malware based on its behaviour. Bayer et al. (2010) also propose a dynamic 
analysis technique, whereby the program traces executable logs, which are then analysed to 
check transition probabilities. 
c) Hybrid Analysis Method 
The hybrid method is an amalgamation of the static and dynamic methods. This method is 
discussed in Mukamurenzi (2008) and Bayer et al. (2010). The authors designed a 
framework called Malware-DNA, which uses the technique of a debugging-based behaviour 
pattern to monitor and perform assessments on the findings to confirm the presence of 
malware. Using both techniques gives the analyst an advantage by providing benefits from 
the fidelity of the dynamic analysis and the efficiency of using a static analysis. Additionally, 
a survey report by Shijo and Salim (2015) shows the results of an experiment where the 
accuracy rate was 95.8% using the static method, 97.1% using the dynamic method and 
98.7% using the hybrid method. This shows a drastic improvement in the accuracy and 
completeness rate, as compared to individual static and dynamic methods. Combining both 
these methods can provide a stable yet effective result in malware detection, thus making it 
a reasonable underlying function in proposing a new framework for malware detection and 
analysis. The only drawback of this method is its slowness during malware investigation and 
analysis; however, this should not be a limitation for those users for whom efficiency 
outweighs the long timeframes involved during investigation.  
2.9.1 Examples of Malware Detection Architecture  
There are two different types of detection architecture, the first of which is a centralised 
command and control (C&C) architecture, and the second, a decentralised C&C 
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architecture. Determining which one to use is based on the way communication is 
implemented (Maheshwari, 2010).   
A centralised C&C architecture approach will see a central server as a connection point that 
controls and monitors all activity. This approach is divided into two sub-groups: internet relay 
chat (IRC) where online communication (chat) occurs in real time; and HTTP-based where 
an IP address is used as a central server to communicate and send instructions. A 
decentralised C&C architecture approach is based on a peer-to-peer network (P2P) model, 
a control system that sees infected computers simultaneously act as malware and C&C 
servers. Commands are received and transmitted to each malware item and do not rely on a 
single communication point to deliver instructions (Gupta et al., 2016).   
2.10 Malware Detection Techniques 
Various malware detection techniques can be used to discover vulnerabilities by examining 
patterns in malware. Different means and mediums are engaged in the detection of malware 
and each has a specific responsibility, depending on the type of evidence being sought. 
Digital forensics and malware detection teams have different roles and responsibilities, such 
as collecting evidence, performing analysis, creating reports as evidence, maintaining 
custody of documents, etc. In the following paragraphs, different types of common detection 
methods are presented and briefly outlined.  
a) File System Analysis 
File systems (or filesystems) provide a mechanism for users to store their data in files and 
directories. According to Carrier (2005), ‘File system analysis examines data in a volume 
(i.e., a partition or disk) and interprets them as a file system’. 
A file system is where data is arranged within a computer system in a logical and ordered 
manner so that it can be found. Analysis of this file system is a commonly used process 
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within digital forensics as it finds information about system accessibility (Farmer & Venema, 
2004). The process itself extracts layers of data from the computer for examination where 
the layers can be combined to discover any malicious files that are alien to that computer 
system. To escape detection, malware developers use special techniques to avoid affecting 
files, such as introducing encrypted code and links to malware files. File system analysis 
excels by being able to analyse data that is hidden behind data files, which would otherwise 
go unnoticed, and access deleted files which may be used to trace files stored in different 
system locations (Rahmatian et al., 2012). Due to its importance, this method is key in the 
proposed solution.  
b) Analysing Keywords and Identifiers 
A simple technique to extract information regarding malware is to use a keyword search tool. 
For the proposed solution, it can help in identifying files associated with the malware. 
Keyword searching is an easy way to evaluate bot master communication threats. Ample 
critical information, including domain names, internet protocol (IP) addresses and strings, 
can be used for analysis by investigators using this method (Edem et al., 2014). Another 
technique that can be integrated is to use a ‘string search’. This search is helpful in 
determining the malware’s attributes related to string values. An example of a string search 
is the string ‘key-log’, which can be used to fetch data related to strings. Sometimes, this 
may return incorrect results because other tools, such as antivirus software, may contain the 
same string values in their databases, thus creating contradictions. Searching through 
strings can be accomplished in many phases of the investigation and is generally carried out 
when expert knowledge is required for the investigation (Edem et al., 2014).  
Investigators can conduct an analysis on a forensic image using keyword searching. To 
obtain optimum results through searching, it is very important to understand the level of 
searching. Searching is performed in a systematic way and passes through a level of 
abstraction, thereby revealing information on which the search is performed. Identifiers and 
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strings are considered to be the best sources for detecting malware on host machines. A 
variety of sources can be searched to detect malware threats, such as intrusion detection 
system (IDS) logs, firewall logs and the information extracted from previous forensic 
analyses.  
c) Detection Using Intrusion Detection Systems 
To detect anomalous activities, a special detection system is used that identifies inconsistent 
activities and is known as an IDS (Siddiqui et al., 2008). Improvements can be made in 
detecting intrusions by implementing data mining techniques that can automatically 
interrogate large data sets, thereby reducing time and increasing efficiency (Nadiammai & 
Hemalatha, 2014). IDSs are used to detect malicious codes on suspected machines. There 
are two types of IDS domain: 
 The host-based IDS (HIDS); and 
 The network-based IDS (NIDS). 
Signature techniques are used to identify different malware and are the essence of IDSs. 
These are anomaly detection systems and are responsible for detecting anomalous 
activities. Moreover, investigators use advanced techniques by employing data mining 
methods. HIDS systems are used globally as a malware detection technique and are 
integrated with intrusion detection tools. Host-based detection systems are rich in their 
functionality as they can analyse program code signatures and clarify the behaviours of 
malicious activities. The responsibility to detect malware intrusions lies within both network- 
and host-based detection systems.  
For the proposed solution, the system can be preloaded with IDS capabilities for detecting 
botnet intrusions. IDSs can be used to detect malware intrusions, which can be analysed 
using digital signatures in the proposed solution. These techniques will be used to obtain 
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information regarding the botnet architecture and a host of information regarding botnets, 
which can be used for detailed botnet analysis (Burji et al., 2010). 
d) Data Mining Techniques for Malware Detection  
Data mining has been a primary focus for many researchers in the field of malware detection 
and analysis. It is considered an analytical tool for analysing infected data and summarising 
the findings in a meaningful way. Reports generated from data mining are useful in the 
process of analysing and detecting malware, and can later be presented as evidence. 
Currently, data mining is used in digital forensics to provide solutions and implement 
concepts to evaluate the relationships between internal factors related to unauthorised 
access to files, executable links, anomalous behaviours within the system, and external 
factors related to exploitation by compromising the confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
stored data (Amos et al., 2013). The motive of integrating data mining functionality in the 
proposal is to gain insight into a large amount of data to find traces of the injected malware 
(Amos et al., 2013). Data mining concepts will be used to uncover unsuspected relationships 
between the data, and to summarise the content into useful and easily understood 
information. Investigators may gather variable data patterns belonging to different files and 
systems, which can be combined to generate useful information that can later be formed into 
a statistical report to reach a final conclusion (Thuraisingham, 2011). 
The techniques of data mining will be useful in understanding large datasets by analysing 
attributes and extracting important facts related to a specific malware program. Mining 
techniques play an integral role in the detection of malware during forensic analysis 
(Bhavani, 2009). To improve the structure of datasets, data mining is integrated with data 
warehousing and data with specifications on malware is stored in the same database. 
Integrating data mining and data warehousing could be helpful in extracting important 
information on injected malware and the results can be retained for later use in 
investigations. The efficiency of the data mining operation results relies on how the data is 
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evaluated and represented in investigation studies (Duhan et al., 2009). Data mining 
techniques can be categorised according to different specifications, depending on the 
objectives with which the extractions are performed. Various modelling techniques 
(mentioned in Szor, 2005) can be used in data mining, according to the sources used. Two 
common techniques will be used in the proposed solution: 
i. Descriptive Modelling: Descriptive modelling can be used to increase 
knowledge regarding existing patterns of malware present in the system. This 
modelling technique involves discriminating and summarising existing explored 
data from the infected system. Common examples of descriptive modelling 
include segmentation and cluster analysis techniques, which are considered the 
best techniques for malware detection and analysis under descriptive modelling 
(Szor, 2005). 
ii. Predictive Modelling: Predictive modelling is performed on the outcomes of 
known results and is used in making predictions regarding existing malware and 
other malicious programs in the system. During investigations on malware, 
predictive modelling attributes are combined with descriptive modelling. 
Descriptive techniques are used before making any future predictions regarding 
the information. Examples of predictive modelling include rule-based analysis 
and regression techniques, for which the detection rate is extremely high (Szor, 
2005). 
For the proposed solution, the researcher can use the dataset as the input for initialising the 
technique. At the beginning of the process, data are collected from the infected sources and 
represented as objects. Objects are analysed by software that measures their attributes and 
features. To achieve efficient results through the data mining process, it is necessary to 
select representative data for the input process and then perform pre-processing 
accordingly. To obtain the right form of data, transformations are carried out on the datasets, 
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which convert data repositories into important information. In the case of the artefact Toolkit, 
we have integrated basic fundamentals of data mining while searching the artefact, as we 
are collecting data repositories of malware types and categories during investigation, which 
can be searched for better utilisation and converted into datasets through the data mining 
process. 
e) Attack Vectors Detection 
An attack vector can be defined as a technique that involves gaining access to infected 
machines. For this research, it is vital to start the process by accessing an alleged machine 
and performing analysis and associations on typical vectors that are linked with peripherals 
connected to the machine, such as CDs, DVDs and other removable media. Due to 
advances in technology and widespread internet connectivity across the globe, attack 
vectors have become established in the communications domain. The most common 
activities associated with internet attack vectors are search engine manipulation, Trojans, 
social engineering and P2P file-sharing activities (Carrier, 2005). By using the associated 
tool in the proposed artefact, attack vectors can be detectable and analysis can be done at 
any level of investigation.  
f) Identifying the Characteristics of Malware 
To carry out the malware detection process, it is essential to collect information on as many 
attributes related to the evidence as possible so that relevant details are easily found. 
Evidence is analysed and important malware infection patterns are used to detect malware 
intrusion. This method will help uncover malware evidence through an iterative process; it 
includes systematic, step-by-step detection techniques that can be integrated into the 
proposed framework. In each phase, evidence is gathered and analysed by investigators. 
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g) Timestamp 
To detect malicious and irregular activities caused by malware, timestamps were applied in 
the proposed framework. Integrating anti-forensics techniques with timestamps can be a 
slower process, as anti-forensics attempt to counter-attack investigation techniques, which 
can produce a negative effect on the evidence and the quality of an investigation. During the 
process of transmitting C&C information between an infected host and a bot master, 
timestamp information regarding irregular activities is generated. Anomalies can be detected 
and monitored using network monitoring tools. Timestamp information can also be employed 
during the post-mortem analysis of stolen log files (Wolff, 2015). 
h) Detection through the Hashing Technique 
It is also possible to use hash signatures, a method based on signature detection techniques 
and considered one of the best forms of encryption (Clarke et al., 2012), which store the 
malware file codes in hash databases. The National Drugs Intelligence Center (NDIC) hash 
keeper, hash sets and the National Software Reference Library (NSRL) reference datasets 
are examples of hash signatures. Search techniques play an important role in the filtration of 
the data, as desired files can be sought from full-length codes. These searches can be 
easily and directly performed on live servers or on suspected hard drives (Shannon, 1948). 
i) Analysing the System Configuration and Settings 
Investigators can analyse the applications installed on a computer to investigate suspected 
malicious behaviours. The Windows registry plays a vital role in revealing malware code files 
on a computer. Thus, it is important to include a registry investigation in the proposed 
solution. The registry keys hold an ample list of executable paths. To carry out investigations 
on installed applications, the following registry key can be checked: 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion. Trace files for installed 
applications can also be analysed by investigators to identify activities related to malware. It 
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is necessary to have some Windows registry datasets that store suspicious trace files and 
can be used to detect malware traces. Malware has the greatest impact on the registry of a 
computer and its functions by adding the malicious content to auto-run registry settings 
(Nguyen et al., 2010). Investigators can also obtain information regarding installed 
applications by examining pre-fetch files, which are automatically created when a program is 
executed in Windows. Pre-fetch files can help extract start-up information when a program is 
launched on the Windows platform. For an in-depth examination of user and system actions, 
event logs can be used; these keep track of user activities and reveal critical and non-critical 
activities. To access the event viewer, it is necessary to develop a functionality that triggers 
a command, that is, eventvwr.msc (Nguyen et al., 2010). 
2.11 Challenges in Malware Detection 
During the literature research, many difficulties and challenges of malware detection were 
found throughout the various sources. For a consistent yet effective framework, it is 
important to address all the challenges. These challenges are mentioned and discussed as 
follows: 
a) Time-consuming and Complex  
The actual spectrum of malware threats is wide and complex, especially if costs related to 
system damage are included. No computing base or network platform is immune from such 
damage. In traditional malware detection, methods were based on an antivirus system that 
considered malware to be a virus or a worm and used detection mechanisms based on 
signature-based algorithms or the acknowledgement of a heuristics approach based on 
specialised behaviour. Modern malware is multi-partite in nature, and thus incorporates 
several multiple infections and payloads in a single instance and situation (Duhan et al., 
2009). Traditional means of detecting malware are failing due to the large customisation 
involved in detection frameworks, making them rapidly obsolete. Moreover, various anti-
forensics techniques have been deployed to create a bottleneck in terms of detection, and 
 36 
which delay the ensuing removal of infections from a system. The increasing use of the 
entropy method and extensive knowledge of malware makes detection more complex and 
time-consuming (Szor, 2005).  
b) Changing Behaviour Heuristics 
Improved malware types have a tendency to change their behaviour heuristics to go un-
noticed as an increased level of avoidance. Using automated systems, internal code can 
change and appear different to any detection method, resulting in a missed flagging of the 
malware or what appears to be a continuous stream of viruses attacking the system, thereby 
eventually flooding it. A variety of different adaptive techniques can be used to accomplish 
this, and this method is being used more frequently (Kolosnjaji et al., 2016).    
c) Poor Reference and Documentation 
Studies on malware analysis have provided large amounts of data that are often too 
conflicting to provide any definitive result. Moreover, data is not always documented in detail 
for referencing purposes. A complete rationale is given in an article by Szor (2005), focusing 
on the criticality in malware detection and analysis. Szor (2005) argues that most malware 
analysis companies specialise in antivirus algorithms and tools; therefore, they do not want 
to share their experiences or knowledge in this field to protect their proprietary information 
(Neelakantanand & Rao, 2008).  
d) Problems with Traditional Methods 
Most companies follow ‘signature-based’ methods to recognise virus-infected programs. 
Signatures are simply detected patterns in the form of hash-containing bytes of malware in 
an executable format. They are collected in a known database and often used together with 
algorithms or methods of detecting suspected files (Demme et al., 2013). Problems 
associated with this method (mentioned in Vinod & Laxmi, 2009) are that malware tends to 
change its functionality or characteristics automatically, often making it difficult for any 
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antivirus software to fully detect it. For this reason, variations in scanning for malicious 
programs are required.   
e) Variable Malware Techniques 
Malware infections are gradually evolving through variable techniques. Generally, malware 
exploits vulnerabilities existing in any given software; however, with new software versions, 
there is the possibility to introduce new patches. Thus, dynamic development must take 
place in the field of malware analysis to meet the challenges in frequently used software 
(Vinod & Laxmi, 2009).  
f) Challenges in Referencing and Linking 
Investigators are often unable to create matching patterns linking previously recorded 
malware data with new malware data. This implies that existing infected files may have been 
corrupted by other malware. When this occurs, the investigator’s result will be inaccurate, 
and malware detection and analysis are less likely to be provided (Demme et al., 2013). In 
some scenarios, costs and skills related to existing malware detection create a challenge for 
investigators, especially when investigators and analysts lack knowledge in the malware 
detection domain.  
g) Difficult Data Mining Process 
Many pitfalls can occur during the data mining process. Some of these possible pitfalls 
mentioned in Milenkovic and Jovanov (2005) are as follows: 
 As systems will contain data with different formats and specifications containing both 
infected and non-infected files, inconsistencies may arise in the accuracy of the results, 
and vast amounts of data with variable formats may harm the execution if not properly 
implemented; and 
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 Meaningful results from data mining can only be justified if systematic processes are 
followed. In any situation in which an investigation is carried out using static analysis of 
malware files, valuable information may be obtained in a fragmented format. Thus, 
through data mining, various results could be obtained that do not provide insights into 
the mechanism of malware development (Milenkovic & Jovanov, 2005). 
To address the abovementioned challenges and issues, the author will be introducing new 
methods of proliferation and malware data remediation (in Chapter 5) to check the 
probability of the occurrence of malware reinfection. New methods and techniques will be 
used to update the traditional framework and incorporate them into the new one. The new 
methods are intended to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of malware detection and 
analysis. For instance, using a hybrid analysis model (using both static and dynamic 
methods) reduces the implications and associated challenges, making the framework more 
robust and effective.   
2.12 Summary 
This chapter dealt with the aforementioned related literature by various scholars and 
publishers on the subjects of IT security and malware. The author has tried to select relevant 
material related to the problem statement and the objective of the research (mentioned in 
Chapter 1). The chapter is written in the context of the issue of malware and its detection to 
better understand potential solutions in this field. The chapter was initiated by discussing the 
increase in the dynamism of technology and its data and security using sophisticated tools 
and techniques. It was found that cyber criminals are taking advantage by using the internet 
to steal confidential data and sharing it with the public, thereby harming the integrity and 
availability of these sources. Thus, to highlight the situation, it was vital to discuss the 
responsibility of experts to investigate online crimes and provide evidence to protect internet 
users. This discipline is widely known as digital forensics. It was also explained how experts 
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use computational power to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of forensics to detect 
computer-related crimes with relevant evidence provided.  
A section on the increased number of threats by malware was discussed via statistics 
provided by AV-Test (2015), demonstrating global malware growth. It further explained the 
involvement of associated crimes using malware to work against a common adversary, 
creating extended, intentional or unintentional attacks and threats. It was suggested that 
malware was found to empower individuals who pose a danger to all online services, but 
especially within the financial services sector. Another section (2.4) discussed the on-going 
and rapid increase in advanced persistent threat (APT), referring to the class of malware 
affecting the cyber world. APT allows criminals to gain illicit remote access to host systems, 
including system maps and software modifications. Often, malware utilities represent the 
most likely code to take advantage of an organisation’s vulnerabilities; however, APT 
activities exploit new, custom code not easily detected by large businesses, and which 
interferes with and antagonises their systems. Various vectors create infections from 
malware, and these are distinguishable based on the category in which they are included.  
Some types of malware present in the cyber world have been briefly discussed here, as well 
as their effects and the damage they can cause to a computer system. These types include 
viruses, worms, backdoor programs, botnets, malicious codes and Trojans. Malware poses 
a large threat of loss to the industrial sector, particularly the financial sector. To control the 
level of infection, malware forensics and detection activities play an important role. A digital 
forensics process involves several internal technical activities in each investigatory stage 
performed. The categories used in a digital forensics process are Identification, 
Preservation, Collection, Examination, Analysis, Presentation and Decision-Making.  
Also highlighted as important was having a detection mechanism capable of achieving 
effective and efficient investigative results. To do so, the importance of an efficient and 
effective malware detection mechanism was found to be a major attribute of malware 
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analysis that must be maintained at each stage of the investigation. Effectiveness helps to 
identify the important aspects of the evidence, resulting in meaningful investigations. 
Efficiency is related to the resources used to gather evidence. These attributes differ in their 
functionalities and play independent roles in digital forensics investigations. Various malware 
detection methods have been discussed in relation to the attributes that can be used to 
detect patterns of malware vulnerabilities in a system. Two major detection methods – a 
static analysis method and a dynamic analysis method – were discussed. A relatively new 
integrated hybrid technique was also mentioned to highlight the importance of embracing 
both static and dynamic methods as a proposed solution. In addition, techniques were 
identified in the use of digital forensics, including time stamping, attack vectors, data and link 
mining, hashing, data representation, keyword and identifier analysis, intrusion detection 
mechanisms and file and format analysis. These methods have justified an intrinsic, yet 
enhanced solution for digital forensics investigations. Although they simplify the processes 
used by investigators to generate conclusive reports, they still pose challenges during 
investigations, such as limited availability of forensics tools, conduction and poor database 
patterns used in matching and detecting malware, which are not often updated, and a lack of 
custodial data in the labs. Thus, this literature review not only affirms existing approaches 
regarding malware detection, but highlights the need to develop new frameworks and 
methods for detection and analysis, as discussed in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 of this thesis. 
The final section acknowledges some of the common challenges in malware investigation 
and analysis, which once resolved, are to be part of a proposed solution in using a new 
framework for the problem statement (mentioned in Chapter 5).  
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CHAPTER 3 - RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter defines the methodology for conducting market research as well as the analysis 
presented in the next chapter (Chapter 4). In this chapter, the author’s intention is to present 
the associated gaps in the research and to elaborate on the research objective by using a 
distinctive research methodology. Various methods and processes were selected based on 
the current requirements, objectives and problem statement discussed in Chapter 1 
(particularly Sections 1.3 and 1.6). Qualitative and quantitative approaches were 
implemented, whereby primary data were collected through a questionnaire-based survey 
and face-to-face interviews. Targeted samples of digital forensics professionals were asked 
to give feedback on selective questions that focused on issues related to the problem 
statement of the research. These selected questions were based on the problem statement 
and the objectives of the research. As this research needs more precision in subjective 
areas, it was considered important to get feedback from seasoned specialists. Thus, the 
entire methodology focuses on two methods – a questionnaire and an interview. In the 
questionnaire method, selected questions were based on the topics of malware, IT security 
and detection tools. The process was initiated by distributing the questionnaire via email or 
physical post to only those candidates comprising IT professionals in the fields of security 
and forensics, or professionals in the field of malware and related tools, followed by 
responses received for analysis. As the selected respondents did not represent the wider 
community or society affected by malware, the results obtained are of interest but cannot be 
generalised to cover the whole population. However, these selected respondents play an 
important role in their respective companies/countries, such as the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE), India and the United Kingdom (UK). For the face-to-face interviews, the respondents 
were selected on the basis of their professional experience working with specialised 
malware detection and analysis tools or their respective knowledge in the field. The rationale 
for selecting the respondents for the interview was as follows: 
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The process of selecting candidates was initiated by scrutinising the respective profiles of all 
the respondents participating in the questionnaire process. The set criteria are illustrated 
below. 
a) Candidates should be seasoned specialists in the field of digital forensics or malware 
investigation; or 
b) Candidates should possess hands-on malware investigative tools experience or have 
had experience in the field of malware investigation through extensive malware 
detection toolkits; or 
c) Candidates are part of an organisation dealing with anti-malware tools and toolkits; or  
d) Candidates work with any government organisation in the field of cybercrime and 
computer forensics.  
3.2 Definition of Methodology 
A research methodology determines the process model or plan for conducting research and 
collecting data for sound qualitative or quantitative analysis. The model deployed was 
divided into two phases: first, developing a new enhanced framework for malware detection 
and analysis, which is intended to be a novel approach towards digital forensics; and 
second, gathering results in developing an artefact that reflects a toolkit required for 
implementation and testing. 
Selecting and implementing a methodology is important as it assists in collecting repositories 
of data based on facts and literature. It simplifies the process and assists in defining new 
observations and vital conclusions in a research project.  
Three major examination approaches have been selected, based on the following research 
paradigms: 
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 Quantitative research 
 Qualitative research 
 Mixed research 
3.2.1 Quantitative Research 
Quantitative research is an examination standard that depends on the accumulation of 
numerical information gathered using quantitative or statistical techniques. In general, this 
type of data is a large chunk of information for analysis and provides a more specialised 
approach in the research (Marshall, 1996). For this research, a more generalised problem 
statement of ‘detecting and preventing malware activities in the user’s system’ exists, which 
requires a more formalised and wide approach of collecting statistical data from respondents 
to make analysis more viable for the larger audience.   
3.2.2 Qualitative Research 
Qualitative research is defined as a technique that depends on the accumulation of 
subjective information extracted from the methods and approaches used. This is a more 
generalised approach and information could be gathered from small, related respondents 
(Marshall, 1996). For this research, one of the major objectives is to design and formulate a 
new framework of detecting and analysing malware activities in an enhanced manner. The 
data needed to be collected from subjective professionals and seasoned specialists. This 
provided precise opinions from respondents in a collective manner. 
3.2.3 Mixed Research 
Research paradigms can be based on mixed research, which includes the blending of 
quantitative and qualitative methods. Mixed research can be further blended into different 
categories of mixed research, where each category may depict different research statistics. 
Numerous structures can be developed through blending qualitative and quantitative 
research attributes (Marshall, 1996). Furthermore, for this research, the mixed research 
approach has been deployed across many engineering disciplines by integrating the results 
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and data gathered from both the above methods. Blending and integrating the analysis 
results provided a more reliable and robust solution, which was later used for proposing a 
new framework for the research. Moreover, this integrated report assisted in developing the 
artefact for the study.  
3.3 Data Collection 
Various methods can be used for collecting, designing and conducting the study in the form 
of data. This section of the research focuses on the processes and procedures for research 
manipulation and management. Two major concepts are reflected by this methodology; 
these are related to issues that were highlighted within the literature review (Chapter 2) of 
this thesis, such as challenges in current malware detection, optimisation in malware 
detection techniques, awareness of malware-related threats among users, effective tools for 
the investigators, etc. The two selected methods for this research are the primary research 
method, often referred to as the current analysis technique, and the secondary research 
method, also known as the conceptual analysis technique. 
3.3.1 Primary Research Method 
The primary research method includes the original source of information, which is mainly 
extracted from the source data and is not analysed before being included in the assessment 
sheet. Assessment criteria play a vital role in the collection of important information from 
people through fieldwork. The essential information is regularly gathered through face-to-
face meetings or conversations with the relevant community. Other mediums can also be 
used to extract the information, such as telephone communications, radio correspondence 
and email exchanges (Curtis, 2008). For the research presented herein, primary research 
plays an important role. A common theme identified in the literature review (Chapter 2) was 
that malware has a distinct dynamic nature, with new developments and issues occurring 
periodically, making it essential to perform data gathering and analysis. In this research, the 
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primary sources of data collection consisted of interviews and questionnaires, which will 
satisfy the current needs and requirements of the study.  
The questionnaires were distributed through telephone communications and email 
confirmations to all the respondents in the UAE, India and the UK. In order to design an 
appropriate questionnaire, the work focused on the literature related to the study of malware 
analysis and detection tools. The design for these methods included patterns of collecting 
information based on the research questions of the study (Turner, 2010). For the interview 
part, questions were designed according to the research question, reflecting the problem 
statement of the research (Driscoll, 2011). Here, the interview process focused on the 
experience, recommendations and references from respondents associated with the field of 
computer security or related technologies. It also included understanding the scope of 
malware detection and analysis. The design of the interview questions was related to the 
subject of the research, and prior examination of the questions was performed by personnel 
working in the respective organisations. The extracted information was then evaluated and 
observations were made to draw conclusions. Information gathered from the literature 
review uncovered some important problem areas that needed to be discussed. These areas 
were considered vital and needed to be acknowledged during the primary research in the 
form of a questionnaire or interview questions. Some of the key areas are as follows: 
a) Questions based on knowledge and opinions about malware;  
b) Questions based on various security processes, adopted technologies and gained 
skills in malware detection; 
c) Questions based on malware detection tools and analysis; and 
d) Questions based on problems faced by investigators while conducting malware 
analysis. 
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3.3.2 Secondary Research Method 
Secondary data can be defined as information that has been gathered via the analyst’s 
research and which does not involve assessments from the fieldwork. The data extracted 
from the secondary sources was utilised in no less than one layer of examination before 
being incorporated into the needs assessment. This is required to achieve more precision 
and accuracy in the report. The secondary data can be categorised into different classes 
that may contain data with different specifications. Secondary data can be specified as web 
materials, communication media reports, published journals, acknowledgements and 
information that has been cleansed, broken down and gathered for a reason other than the 
needs assessment (Church, 2001). For the research presented, a mixture of information 
collected from genuine internet sources, such as IEEE, books and published documents, 
was selected. Based on previous work, the author selected the methodology to justify the 
findings of the study; however, for this section, research through current analysis was 
selected. This methodology involves certain design attributes such as explanatories, 
standardisation, methods for reaching the target audience, permissions, ethical 
considerations and the environment. This helped in determining the way in which interviews 
were conducted. It also constituted information authenticity, allowing the author to select 
relevant respondents and factors that reflected the changes in the results. This activity was 
performed by implementing a qualitative method. A qualitative method is explanatory in 
nature and this approach assisted with obtaining the best understanding of the problem 
statement to ensure a precise solution. It also helped the author by providing exposure to 
current needs and requirements, which was necessary to perform informed observations 
and evaluations in order to obtain a genuine and valid result for the research (Crabtree & 
Miller, 1992). 
As highlighted above, the primary method was used to focus on collecting information and 
actual facts related to current market research. The study presented here used two different 
methods to conduct the primary research paradigm, namely questionnaires and interviews. 
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Designing the questionnaire assisted in assessing current data for the requirement of 
developing a new framework for malware detection and analysis, while the interview 
planning assisted in assessing the needs and requirements for the development and 
implementation of a Toolkit (artefact).  
3.3.3 Questionnaire Planning 
The questionnaire was designed by selecting respondents related to the field of IT and those 
who specifically have knowledge of the subject associated with the research. In order to 
design the survey, observations were referenced from Chapter 2 (literature review) and 
other related studies. It is important to match the design and planning with the 
aims/objectives of this research. All the standard practices must be followed, including the 
ethical considerations from pre-analysis to post-analysis techniques. The ethical 
considerations that were followed during questionnaire planning are as follows: 
a) Confidentiality and privacy; 
b) Including only willing participants;  
c) Prior notifications and information on the survey’s intent; and 
d) Following privacy laws and regulations. 
In addition, the whole questionnaire is divided into sub-categories to get a clear 
understanding and transparency from the feedback and observations at a later stage 
(Chapter 4). 
 
The rationale for selecting a questionnaire as part of the research methodology is 
described below. 
 Defining the problem statement: A primary research methodology will help in identifying 
the real problems faced by investigators during malware detection and analysis. Hence, 
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using a questionnaire assisted the author in defining the problem statement of the study 
in a much more realistic manner. 
 Understanding needs and requirements: Studies that use a primary research method 
assist a researcher in understanding the needs and requirements of the end user. 
Quantitative and qualitative analysis can be used to determine the precise and accurate 
needs of all end users facing the same dilemmas. Questionnaire analysis gives statistical 
data that is more realistic and provides accurate information on the current needs and 
requirements of users of malware detection and analysis. In addition, bottlenecks in any 
malware detection process were acknowledged.   
 Discovering evasion techniques: Conducting primary research for the study can provide 
information on various evasion techniques. An enhanced obfuscation applied to the 
malware code makes detection and analysis flexible and simplistic for an investigator. 
Thus, the gathered information helped in determining various recommended evasion 
techniques.  
 Analysing an attacker’s perception: A questionnaire can also help in identifying the 
perception of the attacker; this can be done by selecting questions on behaviour analysis 
carried out by investigators based on their experiences. This valuable information helped 
in determining the vulnerabilities of existing systems and assisted the author with 
determining underlying updated security features to be included in the proposed solution. 
 Analysing malware detection tools: One of the major objectives of this research is to 
develop an enhanced detection toolkit. Thus, conducting primary research for the study 
provided statistics for various adopted malware programs in the market, which helped in 
building a comparable chart to create a report (part of the thesis) selecting malware 
detection tools for the proposed solution.  
 Verifying integrity: To check the integrity of the proposed framework and methodology, it 
is optimal to perform a third-end analysis. A third-end analysis (primary research) 
provides a genuine analysis to determine whether the previous work done by the author 
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was accurate. Thus, required changes can be made at a later stage to avoid 
inaccuracies in the final results. For instance, much of the literature mentioned in 
Chapter 2 was cross-verified with the analysis report of the questionnaire.  
3.3.4 Interview Planning 
Interview planning was designed by selecting organisations in an associated field of 
information technology. The structural documentation contained pre-defined questions that 
were designed for face-to-face interviews. Various IT experts in the area of IT and security 
with knowledge of malware were selected as respondents. In order to design the questions, 
analysis of the collected literature described in Chapter 2 was used. This analysis therefore 
focused on the requirements of current and future malware investigative techniques, how 
these requirements are presently being met, and any limitations or potential flaws within the 
current set of available tools. Subsequently, the interview questions were emailed to the 
selected professionals one day before the interviews were conducted to provide them with a 
better understanding of the topic. Giving only one day was required ethically and also helped 
to prevent the respondents from providing influenced answers. Moreover, this activity helped 
them prepare their responses to the questions before the recording, thereby providing 
reliable and integrated results within the given timeframe. For efficiency, the interview 
questions were reviewed prior to the interview process to ensure clarity. An audio recorder 
was selected as an optional device for recording the answers for better understanding as 
well as relevancy of the answers in order to maintain quality. At the end of the interview, the 
respondents were also given an opportunity to read their own transcripts before they were 
finalised to ensure that they were satisfied with their answers on the topic.  
The following steps were carried out before conducting the interviews: 
a) The organisations were selected based on their industry and the resources they use 
to conduct their business. Other factors, such as employee ratio, tangible assets and 
turnover, were considered to check the appropriateness and genuineness of the 
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organisations for inclusion. Another reason to consider such factors is that 
companies with high employee ratios and high turnover are more prone to malware 
attacks and have significantly more exposure on issues related to IT security due to 
the large capacity of data (Kroll, 2016). Thus, to satisfy the research objectives, the 
above criteria were selected. The organisation needed to have recognised 
experience with an average amount of data on their servers. 
b) A letter of permission asking to conduct the interviews was written to the managing 
directors of the organisations. Selected employees were also contacted via email to 
invite them to an interview. In the case of any cancellation, an alternative day was 
requested from each respondent. 
c) Ethical concerns were kept in mind while designing all questions. It was ensured that 
no personal questions outside the related subject were asked, and if the respondents 
felt uncomfortable at any time, they were welcome to discontinue the process. 
d) The interview began with basic questions, and gradually, questions on more detailed 
topics were asked that were more aligned with the aims and objectives of the 
research work. 
e) The collected answers were monitored, evaluated statistically and further analysed to 
obtain meaningful results. 
3.4 Data Assessment Technique 
Upon collecting a large amount of data, assessment plays a critical role in defining 
conclusions and suggestions for further work. These assessments can be divided into 
personal observations and factual descriptions collected from the analysis. The 
assessments can be further sub-divided into different categories, including emergency 
assessments. An emergency assessment is an examination of destructive areas and is used 
to construct a mutual understanding of the impacted sources. 
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The collected data can be gathered from assessments, including the following 
options: 
 Collecting reports regarding the critical impact on the subject; 
 Producing discoveries regarding activities that are not definitely known; 
 Gathering information which is collected for a dispute analysis; 
 Investigating the impact of a change in a situation that specifically or indirectly resulted 
from the impact on the associated subject involved in the study; and  
 Using a pre-characterised arrangement of research methods to guarantee effectiveness 
in information gathering and investigations. 
Before designing or implementing a prototype, it was important to gather information by 
conducting an effective market analysis to identify the exact needs and requirements of the 
user, particularly users who were exposed to current software and any limitations that were 
present. For a more extensive analysis of the data and the question put forward, a primary 
research paradigm was executed. The primary research involved accumulating data by 
conducting interviews in which questions reflecting the problem statement of the research 
were selected. In this scenario, market research focused on obtaining recommendations 
from the experts and practitioners related to computer security, cybercrime investigation or 
malware detection methodologies. This subsequently led to conducting the research and an 
analysis was undertaken to establish the outcomes. 
3.5 Summary 
In this chapter, the author’s intention was to elaborate on the research objective and identify 
the precise problem statement for the study undertaken, and the associated gaps in the 
research by using a distinctive research methodology. As the author selected qualitative, 
quantitative and mixed methodologies, respondents were chosen at distinctive levels for 
both the questionnaire and the interview. Special attention was given to ethical 
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considerations, such as privacy, confidentiality, legal feasibilities, etc., before implementing 
these methods. Furthermore, special criteria were executed for selecting the respective 
respondents for both the interview and the questionnaire. Precise planning was done 
beforehand, including the rationale for designing questions while doing cross-referencing 
and integration with the gaps analysed in the literature review (presented in Chapter 2). 
Gathering data posed some challenges, such as sending out the questionnaire in a variety 
of ways, such as email, telephone, post, etc., to all respondents. Special consideration was 
placed on the data assessment technique to achieve a quality analysis report for conclusion 
(see Chapter 4).     
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CHAPTER 4 - MARKET RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS 
4.1 Introduction  
Based on the selected methodology discussed in Chapter 3, the author divided the market 
research into two phases: a questionnaire and an interview. Selecting and implementing a 
methodology is an important task as it assists in collecting repositories of data based on 
facts and literature related to the aims and objective of the research. It simplifies the process 
and assists in defining new observations and vital conclusions in a research project. As the 
research proposes a solution to the given problem statement for a more generalised 
audience by means of experienced and specific respondents who were seasoned 
professionals, two different approaches were selected. The questionnaire was designed with 
a view to developing a new framework for malware detection and analysis, which involves a 
novel approach to digital forensics and research. The interview was conducted with a view to 
gathering results for developing an artefact, or Toolkit, necessary for implementation and 
testing. Each market research method illustrates responses and statistical data with analysis 
and a detailed description. The author also concluded the analysis to provide results in a 
more efficient way, which is used later in the chapter to formulate the framework and to 
develop the artefact. 
4.2 Market Research (Phase 1): Questionnaire  
During the initial research, the questionnaire was distributed via email to the target 
respondents. The framework used for the questionnaire was based on a ‘scale item’ 
approach, which is a method that uses scale analysis (in Sijtsma & Verweij, 1992) as a 
measure to assess data gathered from respondents. A pilot study was conducted to 
authenticate the questionnaire and 189 feedback copies were collected. Further follow-up 
was conducted at a later stage to get more responses; however, due to professional 
commitments, the respondents were not able to share their feedback within the allocated 
timeframe for this follow-up stage. The respective questions, feedback and 
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acknowledgements are provided in Appendix A. 
There were four sections in the questionnaire comprising specific topics (mentioned in 
Appendix A). The sections were as follows: 
 Section A: Knowledge and opinions about malware; 
 Section B: Various security processes, adopted technologies and gained skills in 
malware detection; 
 Section C: Malware detection tools and analysis; and 
 Section D: Problems faced by investigators while conducting a malware analysis. 
4.2.1 Reliability and Validation 
The cross-sectional study consisted of data gathered by distributing a questionnaire to all 
candidates who were professionals working in the domain related to malware and its 
attributes, and who were based in the UAE, India or the UK. A core analysis was performed 
based on the experts’ experiences, investigation cases handled and their designation in their 
respective organisations. The selection was also made based on industry standards, 
followed by the number of years the experts had spent in their respective professions. It was 
found that out of 189 candidates, 43% of the respondents were professionals from IT 
security, 33% were forensics experts and 17% were network administrators, while 7% 
belonged to other IT fields. In terms of experience, the largest group (33%) had 5–8 years of 
experience in the field of computer/digital forensics. 
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Table 1: Respondent Demographics 
 
 
Experience (Years) 
0–1 1–3 3–5 5–8 < 8 
Per cent 10 17 23 33 17 
 
4.2.2 Discussion of the Results 
This section illustrates the data analysis, which was based on the designed questionnaire 
conducted to formulate a design solution for the problem. The details of the questionnaire 
analysis are given below. 
SECTION A: Questions based on knowledge and opinions about malware  
 
Q-1 What is your role? 
Options Forensics 
expert 
Networking 
admin 
IT security Other 
189 69 30 80 10 
 
Figure 6 Tabulated & Graphical Results of Role of Respondents 
 
37%
16%
42%
5%
Forensics Expert
Networking Admin
IT Security
Others
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Analysis: To conduct the analysis, feedback was gathered from 189 respondents. Of all the 
respondents, 42% were from IT security, while 5% belonged to other IT fields. This shows 
the integrity and authenticity of the study, as all selected personnel had direct relatable 
experience to the subject area.   
 
 
Q-2 How much experience do you have with modern malware? 
Options 0–1 year 1–3 years 3–5 years 5–8 years > 8 
189 15 25 35 70 44 
 
Figure 7 Tabulated & Graphical Results of Experience of Respondents with 
Malware 
 
Analysis: The respondents making up the largest portion of the sample (37%) had 5–8 
years of experience in their respective fields, while those with 0–1 year of experience 
represented the smallest portion (8%). These percentages emphasise the credibility of the 
feedback on the basis of experience. Formulating data from experienced professionals 
should provide support for the subjective accuracy of the survey.  
8%
13%
19%
37%
23% 0 to 1
1 to 3
3 to 5
5 to 8
More than 8
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Q-3 How often have you seen changes in the malware 
landscape? 
Options Never Seldom Occasionally Frequently 
189 2 13 95 79 
 
Figure 8 Tabulated & Graphical Results of Changes Seen in Malware Landscape 
 
Analysis: The malware landscape is a major area of concern for any security professional. 
Changes in the malware landscape illustrate the modulations in the nature of malware 
attacks on systems. In this situation, a significant number (50%) of respondents perceived 
occasional changes. The view here of the respondents correlates with reported increases in 
malware attacks; for example, a 36% increase in malware variants was found from 2014 to 
2015 (Richter, 2016). This is highly concerning, as malware detection becomes more difficult 
and complex for any tool with such a high ratio in modularity. This result helps to signify and 
validate the research question addressed in the following chapters.  
 
1%
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Q-4 Is your organisation vulnerable to malware attacks?  
Options No Yes Not sure 
189 40 89 60 
 
 
Figure 9 Tabulated & Graphical Results of Vulnerability of Organisation to Attacks 
 
Analysis: Most respondents indicated a sense of vulnerability in their schema, which they 
considered prone to malware attacks; 47% accepted that their own organisation could be 
vulnerable to attack and then possibly open to infection by malicious codes. This result helps 
to show a sense of insecurity and a lack of confidence in the existing security protocols 
available in the experts’ organisations.  
 
 
 
21%
47%
32%
No
Yes
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Q-5 What is the situation for other non-technical employees? Are 
they capable of identifying a malware attack? 
Options Yes No Not sure 
189 70 110 9 
 
Figure 10 Tabulated & Graphical Results of Capability of Non-Technical Employees to 
Identify Attacks 
 
Analysis: This result shows a perception of a lack of awareness regarding malware attacks 
amongst non-technical employees; 58% of the respondents indicated that most of the non-
technical employees are not aware of malicious codes or malware. This suggests that the 
possibility of detection by employees outside of the specific area of IT professionals is 
insufficient; hence, there is a need for education or possibly an automated detection 
mechanism to provide assistance.   
  
37%
58%
5%
Yes
No
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SECTION B: Questions based on various security processes, adopted technologies 
and gained skills in malware detection  
 
Q-1 Do you have any expertise in the malware handling process? 
Options Yes No Not sure 
189 120 49 20 
 
Figure 11 Tabulated & Graphical Results of Malware Handling Expertise 
 
Analysis: The observation shows that a majority of the respondents (63%) had already 
handled a situation involving malware and considered themselves experienced in this area. 
As most of the respondents had experience in the malware handling process, the feedback 
regarding the following questions could be considered more informative and accurate.  
 
 
 
63%
26%
11%
Yes
No
Not Sure
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Q-2 How many case studies related to malware do you receive for 
investigation? 
Options < 5% 5%–20% 20%–50%  50%–80% > 80%  
189 29 20 40 60 40 
 
Figure 12 Tabulated & Graphical Results of Number of Malware Cases Received 
 
Analysis: Most of the respondents (32%) received 50%–80% of the investigations into 
malware. A total of 21% of the respondents get up to 80% of the investigations related to 
malware. This shows that the majority of respondents (53% when adding the 
aforementioned percentages) receive at least 50% of their cases related to malware only.  
 
 
 
 
 
15%
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Q-3 How many of the above cases were solved with accurate results? 
Options < 5% 5%–20% 20%–50%  50%–80% > 80%  
189 10 40 79 50 10 
 
Figure 13 Tabulated & Graphical Results of Accuracy of Results Attained 
 
Analysis: The above observation reflects the accuracy rate of detections with 42% of 
respondents’ opinions suggesting that accuracy rates of 20%–50% were achieved. This 
result suggests that more than half of the cases involved inaccuracies or retained unsolved 
elements within the infected files. Higher rates of inaccuracy suggest that a gap exists 
between the actual findings of malware and the rate of infection; thus, there is possibly 
scope for improvement in the methodologies and implementations involved in malware 
detection.  
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Q-4 What is your opinion of the level of skills and technological tools 
adopted in your company to carry out the investigation process 
involving malware? 
Options Weak Average Strong  
189 30 109 50 
 
Figure 14 Tabulated & Graphical Results of Levels of Tools and Investigative Skills in 
Companies 
 
Analysis: The level of skills and technological tools adopted for the investigation process 
was rated as ‘average’ by 58% of the respondents with only 26% rating the skills and tools 
as ‘strong’. This suggests that the majority of users perceived the tools and the skills to use 
these tools for malware detection as ineffective, insufficient or in need of improvement to 
protect their systems from infections.  
 
 
16%
58%
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Average
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Q-5 What is the level of effectiveness in detection and response? 
Options Weak Average Strong  
189 60 90 39 
 
Figure 15 Tabulated & Graphical Results of Malware Effectiveness of Detection & Response 
 
Analysis: These results suggest that the level of effectiveness in malware detection as 
perceived by the majority of the respondents (47%) is ‘average’. Moreover, 32% perceived 
that the level of effectiveness was weak in terms of investigators and their performance. This 
result indicates that there is clearly scope to allow for improvements in detection and 
response effectiveness.  
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21%
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Average
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SECTION C: Questions based on malware detection tools and analysis 
Q-1 In your opinion, what kinds of tools have been adopted in malware 
detection and analysis? 
Options Open source 
tools 
Shareware Commercial 
tools 
Cannot say 
189 121 0 60 8 
 
 
Figure 16 Tabulated & Graphical Results of Kinds of Malware Tools Adopted  
 
Analysis: The results suggest that 32% of the respondents use commercial software, 
while 64% use open source tools. The common use of open source tools is an indicator 
of the acceptability and usability of open source tools when commercially available or 
shareware options are available. This result also follows the industry trend for use of 
malware detection software utilities commonly used, where the market split between 
commercial and open source tools is approximately equal (Vermesan & Friess, 2014). 
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Figure 17 Tabulated & Graphical Results of Need of Customised Tool 
 
Analysis: According to this observation, 80% of respondents perceive that there is a need 
for a new customised tool for malware detection. This result follows on from the previous 
questions relating to the opinion held that existing tool capability is considered poor in terms 
of effectiveness and a new customised tool is clearly required.  
 
 
 
 
80%
15%
5%
Yes
No
Cant Say
Q-2 
 
Do you think there is a need for a new customised tool for malware 
detection and analysis? 
Options Yes No Cannot say 
189 150 29 10 
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Q-3 Do you think cost plays an important role in adopting an individual 
analysis tool? 
Options I agree I do not agree Cannot say 
189 120 29 40 
 
 
Figure 18 Tabulated & Graphical Results of Importance of Analysis Tool Costs  
 
 
Analysis: According to the above observation, the majority of the respondents (64%) 
perceived that cost is an important factor in selecting and adopting an individual tool for 
malware detection. This result can play an important role in developing a framework at a 
later stage (mentioned in Section C, question 1) by considering the costs involved in any 
software tool to be developed. 
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Figure 19 Tabulated & Graphical Results of Effective Methods of Malware Analysis 
 
Analysis: Of the respondents, 58% perceived a ‘dynamic analysis’ methodology as the 
most effective method for detection, while 32% perceived a ‘static analysis’ method as most 
effective. This shows that there is no clarity in terms of whether a dynamic method is more 
viable and effective than a static analysis. The respondents’ results here correlate with 
known advances in the development of malware detection methodologies where the latest 
tools are being developed using dynamic analysis methods as opposed to static (Aman, 
2014), and dynamic tools are increasingly becoming commonplace.  
 
32%
58%
10%
Static Analysis
Dynamic Analysis
Other
Q-4 In your opinion, which of the following methods is more viable and 
effective in analysing malware? 
Options Static analysis Dynamic analysis Other 
189 60 109 20 
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Q-5 Is your tool equipped with a specific preloaded database for malware? 
Options Yes No Cannot say 
189 120 9 60 
 
Figure 20 Tabulated & Graphical Results of Tools Equipped with a Preloaded Malware 
Database 
 
Analysis: According to the above result, 63% of the respondents had tools equipped with a 
preloaded malware database while only 5% of the respondents were not using a preloaded 
database. This large number of preloaded database tools currently in use indicates that this 
is a necessary part of any tool and would be an expected feature within a detection tool. 
Therefore, it should most likely be implemented.  
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Q-6 If yes, how frequently do you update your malware database? 
Options Every day Weekly Monthly Annually Do not do 
updates at 
all 
189 110 55 14 10 0 
 
Figure 21 Tabulated & Graphical Results of Frequency of Malware Database Updates 
 
Analysis: According to the above result, 58% of the respondents updated their malware 
database every day, while all of the respondents had updated the database at least 
annually. This shows that malware updates are an important part of the detection tool 
mechanism. This result is also reflected in the industry trend for malware databases to be 
updated automatically and as frequently as possible (Gibson, 2015) to coincide with the 
constant updates in malware itself. 
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SECTION D: Questions based on problems faced by investigators while conducting 
malware analysis 
Q-1 What is the core problem faced by the investigator during malware 
detection? 
Options Detecting the 
size 
Analysing 
the 
behaviour 
Detecting the 
level of 
infection 
Proliferation  Database 
updating 
189 5 40 80 44 20 
 
Figure 22 Tabulated & Graphical Results of Core Problems Faced by Investigators 
 
Analysis: According to the result, 42% of the respondents perceived that detecting the level 
of infection is a critical issue. In addition, 23% perceived that proliferation was critical, and a 
similar number, 21%, perceived that analysing the behaviour of malware was critical. 
Although some problems were deemed more critical than others, it identifies that various 
problems are seen by experts and different problems need to be accounted for. Similar 
results can also be found for industry surveys looking at the ideal requirements sought in the 
3%
21%
42%
23%
11%
Detecting the size
Analyzing the behaviour
Detecting the level of
infection
Proliferation
Database Updating
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purchase of malware detection software (Intel Security, 2016), and no single function is 
considered adequate. 
 
Q-2 What is the level of malware penetration in specific file processes? 
Options Critical Complex Both complex 
and critical  
Highly complex 
and critical  
189 10 18 121 40 
 
Figure 23 Tabulated & Graphical Results of Level of Malware Penetration 
 
Analysis: Of the respondents, 64% perceived that the level of malware penetration is both 
critical and complex, thus indicating that detection is inherently difficult for an investigator. 
This result correlates well with published data on the increasing threat of difficult to identify 
(complex) malware, which are a high threat to system security (criticality) (Pollard & Mak, 
2016). 
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Q-3 On average, how many days does it take for an investigator to detect 
the presence of malware in a file? 
Options One week Less than a 
month 
Many 
months 
Many years Cannot say 
189 70 55 50 0 14 
 
Figure 24 Tabulated & Graphical Results of Days to Detect Presence of Malware 
 
Analysis: According to the above observation, 37% of the respondents perceive that an 
investigator needs less than a week on average to detect the presence of malware; with 
29% of respondents perceiving less than a month. Although this information infers that the 
majority of current industry tools, under the use of experts, are successfully detecting 
malware presence in less than a month, the respondents were unable to give details on the 
method of the investigations, the tools implemented and the nature of the malware, thus 
making it difficult to draw any conclusions on the effectiveness of the tools themselves. 
37%
29%
27%
0%
7%
One week
Less than a month
Many Months
Many Years
Cannot say
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Q-4 What is an important parameter to consider during an investigation? 
Options Malware 
signature 
Malware 
behaviour 
Level of infection All of the above  
189 19 10 10 150 
 
Figure 25 Tabulated & Graphical Results of Important Parameters during an Investigation 
 
Analysis: Of the respondents, 80% perceived that it is essential for any investigator to 
consider all three of the following parameters: ‘malware signature’, ‘malware behaviour’ and 
‘level of infection’. This demonstrates the need for a tool that performs all three activities to 
optimise the detection mechanism.  
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4.2.3 Critical Analysis 
The results from the observations help to identify vulnerabilities in existing tools and 
methodologies used for malware detection. Although most of the experts were aware of the 
criticality and complexity of malware detection, no specific solution for accurate detection 
was mentioned.  
It is noted that the sample size for the survey is small and, therefore, where applicable, 
literature data has been utilised in conjunction to validate the findings from the respondents. 
This has been used to help correlate the findings and instil more confidence in the survey 
results. 
Selected parts of the analysis report are displayed in the following tables (Tables 2, 3 and 4). 
Table 2 Important Factors from the Critical Analysis of the Questionnaire 
 
Factors Yes No Cannot say 
Changes in malware landscape 50% 42% 8% 
Organisational vulnerabilities 47% 21% 32% 
Expertise on malware  67% 27% 6% 
Detection of malware by non-technical 
employees 
17% 53% 30% 
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Table 3: Level of Skill and Level of Accuracy in the Questionnaire 
Level of Skill in Investigations  
Weak Average Strong 
26% 58% 16% 
 
Level of Accuracy during Investigations 
< 5% 5%–
20% 
20%–
50% 
50%–
80% 
Above 
80% 
5% 21% 42% 27% 5% 
 
 
Choice of Tools 
Open 
Source 
Shareware Commercial Cannot say 
48% 0% 37% 15% 
 
Need for New Tools 
Yes No Cannot say 
80% 15% 5% 
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Preferred Methods 
Dynamic Static  Other 
58% 32% 10% 
 
Table 4: Important Factors from the Analysis of the Questionnaire 
 
4.2.4 Further Analysis 
Important factors from the analysis were identified to bring clarity surrounding the problem 
statement. The analysis resulted in the following insights: 
a) The core problem faced by investigators was to identify the level of malware infection in 
the file; 
b) Most importantly, investigators relied on other parameters, such as the malware 
signature and combined behaviour, to make an effective detection; 
c) Most of the infections were both critical and complex. Thus, there is a need for an 
effective method to reduce any associated complications; 
d) Although there are tools that are capable of detecting malware and other malicious 
codes, most of them produce inaccurate or incomplete results; 
e) The cost of the tool plays an important role in its adoption; 
f) Most of the investigators wanted to use tools based on both dynamic and static 
methodologies; 
g) It usually takes less time for investigators to detect the presence of malware but more 
time to investigate it forensically; and 
h) Managing and updating the malware database is a task that should be given priority.  
These points reflect the various challenges and problems that the respondents faced during 
their investigations and detections, effectively highlighting insufficiencies or misgivings within 
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the current methodologies and software usage. These results and analyses were considered 
when formulating a design solution to draft a framework and problem approach to produce 
an enhanced malware detection solution. 
4.3 Market Research (Phase 2): Interview Analysis 
This is an important phase of the research as it reflects the development of an artefact. Out 
of the 189 respondents from Phase 1, 50 respondents were selected to continue within this 
phase. The process of selecting candidates was initiated by scrutinising the respective 
profiles of all the respondents participating in the questionnaire process. The selection 
criteria are explained in Chapter 3 (Methodology) and the area of expertise of the selected 
respondents is shown below. 
 
Area of Expertise of Selected Respondents 
 
4.3.1 Interview Analysis 
The following analysis was done on the basis of the results received from the respondents. 
The analysis considers only answers given by the respondents; the author has included no 
personal opinions or recommendations in the analysis. The questions are as follows: 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Area of Expertise
Area of Expertise
Evidence Collection 2
Malware Analysis 30
Cyber Action Team 12
Access to Legal Process 6
Years
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User Awareness of Malware Threats  
According to the respondents, 64% are not aware of malware threats and their 
consequences. Various reasons for this were provided: 
 A non-technical background; 
 Being spoofed or bluffed, such as fake identifications; 
 False temptations; and 
 Lack of IT security. 
 
 
Figure 26 shows awareness of Malware Threats of Selected Respondents 
 
Critical Analysis: The above reasons have raised concerns about the awareness of 
malware and related issues. In detecting malware, one of the most important aspects is the 
expertise in carrying out a malware investigation, which is vital for its success (Kaspersky 
2017). This provides an important aspect to the research, proposing a user-friendly 
environment for detection, which enables a non-technical investigator to perform in a flexible 
and simple environment.  
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Difficulties in Malware Detection 
When asked about the difficulties in detecting malware, 78% of the respondents agreed that 
they faced difficulties in malware detection, while 22% felt comfortable with detection. The 
most common reasons for difficulties in detection were as follows: 
 The paucity of anti-malware products; 
 Low accuracy rates; 
 Lack of understanding of malware scripts; 
 Lack of expertise in scripting languages; 
 Poor reporting by the tool; and  
 Loss of evidence. 
Figure 27 shows difficulty in Detecting Malware by Investigators 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
78%
22%
YES
NO
 81 
Importance of an Anti-Malware Tool  
An anti-malware tool was deemed to be important because it could provide the following:
 
 
Figure 28 results of the Respondents for Importance of the Tool 
 
What type of anti-malware tools would you prefer as an investigator? 
Several recommendations and suggestions were recorded regarding anti-malware tools. 
Recommendations were categorised into three main types: open source, shareware and 
commercial. Depending on the case study and the needs/requirements of the investigator, 
the most appropriate tool could be selected. Most of the respondents (72%) preferred open 
source as the recommended tool, thus making it an important result in selecting and 
developing the Toolkit artefact for the proposed solution.  
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Figure 29 shows preferences for the ‘Anti-Malware’ Tool 
Statistical Details on Malware Analysis 
Observations on the types of malware affecting information security by investigators based 
on their personal investigative experience were recorded and converted into a statistical 
record. There were various common answers, Trojan horse being one of the most frequent. 
 
Figure 30 shows statistical Details on Malware Analysis 
 
The statistical data (below) shows the existence of current malware and the types of online 
threats posed by malware  
52%
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Online Threats by Malware 
The analysis suggests that the malware domain needs to be considered when designing the 
malware database for the proposed artefact (Toolkit). The result below suggests that the 
maximum threat online is by denial of service (DOS ) attack (46%), with the most probable 
source of an attack coming from a Trojan horse (concluded from previous chart). 
 
Figure 31 shows diagram shows the statistics for online Malware threats  
 
Preferred Anti-Malware Tools Analysis Method 
When asked about the preference for a static, dynamic, or a combination of both analysis 
tools, the combination of both was most preferred with 50% of the respondents giving this 
answer. However, some respondents still preferred the use of either static or dynamic 
methods. This result suggests that there is a requirement for both static and dynamic 
analysis tools. However, a combination of the two would be most preferential and is, 
therefore, sought after in a future developed tool. The results of the respondents’ 
preferences of the analysis method are displayed below. 
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Figure 32 shows preferred Analysis Method of Respondents 
Questions on the Tool’s Performance Metrics 
The questions on the findings illustrating performance are as follows: 
Questions Yes No 
Do you have difficulty with gathering information and then 
performing an analysis on it? 
65% 35% 
Do you think we need customised tools for malware detection? 78% 22% 
Do you think we need any changes in the report structure? 50% 50% 
Do you think collecting evidence is challenging? 45% 55% 
Table 5: Results for the Tool’s Performance Metrics in the Process of the Interviews 
30%
20%
50%
ANALYSIS METHOD
Dynamic Analysis
Static Analysis
Both
 85 
Tools Preferred by the Selected Respondents 
When asked about preferences, the majority of the respondents (48) gave Wireshark as the 
most frequent answer for a tool to investigate behavioural analysis code. However, the 
respondents selected from a variety of tools and all were commonly used by at least 21 of the 
respondents.   
As respondents were allowed to select multiple answers for any preference, the number of 
respondents has been used as opposed to the percentages. The results are displayed and 
tabulated in Table 6. 
 
Figure 33shows preferred Behavioural Analysis Code of Selected Respondents 
 
When asked about the preferred code analysis, the majority (36) of respondents selected IDA 
Pro as their choice. A similar number of respondents selected OllyDgb or LordPE as their 
preference, and a smaller number (11) selected Olley Dump. The results are shown in Table 6.  
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Figure 34 shows preferred Code Analysis of Selected Respondents 
 
 
Behavioural Analysis Tool 
Process Explorer 
Process Hacker 
Process Monitor 
Capture BAT 
Wireshark 
RegShot 
 
Code Analysis Tool 
 
LordPE 
Olley Dump 
OllyDgb 
IDA Pro 
Table 6: Results for the Respondents’ Selected Tools for the Toolkit 
 
Table 6 illustrates the combined results from the above figure as the total selection for both 
behavioural and code analysis tools.  
23
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36
Code Analysis (Tools Selected)
Total no of respondents for a particualr tool
IDA Pro Olley Dump OllyDgb LordPE
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Some similar patterns between the Interview Analysis and the Questionnaire 
 
A comparison between the respondents’ answers from the interview phase and the 
questionnaire phase was made to examine any similarities or differences between similar 
questions. It was noted that comparable percentages of respondents gave similar answers to 
the questions in common within each phase. The results of this comparison are shown in Table 
7 below. 
Questions in common Questionnaire  Interview  
Requirement of a new tool 80% 78% 
Type of tool selected as open source 64% 72% 
User awareness on malware and its detection  58% 64% 
Table 7: Some Commonalities between the Questionnaire and Interview Analysis 
 
 
Figure 35 shows percentage Comparison Results between the Interview and the Questionnaire 
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4.4 Summary  
This chapter discussed the implementation of methodologies and comprehensive market 
research, which provides the descriptions to quantify the basis of this thesis. Methodologies are 
the foundation of research and provide a direction and set of objectives for the author. The 
author used qualitative and quantitative methods, where questionnaire and interview analyses 
were employed to collect primary data. A market analysis acted as a guiding tool for 
understanding traditional methods of malware investigation, as well as helping to identify any 
ambiguities in their performance. The market research was divided into two phases: a 
questionnaire and interviews. Analysing the information gathered in the literature review 
(Chapter 2) helped to focus on important factors within the malware investigative industry. 
Limitations and concerns of existing tools from the perspective of industry-based users could 
thus be further explored through the questionnaire and interviews. The questionnaire was 
important for gathering and analysing a broad range of information to develop a possible new 
framework for malware detection and analysis by identifying any current tool limitations. The 
interview was conducted to obtain specific opinions on the challenges of existing malware 
investigation tools, which could be used to address the development of a new artefact. The 
analysis acted as a yardstick in this development and will be vital in future chapters.  
The research was conducted by selecting 189 respondents who were categorised by 
professional position and divided into two separate research phases.   
In the first phase of the research, selective questions related to malware, detection techniques 
and challenges were asked to precisely determine the current needs and requirements of the 
investigators. The results focused on the problems faced by investigators and discussed the 
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vulnerabilities in detection. They also illustrated the need for using both a static and dynamic 
analysis approach in malware detection and for maintaining enhanced costs and resources.  
The sample size for this first phase could be considered small. However, due to practical 
considerations of locating appropriate respondents, the similarities in the nature of the results 
across different locations and roles, and with consideration of the research objectives, it was 
deemed sufficient for this study.  
In the second phase of the research, through interview analysis, findings were discussed in 
terms of the respondents’ area of expertise, user awareness of malware threats, knowledge of 
difficulties in malware detection, the importance of anti-malware tools, the preferred analysis 
method and preferred analysis tool.   
For the second phase, a relatively small sample of 50 respondents was selected from the 
original group of respondents based on selected criteria. Although the sample size was further 
reduced, it was important to be selective regarding the participants’ roles and experience within 
the original sample of respondents for the interviews. As this second phase consisted of finding 
the opinions of professionals in the correct field of expertise, collecting information from an 
appropriately experienced sample was considered a higher priority than a large sample with 
less experience.  It was therefore considered justifiable to use a smaller sample size for the 
objectives of this research. 
Similarities were found between the questionnaire (phase 1) and the interview (phase 2) with 
clear correlations in percentage results for difficulty in investigation, requirements of static and 
dynamic methods, the need for a new framework and satisfaction with existing methods. The 
closeness of the results from the two phase instils confidence in the validity of the overall 
responses gathered from the market research. 
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The results gained from the market research with the IT experts in malware tie in well with the 
findings from the literature review into malware as a whole. The majority of the respondents 
were aware that malware is a growth area in which the level of threat is increasing, something 
that is well documented in statistical data from the literature review. The respondents identified 
that the effectiveness of malware detection could be improved with almost 80% rating their 
current systems as average or weak. This was shown to be critical in selecting appropriate tools 
through the literature review where effectiveness and efficiency were key drivers, suggesting 
that available tools were not meeting expectations. The challenges associated with malware 
detection were discussed within the literature review, and the respondents were also aware of 
these challenges with the majority recognising the need for technical employees within the field, 
the necessity of frequent updates to stay on top of current malware trends, and the reality that 
malware threats are complex and critical in their penetration. Finally, the respondents could see 
the need for both static and dynamic analysis methods with some preferring one method over 
the other, and the benefits of both were highlighted in the literature review. 
The results from both phases of the market research enabled the author to develop needs and 
requirement criteria for the artefact, covering all necessary steps in its development (Chapter 6).  
The following is a summary of user needs, which will be used for developing a proposed 
framework: 
 Solution to identify the level of malware infection in the file; 
 Develop a malware detection and analysis framework; 
 An effective method to reduce any associated investigative complications; 
 Enhancing current accuracy and efficiency; 
 Developing a cost-effective toolkit; 
 Framework based on both dynamic and static methodologies; 
 Framework that can detect the presence of malware in an effective timeframe; 
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 Managing and updating the malware database is a task that should be given priority; and 
 Maximum utilisation of open source tools rather than commercial ones; 
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CHAPTER 5 - A FRAMEWORK FOR EFFECTIVE MALWARE 
DETECTION AND ANALYSIS 
5.1 Overview 
The current chapter proposes and describes the rationale behind an effective malware detection 
and analysis framework. In the literature review (Chapter 2), various studies (Ayers, 2009; 
Richard & Roussev, 2006) identified vulnerabilities and limitations in the existing forensics tools 
for investigating malware, and this statement was still found to be true according to the results 
obtained in Chapter 4, where data analysis demonstrated some common flaws in the existing 
investigative process for detecting malware in information systems. Thus, there is a need to 
develop and deploy an effective system that assists investigators in the accurate and complete 
detection and analysis of malware without compromising data integrity. The market and 
questionnaire analysis in Chapter 4 showed a need for an extensive system that can handle 
both static and dynamic investigative methods. The analysis also demonstrated that current 
software detection tools are insufficient because they may produce inaccurate and incomplete 
results. As demonstrated through observations and research, there is sufficient room for the 
establishment of a new framework so that investigators can employ efficient malware detection 
techniques that are effective at minimal cost. 
Based on this, the subsequent chapter describes a new approach called the triple-tier 
centralised online real-time environment (tri-CORE) malware analysis (TCMA) method, which 
was developed as part of the current research and, as such, is considered a contribution to the 
field. Current detection methods and their associated issues and challenges are also outlined to 
justify the TCMA method and to show how it addresses the challenges.  
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5.2 Different Approaches to Detection and Analysis 
In digital forensics, methods are carried out based on algorithms, which exist to accomplish 
process objectives. For the detection and investigation of malware, every procedure includes 
two systematic functions: the malware detector (MD) and the source code (S). The specific 
domain of the MD depends on the domain of the S, which is defined by the mathematical ‘set’ 
as malicious or genial (Neelakantanand & Rao, 2008). 
The process is initiated through the MD function, where the MD scans the S to identify where it 
falls on the ‘set’ (malicious or genial). The MD presents the results with the matching technique 
to check stored signatures in the database. The investigation may produce a distinctive result as 
a false positive, false negative or hit ratio (Neelakantanand & Rao, 2008). 
A false positive result appears when the system detects malware in a non-active (uninfected) 
database. The attributes of the detected malware are unique, allowing for easy detection in a 
non-malicious file. A false negative result occurs when a detector is unable to find the malicious 
source code in an infected database. This situation usually arises when a scanner or detector 
fails to match the signature or lacks the sample of a signature, making the scanner vulnerable. 
In contrast, the hit ratio is the expected output that all investigators want to achieve. The hit ratio 
only appears when a detector successfully detects a malicious code accurately and when the 
possible signature matches the attributes of the infected file.  
These abovementioned procedures were considered as the fundamentals for proposing a new 
framework, which provides a definitive pattern for the existing study. Before proposing a new 
framework for malware detection and analysis, it was critical to perform a comprehensive study 
in this chapter on the existing methods and to study their associated issues and challenges. 
This provided a clear picture of the existing working model and its associated deficiencies and 
vulnerabilities, which were later acknowledged by our proposed system.  
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Although there are various categories to differentiate malware detection methods, three 
distinctive methods are popular among investigators: 1) the signature-based method; 2) the 
specification-based method; and 3) the behaviour-based detection method (Demme et al., 2013; 
Egele et al., 2015; Vinod & Laxmi, 2009; Volunkin & Skormin, 2006; Xu & Sung, 2008). Each 
method poses various issues and challenges. 
5.2.1 Signature-Based Detection and Analysis 
Signatures result from the concatenation of bytes, which is an integral part of malware or 
malicious codes. Malware can be either polymorphic or metamorphic. Polymorphic malware is 
more common; here, the identity and source of the generations are usually hidden, making it 
difficult for investigators to collect evidence against the plotter (Demme et al., 2013). In simple 
malware, the source code, or the initial point of reference of the infected program, is 
reformulated and complete control of the system is transferred to the malicious payload. Each 
source code mutates, but the original system data remain intact. This type of malicious program 
uses a model-based engine that replicates malware viruses each time the user runs the 
program on the system. Metamorphic viruses re-program the source code by modifying the 
basic attributes of the parent program and producing a completely new signature for each 
parent–child variant created in later stages. Thus, due to the nature of metamorphic or 
polymorphic viruses, it is difficult to trust signatures as their integrity will always be at risk. 
Therefore, through the research paradigm, the researcher has ruled out this approach and has 
developed a robust solution (database sets for every modified signature; mechanisms such as 
entropy were included) to tackle the abovementioned issues to enhance the signature detection 
mechanism.  
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Associated Problems and Challenges with Signature-Based Detection and Analysis 
The issues related to signature-based detection and analysis are as follows: 
a) Extracting and distributing the signatures for investigative purposes is complex and time-
consuming; 
b) A distinctive infrastructure for the investigator to perform testing is required, such as using 
penetration research and analysis, a manual process conducted in a controlled 
environment; 
c) The signature from an infected file is often bypassed during investigation, requiring periodic 
updates for new signatures before the time of detection and the analysis process; and 
d) As new signatures are added, the database and malware signature repositories become too 
large to store practically or to manage optimally.  
5.2.2 Specification-Based Detection and Analysis 
Specification-based detection and analysis depends on the details of the source code 
implementation and the deployment of a particular system file or application. The process 
requires thorough knowledge and expertise of each application development phase. This 
process also adopts a hypothetical approach, assuming that each abnormality is proof of a 
malware carrier. The process uses concepts of reverse engineering, which focus on reaching 
the source or initiator during the investigation. Sometimes, multiple run-ups are required to 
debug the source program.  
Problems and Challenges Associated with Specification-Based Detection and Analysis 
The main issue with this technique is that it requires complete accuracy and knowledge of 
system application development. The whole process is performed using predefined procedures 
that must be followed by an investigator, making it difficult to carry out in a real-time 
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environment. Moreover, the system’s procedures must be updated on a regular basis, creating 
new challenges for investigators. 
5.2.3 Behaviour-Based Detection and Analysis 
Most malware detection systems perform automatic detection based on observations of 
anomalous behaviour and system activity. Specific pieces of the actions and reactions created 
by malware harm the system with a specific purpose. One method of analysis is to study the 
sequence of the calling program through the operating system. These application program 
interface (API) activities, which use parameters to identify suspicious activity by eliminating and 
dismissing harmful processes running on the system, can be intercepted by behaviour-based 
malware detection software. Experts have attempted to create various parameters to analyse 
the self-replicated, repeated patterns in infected areas 
Problems and Challenges of Behaviour-Based Detection and Analysis 
The problems related to behaviour-based detection and analysis are as follows:  
a) Behaviour-based detection and analysis focuses on selecting files in the system randomly, 
which can allow malicious content to avoid detection. Even if the malware is detected at a later 
stage, its infectious consequences cannot be reversed, creating a detection failure (Volynkin & 
Skormin, 2006); and  
b) The method is inappropriate for recording previously unknown malware information. This 
allows for malware proliferation, making the system unreliable and the investigation complex 
(Egele et al., 2015). 
All of the aforementioned analyses depend on continuous monitoring processes while the 
suspected programs are running. These methods are very risky, as infection could cause harm 
and loss before the system identifies a program as malicious (Xu & Sung, 2008). 
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5.3 Evaluation of Existing Malware Detection Frameworks 
Evaluating various existing frameworks rationalises the need for a new proposed detection 
method. Table 8 depicts the criteria, explaining the limitations of the outlined methods with a 
view to justifying the requirement for the new method. For evaluation, the selection of 
parameters were based on a literature review and analysis (Chapter 2), and distinguishing 
features were based on accuracy, performance and functional operations. The new framework 
would relate to a completely new viewpoint, while acknowledging all previous limitations 
mentioned in existing frameworks. This analysis was critical in proposing the solution as a 
framework for the given problem statement. Special consideration was given to these limitations 
and was proposed as a critical feature in the new system. 
Parameter Limitation of Current Framework 
Recovery Only a few anti-malware tools (Spybot, Norton, etc.) provide auto-recovery 
functions, but the ones that do still fail to detect residual traces of malicious codes 
in infected files (Sharif et al., 2008). 
Usability Most of the frameworks are designed to detect only processes that are untrusted 
and suspicious and non-functioning malware remains active (Reiter & Yen, 2008). 
Performance Existing methods lack robust monitoring systems to analyse the existing stage of 
the central processing unit (CPU). A higher workload during analysis leads to a 
higher chance of downtime (Yin, 2007). 
Functional 
Operations 
The framework proposes either static or dynamic functions, and both have their 
own limitations; still, no system carries a combination of both (Kolbitsch et al., 
2010). 
Reinfection 
Detection 
A process of reinfection is very common, but there is no special consideration of 
the reinfection phase in most existing methods (Sharif et al., 2008). 
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Table 8: Limitations of Existing Frameworks using Selective Parameters 
Detection Method Accuracy Performance 
Functional 
Operations 
Signature-based  The likelihood of not 
understanding 
malicious behaviour is 
high; thus, there is no 
accurate or appropriate 
method to represent 
malware with a correct 
signature every time 
(Barabas et al., 2013). 
As this method is very 
dependent on human 
expertise to generate a 
signature, the 
likelihood of human 
error is greater, 
resulting in fluctuating 
performance (Li et al., 
2008). 
The process is time-
consuming, as an 
expert is needed to add 
new signatures each 
time a malware 
infection is detected 
(Newsome et al., 
2005). 
 
Specification-based  A major limitation of 
this method is the level 
of inaccuracy of the 
results. It is difficult to 
maintain accuracy 
when analysing the 
behaviour of malware 
based on pre-defined 
specifications (Fortinet, 
2017; Moser & 
Kruegel, 2007). 
This method is based 
on attaining a fixed 
result of a certain set of 
rules and patterns. It is 
a complex method, as 
explaining the total 
behaviour of malware 
through fixed rules is 
difficult. Thus, the 
chances of detecting 
invalid behaviours 
become more likely 
(Moser & Kruegel, 
2007). 
This method uses 
system calls to 
understand the 
malware specification, 
so issues such as 
detecting malware 
shadow processes 
become infeasible, 
thereby limiting 
functionality for the 
investigator (Ma et al., 
2010). 
Behaviour-based This method is based 
on comparing recorded 
behaviour with 
detected malware. If 
the exception in the 
detection phase has 
never been recorded, 
then the chances of 
obtaining an error 
increase. Thus, the 
method is prone to 
false detection 
(Brumley et al., 2007). 
If analysis of the 
infected files is 
performed in an 
inappropriate 
environment, the 
chances of 
inappropriate results 
increase. Hence, this 
method does not 
enhance overall 
system performance 
(Liu et al., 2007). 
This system lacks 
major functional 
attributes. For 
example, when 
malware infection 
causes a loss of data 
confidentiality, this 
cannot be detected and 
can result in limited 
operations on the 
client’s machine 
(Brumley et al., 2007). 
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Table 9: The Distinctions between Current Malware Detection Methods Based on Parameters 
 
 
5.4 Requirements for the New Framework 
Table 8 gives a comprehensive analysis of the limitations existing in the current malware 
detection frameworks and methods. These limitations and vulnerabilities attract a significant 
increase in malware attacks and exposure, which results in the loss of the information security 
triad (CIA); that is, confidentiality, which is detrimental to the integrity and availability of data (in 
Barabas et al., 2013; Li et al., 2008; Ma et al., 2010; Moser et al., 2007; Newsome et al., 2005). 
Current malware detection mechanisms and methodologies suffer from inefficiency and 
inaccuracy as they concentrate on specific malware categories, which can be easily negotiated 
through obfuscation techniques. There is a great need to research and focus on a new 
formalised approach to collect, analyse and remove malicious content from a system. To 
address the challenges faced by investigators, there is possibly a need and, therefore, an 
opportunity to use tools based on both static and dynamic techniques (hybrid technique), which 
are able to address associated problems with malware detection. Duo combination has been 
used before in various frameworks for investigation, but due to limitations and challenges 
associated with the speed and timeframe, it has had limited success in the field of malware 
investigation. However, user feedback (from Chapter 4) regarding slowness was not an 
apparent result in a succession of artefact operations, thus was widely accepted for our 
proposed framework. Moreover, in the proposed framework, the duo was integrated only after 
the acquisition of malware, which makes the solution more effective for detection and analysis. 
Having this functionality can assist the system in analysing the malware sample before starting 
an investigation. In a situation where the attributes of a sample infected file or a captured 
malware match the attributes in the database, it directly jumps to the solution. This makes the 
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system more efficient in terms of time and cost.   Moreover, these two methods were kept tightly 
coupled, more agile and comprehensive in nature to provide better results.  
Based on the above challenges and conditions faced by the investigator in detecting and 
analysing malware, it is essential to propose a new effective framework to enhance the ability to 
obtain results. Through rigorous research and expertise, the researcher has identified the issues 
and made a new model, which appears more effective and efficient in terms of usability, 
performance and flexibility. To ensure that the analysis is comprehensive, the framework works 
with both manual and automated processes in detecting and warning the system. The aim is for 
the proposed framework to become integrated with the present system to detect and analyse 
malware activities. To understand the nature of the necessary changes, an extensive search of 
existing market availability was conducted and analysed in the field to gather information to 
develop a new framework. The results, which were outlined in Chapter 4, illustrated problems 
faced by investigators and the vulnerabilities that exist in malware detection. The following are 
some of the important insights from the market analysis, which were identified to bring the 
problem statement into clear view to propose new framework: 
a) The core problem faced by investigators was to identify the level of malware infection in the 
file; 
b) Most of the infections were both critical and complex. Thus, there is a need for an effective 
method to reduce any associated complications; 
c) Although there are tools that are capable of detecting malware and other malicious codes, 
many produce inaccurate or incomplete results; 
d) Most of the investigators wanted to use tools based on both dynamic and static 
methodologies; 
e) Managing and updating the malware database is a task that should be given priority;  
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f) Open source tools were favoured over commercial or shareware-based tools during 
malware detection; and 
g) There is a need for more customised tools for malware detection. 
5.5 The Proposed Framework: The TCMA Method 
The required framework was designed as an effective malware detection and analysis tool 
based on the results obtained from the secondary research conducted for the survey report. The 
proposed framework is called the triple-tier centralised online real-time environment (tri-CORE) 
malware analysis (TCMA) method. The method includes three distinct phases of detection and 
analysis in which the entire research pattern is divided into three different domains called tiers. 
The tiers can be defined as the malware acquisition function, detection and analysis, and the 
database operational function. Using a technique of encryption in the model to improve the 
security level of the code itself from a malware attack, these tiers help ensure the complete 
integrity and availability of required information during the investigation and also help provide a 
comprehensive approach to ensuring document fidelity. Defining tiers is a completely novel 
approach developed by the author to make the model more effective and efficient. This 
approach provides an independent process layer, which links various independent malware 
detection approaches towards a single end-to-end execution system, removing all the 
associated static constraints in the study. The TCMA method defines various policies, 
categorises organisational assets and creates a new environmental variable for the process. 
The framework is designed to confirm malware infection using any standard of deployment. It is 
an unbiased model that initialises its operation by first confirming the malware infection and then 
by analysing, detecting and proliferating it. The objectives in developing this framework were to 
understand the detection costs associated with dealing with malware discovery and analysis 
within an associated environment, and to provide accurate and precise information to enhance 
the performance matrices. As mentioned above, the entire process is divided into the following 
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three phases or tiers:  
a) The malware acquisition function; 
b) Detection and analysis; and 
c) The database operational function  
Figure 36 defines the relationships between these different phases of the process. Each phase 
is explained with consideration of its implementation. 
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Figure 36 Illustration of the Three-Phase Process for TCMA (Source: author) 
 
5.5.1 Phase 1: The Malware Acquisition Function 
Phase 1 begins by identifying the presence of malware code in the suspicious file. It deals with 
the operations and processes concerning the confirmation that a particular file is infected by 
malware. In Phase 1, the author has added functionalities (mentioned below) that can be used 
to detect both active and passive infections in a compromised system. This phase includes the 
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following components: 
a) Notification: Acquisition can be initiated in a number of ways, including alerts from a third 
party (cash management system [CMS] or any payment gateway system or intrusion 
detection systems [IDSs]) or from a destination suite. This function acts as a checkpoint to 
determine whether the issue occurring in the system is realistically a threat (Park, 2012); 
b) Quarantine: The main objective of this functionality is to collect the infected files from the 
system to separate them from the rest of the healthy files on the system and ultimately 
remove them. This prevents any reinfection or replication of malicious code from being 
transmitted to other files (Park, 2012); 
c) Triage process: This function, also called the identifier, scrutinises the criticality present in 
the malware infection. It contains a process of analysis to categorise the level or status of 
the problem (high/medium/low degree of seriousness; Blount et al., 2016); and 
d) Infection confirmation: Before this stage, investigators have obtained enough information on 
the status of the infected file; hence, the infection confirmation function can determine the 
next course of action for the investigator (Blount et al., 2016). 
Depending on the evidence collected in Phase 1, an investigator could take one of the following 
actions: 
a) If the selected file is not infected, then the entire process can be terminated. The 
investigation can return to the initial process and the status can be declared normal; 
b) If malware infection is declared, then a thorough analysis of the detected malware infection 
can be conducted, or the process of remediation can take place; 
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c) If the decision to analyse the infected file is made, then a record of investigation is 
necessary to obtain more information about the stages and the nature of the infection (Adeel 
& Tokarchuk, 2011); and 
d) If malware is identified, then proliferation proceeds. It must be determined whether the 
detected malware matches any of the signatures or attributes stored in the database. If not, 
then this operation adds the new information to the database for future reference.  
5.5.2 Phase 2: Detection and Analysis 
Based on the results of the previous phase, files may be confirmed as infected by malware. 
Therefore, obtaining complete and accurate information about the phase activity and its goals is 
vital. Phase 2, as shown in Figure 37, identifies various attacks, clarifying whether the attack 
attempts to steal passwords, threatens the confidentiality of the data file, and so on. If it is 
difficult for an investigator to determine the rationale behind the attack and the consequences of 
the threat, then further analysis of the infected file is required to obtain details of the malware 
source. 
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Figure 37 shows description of the second phase of TCMA (Source: author) 
 
Detection and analysis illustrates the output functionality taken from Phase 1 (malware 
acquisition). After the investigator confirms the presence of malware, the captured malicious 
code is explored and its definitive characteristics are evaluated (Cavallaro et al., 2008). Defining 
and stating the attributes of the malware may aid the process of malware proliferation, which 
could further add information for updating and developing a fresh malware database (Phase 3). 
This is subcategorised further according to the variabilities described below. 
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(A) Building a Controlled Environment  
Before further analysis and evaluation, it is important to develop a controlled environment for 
safer investigation. Safe investigation helps protect the environment from reinfection. This is a 
singular operative process, but with a dynamic environment and changes in requirements, the 
investigator must follow an ongoing analysis to achieve expected investigative goals and 
objectives (Chen et al., 2012). The fundamental idea behind the use of a controlled environment 
is to protect any system from the execution of a malicious code where it cannot harm other 
systems. This is typically achieved by emulating a real environment but restricting connections 
to it (SANS, 2009). The following proactive development is required for building a controlled 
environment:  
 Secluding the infected file: Keeping the infected file away from live data is important. 
Infected files should be kept in quarantine to prevent any replication or reinfection in the 
network; 
 Providing a separate network for investigation: During the investigation, it is important to 
select a separate network, including a separate ISP; 
 Testing tools: All testing tools used for the investigative process should be clean before 
beginning the analysis. This aids in reducing complexities and confusion in later stages. This 
was extensively done by an auto-termination system, which restarts the tool every time a 
report is made; 
 Keeping a log file: A log file should have special preference during investigation, as it carries 
the essentials regarding the activities performed on the infected file. Log files record each 
step for analysis, which can further ensure that the investigation is carried out according to 
specified rules and regulations; and 
 Sandboxing for analysis: It is always preferable to conduct all analysis techniques in a 
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separate sandbox environment, as this makes it easier to perform evaluation without 
worrying about infecting memory files and other important system attributes. 
(B) Variable Analysis  
In this stage, the method and technique for malware detection that are to be used is decided. 
This method ensures the selection of one or more methods in this stage of malware detection. If 
an investigator chooses to go for multiple methods, then variable analysis provides a selection 
of different static and dynamic methods to carry out an investigation.  
(C) Static Analysis 
Static analysis is the most popular analysis technique and is performed on any suspected file 
system. All identified attributes can be used to add new information concerning malware 
proliferation and update the database for carrying out future detections. Malware always leaves 
traces and evidence; hence, a thorough investigation on executable files must be conducted 
through static analysis to predetermine future threats to the system. Each activity can be 
monitored and reports may be made in a variety of ways, including information on network 
accessibility and performance on the operation of the associated file system and internal 
storage. To optimise the static analysis process, the following guidelines should be followed 
(Cavallaro et al., 2008): 
 Initial analysis: This involves investigation of the obvious symptoms of the attack to 
identify the nature of the infected file. First, the fingerprint of the file is matched to any 
existing malware profiles in the database (this is usually be done with MD5 hashing); 
 Classifying the format of the file: In analysing files, each executable file contains 
schemata that may yield specific information about the attacker and the intention of the 
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attack. An analysis of information from menus, version information and calling functions 
could reveal a vast amount of evidence (Cavallaro et al., 2008); 
 Analysing text strings: It is always important to scan the isolated text strings present in 
the infected file. Using various keywords in the built-in search field can help to retrieve 
the associated evidence; and 
 Debugging: The last step for a static analysis is to conduct a process of disassembly. 
This helps to determine patterns, which can be helpful in identifying the attacker 
(Cavallaro et al., 2008). 
(D) Dynamic Analysis  
As previously mentioned, a static analysis is an initial activity performed by an investigator to 
gather generalised information on an infected file. As each piece of gathered information is 
important, the objective of the malware profiling must be maintained for the database to prevent 
future attack attempts. Moreover, a database can assist an investigator to work more efficiently 
in later stages. Although malware infection can be distinguished at premature stages, it is 
possible for unauthorised modifications to remain undetected. This can lead to compromises 
within the system after the attack. To obtain more details about the attacker, the dynamic 
analysis technique could be applied. Dynamic analysis typically gathers information on the 
following (Adeel & Tokarchuk, 2011): 
 Memory: Malware often results in serious modulations of the buffer flow of the system and 
the critical programs and applications. Thus, a dense analysis of the volatile memory is 
required to obtain valuable information about the traces of malware activities and the 
intention to access the internal memories of the system; 
 Exploring system registries: This process involves evaluating and performing an analysis on 
the changes occurring in the registry keys. The compromised system stores and illustrates 
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the exact modifications and activities that occurred on the system during the attack, which 
assist the investigator by easily providing evidence against the attacker; 
 Investigation processes and running services: Investigating processes that were running in 
the system could show evidence of malware intention to start or stop particular processes 
intentionally. Analysing the running processes can illustrate the initial stage and the source’s 
associated record of accomplishment; and 
 Scanning for installed virtual machines: Investigating installed virtual machines in the system 
can assist the investigator in continuing the evaluation process. Malware could be inactive 
after virtual machines are detected, so the investigator will watch for the presence of virtual 
machines on the hardware to detect a virtual machine freely running inside the system. 
Dynamic analysis is further differentiated into the following three types: (i) network analysis; (ii) 
device scanning; and (iii) file content analysis.  
(i) Network analysis: A tremendous increase in the growth of malware varieties has made it 
increasingly difficult to detect each anomaly present in and around a system. There has also 
been a significant increase in the number of attack variables; therefore, it is important to deploy 
network security parameters to safeguard end users while coping with malware and traffic 
growth from both internal and external threats. Integrating a network analysis mechanism into a 
dynamic analysis is critical for malware detection, as networks are not vulnerable to malware 
practices that involve overthrowing and bypassing system security (Cobb, 2013); however, this 
will remain challenging for the investigator. A network analysis requires perfect synchronisation 
with other tools to be effective; if it is not properly tuned to the environment, this analysis can act 
too aggressively for mission-critical applications and other system processes.  
Traditional malware detection methods only involve the database, which contains only signature 
marks or vendor-written scripts and protocols in which detection systems are isolated and 
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investigative pieces of malware are written and recorded. In contrast, embedding a network 
analysis for malware captures both known and unknown malicious activity by isolating all 
suspicious files and programs in a sandbox environment to confirm the detected behaviour 
(Keragala, 2016). In addition, the embedding network analysis tool can further help with 
investigating custom and polymorphic malicious programs often performed in APT-class 
attacks, as mentioned above. To improve the framework further (in later stages), a network 
analysis might be moved from a physical database server to a cloud-based server, which may 
help to reduce costs and increase the scalability and accuracy rates. 
A network analysis was used to identify various types of malware-related attacks, such as 
analysing communication patterns between the compromised system and the attacker’s control 
system. By analysing only network-based activities and parameters, such as protocols, ports, 
file extensions, type of content and time, an investigator should obtain a complete overview of 
the possible breach character, as well as information on the attacker (Celeda et al., 2010). 
(ii) Device scanning: Device scanning is a simple but important tool in the proposed 
framework. The operating system is quickly scanned; hardware and installed programs on the 
computer are examined to discover any unauthorised activity. Device scanning will use process-
scanning tools to check running rootkits, such as unwanted start-ups, executable files, 
maximum CPU-utilising programs, false APIs, and unwanted browsing and connections on the 
operative system. 
(iii) File content scanning: Files are an important part of the system, as they carry data 
processed by the user and display any activity on the system before a compromise. Hence, file 
content analysis for the new framework is important, as malicious coding (also called Malcode) 
can be easily concealed, remain unseen in all extensible files and become embedded in 
executable applications. As such, an extensive approach is required to implement the analysis. 
Several tools are available that could be integrated into later stages of implementation to detect 
 112 
hash files, identify file types and extensions, check for hidden Malcode, extract metadata for 
patterns, investigate anomalous content, extricate embedded files from the system, and so on 
(Fortinet, 2017). 
One of the major issues concerning previous detection methods is the system’s inability to 
identify ambiguous malware that is fully encrypted. In these scenarios, evaluating the content of 
the file is always recommended. File content analysis can be further justified by calculating the 
entropy of the file or evaluating the specific structure of the string in the file (Davis, 2009). 
The method for calculating entropy can be employed to investigate files that are compressed, 
encrypted and modulated into various formats (Davis, 2009). For this scenario, the author has 
selected entropy calculation for any file system standards using the ENT - Pseudorandom 
Number Sequence Test tool, which evaluates results by comparing differences between the 
original and the infected files in a tabular format. This allows for static investigation and simple 
evaluation. In the string analysis method, it is necessary to search for the correct keyword. This 
is typically done through the International Centre for Automotive Technology (ICAT) tool from 
the Sleuth Kit (TSK) and the Auto Spy Browser, which works as a graphical user interface for 
TSK and employs search strings in the infected file (Dowling, 2016). The motivation behind 
using existing technologies was to integrate them in a more effective way into the framework to 
increase their utilisation and to get efficient results.  
The key points for file content analysis are as follows: 
 Analysing the aforementioned cases and samples could be tedious or complex for any 
malware detection system or investigator, so the proposed framework will integrate the 
file content analysis into a single interface, making for a simpler tool for analysts to use; 
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 File content analysis will help investigators to conduct analyses and store results in a 
structured database, which can be used to carry out further analyses (if required) of 
added file samples; and  
 The focus of file content analysis is to detect file type and other extensions, e.g. Word 
tools for .doc and .docx files, portable document format (PDF) tools, etc. to respond in 
an effective manner. 
This framework is an amalgamation of both static and dynamic methods, generating the best 
outcomes by mitigating all associated risks involved. As mentioned, the static analysis method 
assists investigators with analysing the distinctive features of executable files, while the dynamic 
analysis method focuses on the metadata retrieved from the infected file, including various 
parameters, such as the size of the file, its format and the information about the library 
management system. Both methods assist in detecting malware on the system. Compared with 
the standalone methods, the framework with the integrated approach provides a detailed 
analysis while mitigating all of the risks and vulnerabilities associated with the standalone static 
and dynamic methods. 
5.5.3 Phase 3: The Database Operational Function 
The database operational function focuses on database management, which is required to 
create an analysis report on the availability of malware in the system, depicted in Figure 38. The 
information carries various attributes about the detailed analysis of the malware. This 
information is important as it helps to update the existing profile or add a new attribute in 
malware proliferation. Any failure in the notification (Phase 1) could then be remediated to the 
operation of the database to monitor the occurrence of any reinfection of the malware in the 
associated system (Daryabar et al., 2011). Here, ‘remediation’ involves recommending a course 
of action in reference to the information saved in the database (if any) or logging the failure for 
further results.  
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Figure 38: Description of the Third Phase of TCMA (Source: author) 
(A) Building a Malware Profile and Defining Rules 
Building a malware profile is important for future investigation. Samples from past records 
can be used to monitor, analyse and report infected files in the system (Trinius et al., 2009). 
A malware profile could assist in creating enhanced malware proliferation and preventing 
the possibility of reinfection in the future. A malware profile must follow rules to help achieve 
investigative goals. Following the dynamic and static analysis methods (Phase 2) allows the 
actions and manipulations of malware to be identified, which further assists in malware 
investigation. Malware profiling also includes the following: 
 Summarising findings: Before conducting an analysis, it is important to summarise and 
categorise the findings in a single place. This can include compiling attributes from 
selected files, the system registry, running processes, running domains and open ports; 
 Categorising: Classifying the profiles is convenient for other investigators to access 
information; 
 Suiting the profile: Suiting the profile is accomplished through packaging processes in 
which analysts work out the rules of packaging and place all of the packaged material 
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into forensics tools to find inferences and associations for better results. This process 
makes the results more reliable for screening and scanning; and 
 File sharing: All of the related findings should be stored in a way that may be shared 
externally in later stages with other business partners, including strategic vendors, 
conferences or mailing lists.  
Repeating the process of detecting and profiling the malware periodically can prevent malware 
reinfection. Thus, an updated malware profile is another important function that must be 
considered to make Phase 3 more realistic and usable, as well as to ensure that investigative 
methods are robust.  
(B) Collecting a Database 
Collecting malware and managing the database is an important aspect of the database 
operational function. It involves the collection of new malware detected from the investigation in 
scanning the device and log files in the system. The database contains detailed information 
about the detected malware, such as its definition, the adverse effects of the malware on the 
system and the characteristics that will help to recognise the same malware in the future. During 
the investigation, if any of the files detected as suspicious match the stored attributes, the user 
can be alerted to the existence of the detected file. If new malware is detected through 
investigative tools, then the same database can be updated with new definitions. Detecting and 
scanning malware through the malware database could be an effective tool for investigations; 
however, this process requires regular updates on profiling so that users do not miss new 
malware in the system.  
(i) Scanning Devices  
Scanning the connected devices helps in testing the files for infection. Although scanning is a 
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traditional process for malware detection, new additions are being integrated to make it more 
robust. The new processes involved in the scanning process are as follows: 
 A rule-based testing environment: In any investigation it is important to define scanning 
rules before initiating the testing process. Thus, it was important for the researcher to 
create a rule-based environment in the framework for a distinguishable initialisation of the 
process. The rules can be created based on the generated profile, and they can be saved 
in the tool itself to highlight various malware definitions;  
 Analysing to the core: Once scanning is completed, it is important to analyse grey areas. 
It is possible that more than one system has been compromised, so it is important to 
carefully analyse and obtain the marker points, which can provide more clarity on the 
source device; and 
 A rigorous documentation process: After the devices are scanned and a thorough 
analysis has been performed, documentation is created for future reference. 
Documentation can be as simple as writing a name with the IP or media access control 
(MAC) address of the device to create dissemination among the devices in the network. 
In sharing, such as using documentation for evidence in court, the documentation needs 
to be more formal and standardised. The most important thing to remember in 
documentation is that no assumptions should be made; everything should be based on 
data from the investigation. This process is completely dependent on the reliability and 
authenticity of a genuine and competent investigator following documentation norms, 
allowing for a data-driven approach based on facts rather than hypothesis. 
(ii) Scanning the log files  
Scanning the log files’ content can also provide facts and clues that can be combined to make 
an investigation more effective and efficient. The following steps can be taken: 
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 Search for logged information: Similar to scanning the devices with tools, scanning log files 
can also work on the markers defined in malware profiling. Searching logs can be initiated 
by searching network logs and repositories, followed by scanning tasks, executable loaders, 
running processes and device logs in the system. Scanning log files provides an additional 
advantage in the investigation of inactive or unstable malware; 
 Results analysis: To complete the investigative process, it is necessary to summarise testing 
through an analysis report. Creating statistics through data mining is an effective method to 
conduct an analysis on the system; and 
 Documentation: As in the documentation process explained for device scanning, 
documentation can be carefully created to maintain usability, reliability and priorities.  
(C) The Process of Remediation 
The process of remediation is only effective in stages in which the investigation has already 
confirmed the presence of malware in the system. A decision then has to be made regarding the 
necessity of cleaning the malware. In some situations, remediation would be undesirable (such 
as in cybercrime evidence); however, once it has been decided to continue with the mediation 
process, wiping down the whole system, including the infected file, may be necessary. As 
modern malware is strong, starting the system over for remediation surety is always 
recommended. The effectiveness of remediation cannot ensure the cleaning of the infected file 
or malware, so it is always better to test remediation effects immediately after the process is 
complete.  
It is very important for every investigation to have an effective and efficient model for detecting 
and analysing malware. As all investigations need a comprehensive approach to finalise the 
result, it is important to have an integrated model where all functionalities should be linked to 
one another.  
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In Tier 1, the malware acquisition function, the main purpose is to confirm whether or not the 
given malware is infected. If the file is discovered to contain a malware infection, then the whole 
process will be shifted to Tier 2, malware detection and analysis. 
Tier 2 will use the hybrid methodology (employing both static and dynamic methods) to perform 
comprehensive analysis. Each result will then be shifted to Tier 3, database operational 
function,  for malware proliferation and data remediation. 
5.6 Summary 
The current chapter proposed and described the rationale behind an effective malware 
detection and analysis framework. This framework was developed based on market research 
carried out in Chapter 4 where various rational flaws that exist in the investigative processes for 
detecting malware in information systems were highlighted by current users. Moreover, upon 
further investigation, vulnerabilities and limitations were found in existing forensics tools for 
investigating malware, which were illustrated based on specific parameters, such as recovery, 
usability, performance, functional operations and the reinfection detection process. This chapter 
progressed the identified limitations in the investigative processes where a critical comparison 
was performed between signature-based, specification-based and behaviour-based detection 
methods, focusing on the limitations in their accuracy, performance and functionality. Thus, a 
need was identified to develop and deploy a new system that would assist investigators in the 
accurate and complete detection and analysis of malware without compromising data integrity. 
A new framework called the TCMA (tri-CORE malware analysis) method was subsequently 
proposed. The three (tri) tiers within this method are based on three distinctive phases of 
detection and analysis in which the entire research pattern is divided into three different 
domains. The tiers can be defined as the malware acquisition function, detection and analysis, 
and the database operational function. The model could provide a new advantage in the field of 
 119 
digital forensics by reducing the cost of buying different tools, providing accurate information 
and increasing the throughput compared to other existing investigative tools. New functionalities 
were integrated and measured (by critically analysing related literature and corresponding 
market analysis results) before being put into the framework, making it more advanced, efficient 
and effective than any existing models for malware detection. New parameters such as 
recovery, usability, performance, functional operations and a reinfection detection mechanism 
were introduced, which were seen as restrictions in the current frameworks (ref: Table 7). 
Consideration was also given to the comparisons between current malware detection methods 
on the basis of accuracy, performance and operation rate to conduct a critical review of their 
performance (ref: Table 8). 
New functionalities, such as introducing network analysis as a part of dynamic scanning, give 
the new framework an advantage. Network analysis for malware captures both known and 
unknown malicious activity by isolating all suspicious files and programs in a sandbox 
environment to confirm the detected behaviour; in contrast, traditional malware detection 
methods are typically only based on the database, which contains signature marks or vendor-
written scripts. Even in terms of scanning, the new rule-based method and documentation 
process adds more ease and accuracy in malware investigations. Nevertheless, the proposed 
framework has contributed to the field of IT security and forensics and has also helped in 
collecting the artefact (Toolkit) requirement, development and testing (discussed in Chapter 6) 
for the existing study. The critical functionalities from the proposed framework will be utilised to 
define a simple yet robust integrated open source malware detection software, which will help 
the investigator develop skills to critically respond to the cyber incidents with flexibility in any 
required environment.   
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CHAPTER 6 - ARTEFACT DEVELOPMENT 
6.1 Overview: Building a Malware Analysis Toolkit 
Exploiting the capabilities of malware detection software allows investigative teams to explain 
and declare the nature of the incident, which can reduce further infections in the future. In this 
chapter, it is the author’s intention to develop an artefact that reflects the critical functionalities of 
the proposed framework, as outlined in Chapter 5 – a malware analysis Toolkit, which is simple 
in structure yet sufficiently robust using integrated open source malware detection software 
tools. This Toolkit is a prototype, which can be built into commercial software later for the 
purpose of helping investigators develop skills to critically respond to current cyber incidents 
flexibly and in any dynamic forensic environment.  
It will support the critical needs and requirements by: 
a) Supporting an investigator in analysing given malware; 
b) Ensuring security during the investigation through robust authentication and authorisation 
methods; 
c) Performing a rapid request and response of results; 
d) Creating effective reports on the findings for further analysis; and 
e) Delivering a usable and professional platform for law enforcement. 
 
The development follows prioritisation, reflected from the proposed framework – TCMA (Tri-
Core Malware Analysis), as described in the previous chapter (Chapter 5). The critical values 
that can be deployed in the Toolkit have been identified as: 
a) Minimising the number of investigative cycles; 
b) Maintaining a safe and controlled environment for investigation; 
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c) Performing both static and dynamic investigations through proactive open source tools; 
d) Ensuring incident response situational analyses are efficient; 
e) Using a single platform for multiple malware analyses; 
f) Implementing/deploying only effective tools, reducing the usage of irrelevant tools; 
g) Save investigated data for future usage by accumulating databases; 
h) Minimising the cost of using different tools by amalgamating into a single tool for 
investigation; 
i) Generating a cost-effective reporting structure; and 
j) Decreasing the frequency of paying additional investigators for the same work. 
6.2 About the Toolkit 
The Toolkit is an effective malware detection system comprising multiple accesses to various 
open source malware analysis tools. Open source code, whereby the source code is made 
available for any person to change and distribute the software for any purpose (Andrew, 2004), 
is common in malware security-based software, because it allows more people access to help 
develop it, aiding the development in a rapidly changing environment (Simmons, 2016). The 
selection of open source software for this Toolkit was a conscious effort to minimise upfront 
costs with this development cycle, and was also based on the survey results from Chapter 4, 
the market report and analysis, where respondents gave a preference for the use of open 
source code. Recommendations and preferences were collected through two research 
methods, namely the conceptual work and current analysis. The conceptual work focussed on 
data collected by analysing literature related to the study of malware and its detection processes 
by various scholars and researchers, while current analysis was performed using a primary 
research method (PRM). The PRM included the questionnaires and interviews (refer to 
Appendix A), involving experts and practitioners related to computer security, cybercrime 
investigation and malware detection methodologies. A thorough analysis was performed to 
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establish the outcomes. It was suggested in the results that tools should be used that employ 
both static and dynamic methods for detection (Chapter 4 and Appendix B). The Toolkit is 
capable of carrying out processes that can assist in analysing the infected files and checking the 
optimisation of open source tools available worldwide. A rationale was designed based on 
certain parameters, illustrating the reasons for using the Toolkit over a single tool for malware 
investigation. These are presented in Table 10.  
Parameters 
 
Generalised Single Tool  Designed Toolkit 
Flexibility 
 
If a malware tool does not allow any form 
of modification in its design or method, 
this inflexibility could detract from the 
user’s quality experience. Such tools are 
proprietary software and they do not offer 
any form of modification as they are 
restricted and, therefore, suffer from this 
trait.  
The Toolkit takes a flexible 
approach to customisation and 
allows changes to the design or 
its methodology to suit individual 
user requirements.  
Scope A single tool that has its own particular 
application and is not part of a suite of 
tools; in essence, it has a restricted 
scope and, therefore, has limited usage.  
The Toolkit has a feature to add 
new tools or delete existing tools 
at any stage as required by the 
user. This offers greater scope 
to apply to a range of 
applications, not just a single 
one.  
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Security Most tools come without an 
authentication and authorisation process. 
Any user or investigator can use the tool 
anonymously, thereby increasing the risk 
to integrity. Forensic tools such as 
Wireshark or Registry Monitor are 
desktop-based and can only be installed 
on the same platform, with reports being 
made only on that platform. 
The Toolkit comes with a two-
user authentication system 
(Super Admin and User). All 
activities can be monitored 
through the Super Admin 
account, thereby producing an 
added level of security. 
Reporting 
structure 
Some tools can only provide results to be 
analysed by an investigator. When an 
investigator is using multiple tools, he or 
she needs to follow a multiple tool format 
based on that tool to make reports. With 
every new tool, a new format is needed 
for report creation. No specific or 
standardised reporting formats are 
available, making knowledge transfer 
difficult and requiring prior knowledge for 
use. 
The Toolkit possesses its own 
reporting structure functionality 
in the form of screenshots. This 
makes a reliable, but simple 
output for report creation. A 
single style of reporting can be 
shared and read in same format. 
User interface Each specialised tool comes with its own 
user interface. This increases the 
chances of a less user-friendly 
environment occurring with multiple 
The Toolkit has been designed 
with the focus on developing a 
user-friendly environment. The 
environment is also fully 
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interfaces, and requires the knowledge 
and experience of a multitude of different 
environments. 
customisable which allows users 
to change settings to their 
preference to aid in setting a 
scene that an individual user will 
be familiar and happy with. 
Usage  A single specialised tool is intended to be 
used on a specific scenario and 
environment. They are not intended for 
usage across a wide range of 
applications as they have dedicated 
roles. 
The Toolkit comprises an 
amalgamation of various tools 
present in various categories. It 
can be used in any dynamic 
environment; this offers more 
usability as its application to 
different possible tasks is 
increased.   
Table 10: Comparing Generalised Single Tools with the Designed Toolkit 
 
Further highlights of the developed Toolkit are as follows: 
a) It creates reports on the findings for further analysis; 
b) It has an enhanced GUI for investigating multiple entities; 
c) It decreases the cost of using different tools for investigation; 
d) It reduces the number of investigative cycles; 
e) It uses a single platform for multiple malware analyses; 
f) It is efficient for incident response situational analysis; 
g) It decreases the need to pay additional investigators for the same work; 
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h) It implements only effective tools, reducing the usage of irrelevant tools. Here, 
optimisation refers to using only those tools that are required in a given environment 
while minimising the inappropriate ones; 
i) It saves investigated data for future use in databases; and  
j) It provides a cost-effective reporting structure. When a similar situation occurs, an 
investigator can seek results from the database and can update the previous records, 
preventing any sort of redundancy  
 
Before initialising the development, it is vital to seek answers to some important aspects of the 
work that reflect user notions and conceptions in the field of forensics investigation, such as: 
a) What actions can an investigator take with respect to an infected/ineffective system? 
b) How can evidence against attackers be obtained?  
c) How can a detection process be differentiated based on the nature of the attack? 
d) Is a dynamic solution needed for every scenario, or can all investigations be performed 
with a single tool? 
e) How is the number of tools required for an investigation determined? 
These questions can be addressed only if an investigation is undertaken in a controlled 
environment and by performing a rigorous analysis (Lindorfer et al., 2011). To justify the 
probability of obtaining answers to the abovementioned questions, a prototype has been 
proposed in the form of a malware detection and analysis Toolkit. The objective of developing 
the Toolkit was to reflect the new TCMA framework and propose a live implementation of a 
malware detection system by integrating open source tools for testing. For developing the 
artefact, studies and observations from previous chapters (Chapter 2, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5) 
were considered. It was vital to emphasise a dynamic environment to match users’ expectations 
and requirements; thus, a market research document was included as the key activity. This 
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results in a more definitive problem statement by providing a specification document to model 
software development activities. Once the artefact was developed, this executable system was 
tested under a controlled environment for observation and analysis (in Chapter 7). Figure 9 
shows the relationship between previous research activity and Toolkit development. 
 
Figure 39: Relationship between Research Activity and Toolkit Development (Final Artefact) 
(Source: author) 
6.3 Artefact Development Model 
There are various software development lifecycle methodology models available for developing 
a software-based artefact and, in practice, selected based on the aims or goals of the project 
outcome. This methodology will set out the guidelines for the approach upon which the software 
will be designed, built and maintained. Although various different models do exist, the most 
commonly used are the Waterfall model, the Spiral model and the Iterative model (Alshamrani & 
Bahattab, 2015). Each methodology will have its own particular strengths and weaknesses, but 
all follow a format of sequential steps to allow for a system to be developed.   
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The Waterfall model is a widely known and, therefore, used model where it is considered 
intuitive although less practical. However, all other lifecycle models are derived from the 
Waterfall model (Ruparelia, 2010). As the most widely known model, it is used extensively 
throughout industry (Petersen et al., 2009) and incorporates a logically applied series of steps. 
These steps lay out the process in which development occurs; each step is completed prior to 
starting the next one, although this leads to a less flexible methodology.  
The Spiral model has its place where flexibility is demanded. The project is passed through the 
same phase, or spirals, until it is completed. This allows for multiple refinement opportunities, 
incorporating feedback and, subsequently, making further improvements.  The Spiral model is 
highly personalised due to this feedback loop being directly affected by the end user (Barjatya et 
al., 2017). Alternatively, when a flexible approach is deemed necessary, an Iterative model can 
be incorporated where guidelines are used to help pinpoint the software requirements by testing 
and evaluating through different iterations until each phase is satisfactorily completed. This 
allows a version to be completed relatively quickly, and depending on the required iterative 
loops, a solution can be rapidly found, although conversely, too many loops can result in a large 
resource drain (Ghahrai, 2008). 
In practice, any methodology can be applied to any development process but will carry a 
different level of risk, budget, timeframe, and particular benefit to any specific project. It is 
ultimately up to the developer to examine the strengths and weaknesses of any particular 
methodology and assess these in relation to the project that is to be undertaken. 
The main constraints when the author selected the software development model were based on 
the general domain in which it was to be used, and the timeframe that was deemed suitable for 
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learning and using the model. Based on these constraints, the Waterfall model was selected as 
the standard model for development.   
The Waterfall model was selected as this is one of the simplest and easiest to understand; and 
given the time constraints of this project, these were important factors in adopting a model while 
ensuring an adequate design methodology could be put into place. The Waterfall model is also 
better suited to smaller projects where requirements are well understood and remain less 
dynamic during development, which was well suited to this research domain. Figure 10 shows 
the systematic diagram for a Waterfall model for developing a malware detection and analysis 
Toolkit.  
Figure 40 Systematic Diagram of a Waterfall Model 
(Waterfall Model , 2009) 
Before initialising the process of gathering requirements (Phase 1) and other needs for the 
artefact development, it is important to highlight the problem statement and acknowledge the 
challenges associated with a malware analysis. The malware spectrum is extensive and it is 
important to rigorously analyse it to fully understand the complete threat. No single platform is 
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100% threat-proof or immune to attacks (Mell et al., 2005). As discussed previously (Chapter 2), 
modern malware is multi-layered in nature and possesses many infectious vectors and other 
payloads to make an infection harmful. Traditional detection methods are often not adequate in 
malware detection due to framework customisations. Moreover, attackers are using anti-forensic 
techniques to obfuscate infection and prevent detection (Garfinkel, 2007). Thus, considerable 
time, expertise and knowledge domains are required to quantify modern forensics techniques to 
enable robust detection.  
The two main techniques used by investigators to detecting malware are static and dynamic 
analysis. Static analysis focuses on investigating the code without executing it. Investigation is 
undertaken using dissemblers, searching the string, API callings, library calls and graphs. It 
reconstructs data structures and forms a union with the source code to draw conclusions 
(Sponchioni, 2010; Tratt, 2011). Although the static technique provides valuable information for 
investigation, it is time-consuming and does not allow anti-forensic techniques in the form of 
packers, which are commonly used by attackers, to be detected (Sponchioni, 2010). In contrast, 
dynamic analysis does not focus on source code at all; rather, it highlights the observations 
performed on hosts and networks. It uses mechanisms to investigate the use of registries, files 
and other monitoring tools (Egele et al., 2010). Investigators prefer this technique due to its 
flexibility and usability. Still, using these tools, malware can change its behaviour after being 
detected. Malware can delete itself, decide not to run on a payload or decide to destroy/harm 
the system (Vemparala, 2015). As mentioned in several reports (Damodaran, 2015; Tzermias, 
2011; Zeltser, 2010, 2015), it is more productive to use iterative and recurring techniques, which 
use both static and dynamic tools for an investigation in significant detail (Damodaran, 2015; 
Moser et al., 2007; Tzermias et al., 2011). In the proposed prototype, static and dynamic 
techniques will be used in conjunction. Concatenating static tools will be used to detect malware 
proliferation, and dynamic tools will be used to focus on behavioural detection and signature 
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analysis, which have been shown to provide an advantage, yielding an effective and efficient 
investigation.  
The selected analysis process for artefacts involved a one-dimensional simplistic approach for 
performing malware analysis, as shown in Figure 11. This method was selected for its simplicity 
and ease of implementation to allow for a quick but robust approach. Figure 11 illustrates that 
the malware sample is one of the two inputs to the methodology with a report created as an 
output. The result produced can create feedback, which would then be converted into a report 
format again for improvements through a post-analysis assessment.  
 
Figure 41 Selected Analysis Approach for Performing Malware Analysis  
[Source: author] 
6.3.1 The Requirement Gathering and Analysis Phase for Toolkit Development  
The previous chapters illustrated the findings and associated issues in the study of malware 
development and analysis. It was highlighted how vulnerabilities and limitations exist in the 
current forensic tools for investigating malware, surrounding the recovery, usability, 
performance, functional operations, and reinfection detection processes. Using these 
vulnerabilities and limitations, the value of developing a new system that would help 
 131 
investigators to accurately and completely detect and analyse malware was identified. This new 
system would need to reduce the costs of multiple tool purchases, provide accurate information 
and increase throughput over existing systems. New functionalities to increase the overall 
efficiency and effectiveness were also recommended and would be of further value to a finalised 
product.   
Considering the critical analysis from the literature review and observations from the market 
analysis, needs and requirements were gathered. Development propositions, including system 
planning and details on the execution, which were projected from the proposed framework 
(TCMA as mentioned in Chapter 5) are listed below. 
User Requirements 
a) Generic Functions 
 The system shall allow users to perform multiple investigations through the 
authentication access; 
 There shall be two user roles: Administrators (Super Admin) and Investigators (Users); 
 The system shall allow users to generate reports on each activity performed; 
 The system shall allow Super Admin to add/delete Investigators (users); 
 The system shall allow users to save results in the database, which have been detected 
live from the investigation in the user-specified folder; and 
 Administrators shall be capable of adding/deleting/modifying/viewing any user activity. 
 
b) Security 
 The system shall apply secure login IDs and passwords to provide a robust 
authentication and authorisation mechanism for secure investigation. The self-designed 
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system uses security protocols and encryption. Limited access shall be given based on 
the type of user; and 
 The system shall ensure protection through high-end backup in a given database for 
each record and result generated.  
 
c) Portability 
 The system shall use a programming language which is platform independent. It shall 
also provide an efficient way of developing and running desktop-based applications on 
any operating system, making it portable for use on any configuration. 
 
System Requirements 
The system will have two categories of users: 
 Super Admin: Super admin will have all rights to add/delete/modify any system 
configuration or functionality; and 
 Investigator: Investigator rights will be limited, depending on the case, scenario and 
designation. Investigators can create reports and databases. To ensure data integrity is 
maintained and only the investigator can access their own specific cases, the database 
will be separate for all individual investigators.  
 
The main functions of the system, which includes user profiles based on the access control 
mechanism, are as follows: 
 Login; 
 User creation; 
 The adding/deleting tool category; 
 View list of users; 
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 View list of tools; 
 Upload infected file/linking network; 
 Report generation; 
 Results; and 
 Logs/last records. 
 
Technical Requirements 
a) The software requirements are as follows: 
 Win 7; 
 Oracle VirtualBox; 
 MySQL; and 
 .NET (dot net) Programming 
 
b) Considering the required software, the malware samples to be used in the system, and using 
computing resources capable of running similar applications, the following hardware is required: 
 PC/laptop (any platform); 
 Hard disk (minimum 50 GB); and 
 RAM (4 GB). 
 
6.3.2 Design Phase for Toolkit Development  
The following section shows data flow diagrams and describes the general methodology, 
displaying a graphical representation of how data is passed through the Toolkit. Use case 
diagrams are also provided in this section to describe the actions of the Toolkit system. Also 
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included is an activity diagram, which describes the dynamic aspects of the overall system to 
provide a graphical display of activity-to-activity connections of the Toolkit. 
Data Flow Diagrams 
 
Figure 42: Data Flow Diagram for Admin Panel  
[Source: author] 
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Figure 43: Data Flow Diagram for User Panel  
[Source: author] 
Use Case Diagrams 
 
Figure 44: Use Case Diagram Illustrating Working System  
[Source: author] 
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Figure 45: Use Case Diagram for Admin Panel  
[Source: author]
 
Figure 46 Use Case Diagrams for User Panel [Source: author] 
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Activity Diagram 
 
 
Figure 47: Generic Activity Diagram for System Implementation  
[Source: author] 
6.3.3 Implementation Phase for Toolkit Development 
For implementation, essential hardware and software were acquired and implemented. This 
section explains the implementation of the Toolkit, which can help in developing a malware 
detection toolkit in a more robust and efficient way. It explains various stages for the 
development of an integrated platform that functions as a toolkit for performing an efficient 
malware analysis.  
The entire process of implementation is divided into two investigative domains: 
A. The pre-implementation proposition; and 
B. The post-implementation proposition. 
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A. The Pre-Implementation Proposition focuses on the activities that include the building of 
an integrated toolkit acting as a framework (working model) for analysing malware activity. This 
can be divided into two phases, as follows:  
 Phase 1: Working on the back end; and 
 Phase 2: Working on the front end. 
As the back end possesses the main functionality of the system, this is the phase that is 
developed first. The back end is the brain of the artefact. This is located on the backside, and is 
not visible to the front-end user. It is built with a server side language and database. A back-end 
application will return results to the user via front-end queries in the form of buttons [126]. The 
front end is usually an interface for user communication with the system in a format supported 
by a GUI. This part of the development is visible to the user via a suitable style and material. 
Here, development was made according to the designs and the integrated application source 
code, and then making the code adjustable for back-end services. In addition to the source 
code, the researcher used several predefined libraries and frameworks to make the 
development more simplistic and less time-consuming (Fender & Young, 2013).  
In developing the artefact, the .NET framework was selected for front-end development while 
MySQL was selected for back-end implementation. The rationale for selecting the preferred 
languages used for developing the front and back ends of the artefact is as follows: 
Using .NET as a Platform 
The author selected .NET in the Toolkit implementation because it is encoded with high-end 
security codes that provide secure executions when compared to the traditional languages, 
such as C and C++, which are rigid and restricted in their functionality. .NET provides faster and 
safer executions compared with the other source code languages. This programming language 
is one of the most trusted languages across the globe for developing secure, robust applications 
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that are easily extendable to market needs. This ultimately ensures investment protection at a 
lower cost (Taboada et al., 2009). 
Various attributes make .NET one of the best languages for developers to create desktop-based 
applications, especially those that require dynamism in the operational environment. Some of 
the critical attributes for selection are as follows (Baitsch, 2010; Dickens & Thakur, 2000): 
a) Rapid Execution: .NET provides a rapid platform for executing the source programs 
faster, as the codes are effective during program usage. No other traditional 
programming language provides executions that are as rapid (Microsoft.net, 2017);  
b) Robust Programming Language: .NET is a language that provides a robust 
programming platform, which is aimed to deliver secure, high-level programming code 
implementation. .NET is among the latest and smartest tools for development; it delivers 
the most trusted applications compared with other languages, which offer fewer and less 
secure applications compared to the .NET platform;  
c) Massive Machines: The .NET language is commonly used in large systems that require 
high security and complex functionalities. .NET is a secure language that is easy to 
maintain at a low cost. The language is often implemented in large organisations to 
secure back-end operations (Sheriff, 2017);  
d) Flexible Operations: .NET is flexible in its operations and interface, as performance 
enhancements can be easily accepted without changing the structure of the source 
codes. .NET virtual machines can be deployed in current applications without 
recompiling the existing codes. Technology hardware configurations and operating 
systems can be advanced without making any complex changes in architectural 
interfaces; 
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e) Performance: Programming languages can be compared based on performance, which 
can be evaluated at the time of using any developed applications. The .NET language 
creates a benchmark for delivering the speediest performance amongst other languages 
(Obasanjo, 2013); 
f) Ease of Development: An important factor for any developed application is how user-
friendly the application is, and any good application must be embedded with a good 
quality code and a debugging functionality, which is embedded in all .NET applications 
(Obasanjo, 2013); 
g) Ease of Maintenance: Maintenance of any developed product must not be complex, as 
it will be difficult to use with complex functionalities; the .NET language is best for 
providing the core functionalities, such as monitoring and error diagnostics; and 
h) Portability: The .NET language is built using the Common Language Infrastructure 
(CLI), a language-neutral platform that allows functions within .NET to not be specifically 
tied to a single developmental language. This allows for modifications, upgrades and 
source code adaptations written in various languages to be used in .NET, allowing for a 
wider audience of code developers to easily implement change. 
 
Using MySQL as a Database Tier 
MySQL is a fast, reliable database system based on relational methods. There are many 
database platforms, such as DB2 and MaxDb, and amongst them, MySQL is considered the 
most trusted platform for managing database operations (Lee, 2013). 
The basic characteristics of MySQL justify its selection for a database tier. Some of the 
essential attributes are as follows (Kulshrestha & Suchdeva, 2014): 
a) Supports the Client/Server System: MySQL is a standard database procedure that is 
based on the client/server architecture. The client/server architecture is a standard 
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security system; it is responsible for maintaining the security of the data, as client and 
server data can be maintained on different servers, and the information is shared on a 
secure platform. Other database companies, such as Oracle and Microsoft, also support 
the client/server architecture, but they focus more on file servers. The drawback of using 
the file server system is that it becomes overloaded as the number of clients in its 
database tables increases; 
b) SQL Compatibility: SQL stands for ‘standard query language’; this is responsible for 
running statements such as the data manipulation and the data control language. These 
are the standard statements for retrieving and updating the contents of the database, 
and MySQL supports these operations; 
c) Platform Independence: A MySQL database can run on a variety of operating system 
platforms, such as Windows, Linux and Macintosh, and it supports UNIX variants as 
well. Thus, MySQL is considered platform-independent, making it an international 
platform for managing the back-end operations of worldwide applications; and 
d) Fast Executions: The MySQL database supports fast executions of updating and 
retrieving the content in the database, as the source codes are efficiently embedded in 
the database coding. The MySQL coding tests a variety of platforms, thereby rapidly 
retrieving database operations. 
B. Post-Implementation Proposition focuses on the activities related to individual testing of 
the tools in a controlled environment. Selecting an appropriate tool is vital, as it assists in 
making a powerful yet cost-effective instrument for analysis. A scheme was devised for 
different phases of developing a controlled analysis lab and was based on the work outlined 
by Zeltser (2015). The development was conducted through the phases listed in Table 11. 
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Phase Task Example 
1 Allocating a physical or virtual system 
for the analysis laboratory 
Oracle VirtualBox 
2 Selecting a behavioural/signature 
network/process analysis tool 
Process Hacker, Wireshark, etc. 
3 Testing the tools on sample malware Running the system in a safe 
environment and then running the 
selected malware to capture results 
4 Analysing the recorded data The result is recorded and saved in the 
database selected by the user 
5 Results and conclusions Analysis, evaluation and reports can be 
formulated while investigating the 
captured output 
Table 11: Phases of the Post-Implementation Proposition of the Toolkit 
 
6.3.4 Testing Phase for Toolkit Development  
Testing is an important phase in the development of software as it executes and runs the 
system to observe it working. Before initialising this phase, it is important to create suitable 
environmental conditions for running the system. For this, an infected system was required 
which can be further investigated to generate high-end results. Furthermore, it is essential to 
select appropriate tools for conducting successful testing investigative processes for clearer 
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observation later (in the next chapter of this thesis). This section is divided into two phases: 
Phase 1 discusses the attributes for developing a safe analysis laboratory as an environment for 
conducting investigations; Phase 2 discusses the selection of open source tools for integrating 
the Toolkit.    
Phase 1: Allocate physical or virtual systems for the analysis laboratory. 
A common approach to examining malicious software involves infecting a system with a 
malware specimen, and then using appropriate monitoring tools to observe how it behaves. This 
requires a laboratory system that can be infected without affecting the production environment. 
The most popular, flexible approach to setting up a lab system involves virtualisation software, 
which allows the use of a single physical computer for hosting multiple virtual systems, each 
potentially running a different operating system.  
For the present development, the author used Oracle VirtualBox. VirtualBox is an open source 
proprietary licence, making the research more cost-effective than many other virtual software; 
moreover, for academic purposes, especially with a Windows desktop, this virtual software is 
robust and reliable. The following are some important points that should be considered when 
allocating virtual systems for a safe environment: 
a) Deploying and running virtual environments together on a (isolated) single machine is 
essential and vital for analysing malware in which interactions and analyses from other 
systems, obfuscating data and other instructions from hackers or updating systems are 
required. In all situations, virtualisation can be easier and more flexible for users than 
installing numerous sandboxes (Broder, 2012); 
b) Another very useful capability of a virtualised environment is that it can take instant 
snapshots of the complete system, thereby working as a laboratory for investigation. 
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This can help to possibly record the status of the system before and after the infection, 
and then to remediate the environment back to normal with a single click of a button for 
analysis (Distler, 2007); and  
c) During installation and while using a virtualisation environment, maximum random 
access memory (RAM) is installed and kept in the physical system, as this can represent 
the most important factor in increasing the performance of the analysis. Moreover, a 
larger hard drive is installed to host several virtual machines on a single system, allowing 
it to store the maximum number of files for investigation (Broder, 2012). 
 
 
Figure 48: Screenshot of VirtualBox Installation (Source: author) 
 
Phase 2: Selecting Tool for Investigation 
Before downloading of the infection or an infected malware specimen can begin, it is important 
to install all appropriate tools for analysis purposes prior to the system becoming corrupted. To 
select the tools, free utilities available to the author from various sources have been 
downloaded and installed; these will be discussed in the next chapter (Chapter 7) in terms of 
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observing Windows malware. Authentic sources were selected from which the tools were 
downloaded directly from official websites. The selection of tools was based on a market 
analysis, which was discussed in Chapter 4, from which selections were made for testing 
purposes. Some of the selected Toolkit tools are explained in detail. 
SmartSniff Packet Analyser 
SmartSniff Packet Analyser is a packet analyser tool that works on sniffing network packets that 
are passing through the network adapter; it also checks the data conversations occurring 
between the server and client. The complete format can be viewed in both ASCII and test mode 
for protocols like FTP, HTTP and SMTP or hex dumps (Nirsoft, 2015). Some of the features that 
were considered vital in the testing are as follows (Black, 2015):  
a) Display Interface: This tool comes in three different interface modes to view captured 
data: hex dumps, ASCII and hybrid mode (automatic). In hybrid mode, the tool checks 
the first stream of data packets and displays data in hex mode or ASCII mode, 
depending on the number of characters; 
b) Exporting the Result: The captured result can then be transferred into another 
application based on the requirements of the investigator/user. By selecting options, the 
captured data can be copied into a clipboard and then later exported to any supported 
extensions, such as Excel or Word, or even saved in HTML or XML. Alternatively, a user 
can select TCP/IP streams and copy/paste them directly into Notepad, Microsoft Word or 
any editor. Additionally, these can be directly exported as raw data or HTML files. Any 
captured documents can be attached with other results in the Report Section of the 
Toolkit; and 
c) Display Filters: There are several options for filtering the streaming of data packets to 
investigate different selections, such as for displaying packets only for TCP port 80 and 
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for including UDP packets for port 53 (DNS). 
 
Buster Sandbox Analyser 
A sandbox analyser is a malware detection tool designed for observing the behaviour of the 
processes and modifications that are performed on the system, and then to undertake an 
evaluation to detect the presence of malware in the system. The changes can be categorised 
into various types, such as file system, modification to the registry files and port changes. The 
following points illustrate some of the important aspects of an investigation using a sandbox 
analyser (Buster, 2013; McRee, 2012): 
a) To obtain valuable information, it is essential to analyse the file system while creating, 
deleting and modifying. The extension of the file and the section where it was created 
are the most important factors for collecting valuable information; 
b) A sandbox analyser also provides information on the modification performed on the 
Windows registry. These changes include modulation in value keys, a newly added 
registry or registries deleted from the system; 
c) It provides information on the port changes, especially when a connection is established 
from outside the system or a port is left open on a local domain. It also collects 
information when an open port is listening to packets for incoming connections; 
d) This tool illustrates a list of the modifications performed by the malware on the system, 
for example, if any unauthorised software was installed and where exactly it is located; 
and 
e) In addition, it also shows system changes initiated by the actions of the installed 
malware or infectious files in the system. Issues such as keyboard logging, Window 
session termination, loading of unwanted drivers and the connection to the internet can 
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be scrutinised, and then a user can take appropriate actions.  
 
Process Hacker 
Process Hacker is a sophisticated tool for monitoring Windows that assists in analysing 
registries, process trees and threads running on a real-time system. It is an open source tool 
that views all running processes and includes a memory editor. It also has powerful features, 
such as termination processes and a Regex memory searcher. One of the main features is its 
ability to detect malware while troubleshooting for other unwanted activities. Some of the silent 
features include (Smith, 2010; Source Forge, 2015): 
a) Assisting in accumulating more data for investigative operations using input and output 
parameters; 
b) Providing non-destructive features that permit an investigator to filter processes without 
losing the integrity of the data; 
c) Capturing complex stacks of the process threads for each operational activity and 
making it possible for users to reach the root cause of the problem; 
d) Showing each detail of the process activities, including the directory path, the user 
involved and the sessions identification created on real-time systems; 
e) Generating filters for datasets, including the headers, which are not configured as 
columns; 
f) Using advanced architecture for logging activities and scanning up to millions of events 
in a few minutes and gigabytes of data from logged information; 
g) Allowing any investigation to be cancelled at any time during scanning; 
h) Capturing records of the processes running from the boot time of the system, making it a 
more reliable medium of investigation; 
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i) While scanning a process tree, illustrating all of the associated process trees, which are 
referenced in a specific pattern and format; 
j) Recording native logs syntax, which protects data from being deployed completely over 
a process hacker tool, making this a persistent tool for investigation; and 
k) A user-friendly GUI allowing users to view scanned data in a convenient format, even 
when it does not fit into the correct column of the result.  
The Process Hacker Tool in Artefact (Smith 2010; Source Forge, 2015) 
a) Process Tree View: To detect malware, it is important to check all process trees 
associated with a single executable file. A running process can span into new processes 
with a parent–child relationship and can be checked in the tree view selection. Each 
process detected contains at least one thread in which a thread is using the CPU either 
for actual use or malicious use;  
b) Look for Packed Processes: It is common to have packed executable files; 
alternatively, there can be an encrypted process. Thus, before starting the process 
hacker tool, it is important to use third-party tools for unpacking files, which then use the 
process hacker tool for detection; 
c) Using Terminator: Sometimes, after detection, it becomes impossible to kill the 
process. In this situation, using Terminator by right clicking can disrupt the running 
processes. Sometimes, an investigator needs to manually suspend all running member 
processes to terminate the tool completely; 
d) Looking for Unexpected Sessions: Sometimes malware is hidden in a new session, 
which can be checked through the Sysinternals Process Monitor Tree. Session 0 and 
Session 1 are normal for any system, but having additional sessions could be a sign of 
malware in the session; and  
e) Looking in Service.exe Files: Through process hacker, all running services can be 
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viewed through sc.exe. There could be some non-running and non-interactive services 
running on the system. Using the sc.exe built-in tool can help with interacting with the 
service.exe and detecting anomalous files. 
Wireshark 
Wireshark is a packet analyser tool that captures network packets, showing the details of the 
network to the user. It is similar to a measuring device to check the on-going activity of the 
network in detail. For many investigations or the detection of malware activities, Wireshark can 
often be regarded as the best tool to use. Some of the most important features of Wireshark are 
(Cheok, 2014; Kurose, 2009): 
a) The tool is available and can run comfortably on both Unix and Windows platforms, 
providing flexibility for investigators; 
b) It uses a network interface to capture live data feeds present in the network; 
c) The open option provides detailing of the files and other data packets that were captured 
with tcpdump or any other packet capture tool available; 
d) It displays data to users with all of the detailed information on the protocols captured; 
e) It can import and export data packets in other file formats to simplify documentation for 
the user; 
f) Users can save the captured data packets for future use and analysis; 
g) The search button can assist an investigator in filtering out captured packets to resolve 
the intended problem or scenario; and 
h) Investigators can convert the captured data into statistical data for further explanations 
and analyses. 
Using Wireshark in the Artefact for Malware Detection (Cheok, 2014; Kurose, 2009) 
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a) Changing the Display of the Column in Wireshark: Wireshark can be initiated by 
changing the display button of the column, as the display button does not work properly 
for investigative purposes, especially in the case of detecting malware in the network; 
b) Filtering Protocols: Use the ‘filter’ option to search for a particular protocol used in a 
testing artefact; 
c) Monitoring Website Access: This can be a good source to detect malware, carried out 
by breaking traffic into protocol differentiation. Typing ‘http’ into the filter box can assist in 
viewing only traffic coming from http; 
d) Endpoint Dialog Option: Using the Endpoint dialog, the list of the websites being 
accessed on the system, websites from third parties, unknown sources and advertising 
networks can be viewed in a separate box to check for abnormalities; and  
e) Plug-in Detection: Noticing and detecting plugins can be very useful in detecting 
malware in the associated system. Plugins can be vulnerable, as they can attack 
browsers. To detect the plugins in systems, Plugin Detect can be used by including ‘http 
contains stat’ in the filter option. 
6.4 Risks and Issue Analysis 
Considering the artefact as a prototype for the proposed framework, issues and risks are 
involved in the development. These are briefly outlined as follows: 
a) Initially, a lack of expertise in the programming language (.NET) was problematic. 
Learning and enhancing capability from various sources, including university resources, 
helped in optimising the development for later stage; 
b) The Toolkit is an amalgamation of open source tools and requires learning, training and 
tutorials for performing investigations and associated experiments;  
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c) Every experiment requires a sample malware to be downloaded from sources for testing 
and experiments, which creates a risk of infection in the system. Thus, substantial time 
was invested in developing a safe environment, preventing the master machine from 
loss of integrity. 
6.5 Summary  
The intention in this chapter was to develop an artefact that reflects the critical functionalities of 
the proposed framework mentioned in Chapter 4. The artefact is in the form of a malware 
analysis toolkit, which is simple in structure, yet provides a robust system that integrates open 
source malware detection software tools. The developed Toolkit provides a flexible skillset to 
critically respond to current cyber incidents in any dynamic forensic environment. Furthermore, 
due to the Toolkit allowing further code and modifications to easily take place, future cyber 
incidents will also be responded to as malware itself changes as future trends and 
developments occur. It will support an investigator in analysing given malware on complaint 
management, and ensure security during the investigation through robust authentication and 
authorisation methods. It will perform a rapid request and response on the results while creating 
effective reports on the findings for further analysis. It also aimed to provide a reasonable and 
useable standard upon which law enforcement could act accordingly. Although this was 
something that could not be directly measured without conducting tests within a law 
enforcement environment and would need to be part of future development, it was an important 
consideration for the longevity of the final product. For developing the software within the 
respective domain and timeframe, a Waterfall model of the software lifecycle was selected as a 
standard model for development. This comprised four phases: requirements and gathering; 
design; implementation; and testing. In the requirement phase, the focus was on listing 
functional and non-functional requirements of the system, which included lists of required 
hardware and software. For developing the front-end design of the system, .NET was used as a 
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programming language while MySQL was used for developing the back-end services. After 
implementation was complete, testing was initiated by executing and running the system to 
observe its performance. Before initialising this phase, it was important to create suitable 
environmental conditions for running the system. Thus, a safe environment was also planned in 
accordance with testing and observation. Before downloading of the infection or an infected 
malware specimen could begin, appropriate tools were installed for analysis purposes prior to 
the system becoming corrupted. To select the tools, free utilities available to the author from 
various sources were downloaded and installed.  
The use of free utilities for this research was a purposeful decision, which was considered to 
have little effect on the outcome of the overall results. Many different commercially available, 
freeware, and open source tools are available, but performance is not directly linked to the 
upfront costs of the tool (Rastogi, 2013). Although some tools have been shown to outperform 
others (AV Comparatives, 2013), with frequent changes to malware keeping pace with updates 
to malware tools (Malwarebytes, 2017), it is not necessarily the appropriate approach to select a 
more expensive commercially available tool. However, this can be a consideration for further 
work in the development of a full-scale version of the software.  
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CHAPTER 7 - RESULTS AND OBSERVATIONS  
 
7.1 Overview 
Testing of the Toolkit was based on the work discussed in the previous chapter (Chapter 6); the 
required hardware and software were obtained and utilised. From creating the working 
environment (an isolated lab) to the testing environment, each phase was important for testing. 
This chapter illustrates the testing attributes used to deploy a successful Toolkit functionality. 
Moreover, it presents the theoretical and practical implications faced during the implementation 
and testing phases. The choice of environment and functional elements for implementation were 
dependent on the problem statement, as well as the market analysis performed, as described in 
Chapter 6. A thorough evaluation was undertaken; thus, it was useful for the author to explain 
the needs and requirements for the Toolkit. This activity helped the author to enhance the 
performance of malware detection and analysis more robustly and efficiently, and assisted in 
achieving better investigatory results. The Toolkit is an amalgamation of various successful pre-
existing open source tools, thereby eliminating the need to develop a completely new tool for 
malware detection. Thus, the implementation focused on a user-friendly solution to make the 
complete process of investigation usable and scalable in any dynamic environment.  
The Toolkit is a novel approach designed to create a better investigative environment and 
robustness in malware detection. As mentioned in Chapter 6, this Toolkit is a prototype that 
focuses on vital attributes, such as reducing the number of investigative cycles, providing a safe 
and controlled environment for investigation, performing both static and dynamic investigations 
through proactive open source tools, allowing for an efficient incident response in situational 
analysis and using a single platform for multiple malware analysis. Highlights of this tool include 
the removal of irrelevant tools, the saving of investigated data, and by minimising the amount of 
tools used in an investigation, there are also possible cost-saving implications. 
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As mentioned previously (Chapter 6), the development of the Toolkit was programmed using the 
.NET language for developing the front-end interface, while MySQL was deployed for back-end 
database development in the system. Before implementation, there was a need to ensure that 
the development and execution would occur within a safe and controlled environment. To 
accomplish this, the concept of a virtualised operating system was used. VirtualBox software 
was installed with a Windows ISO image file to protect the actual network system from any 
infection or any associated risk during the experiment. 
7.2 Environmental Setup 
To investigate and test the Toolkit, it was essential to create and maintain a safe environment 
that consisted of a virtual system placed on the actual system. The scope of the environment 
was not only restricted to the software, that is, the operating system, but also to the network 
resources and other related services. In this scenario, malware is modern in nature and directed 
towards networks and other running services. Thus, it may become necessary to emulate the 
environment, helping malware to run completely for testing purposes and used for common 
services, such as the domain name service (DNS) or simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP). To 
create this environment, VirtualBox by Oracle, VMware or Virtual PC could have been used. For 
the present development, the author selected VirtualBox to perform test experiments to create a 
safe environment. This was selected due to the author having familiarity with the software, 
although any of the aforementioned software could have been chosen based on performance 
and suitability. To give an appreciation of Oracle VirtualBox environment, selected screenshots 
have been provided in Figure 19 below: 
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Figure 49: Selected Screenshots of the VirtualBox Environment (Source: author) 
 
After the entire source code was created and run, the application was transferred to a safe 
environment for testing purposes. Before the Toolkit could be tested, it was important to load 
malware samples in a reserved, specific folder, which was later used for results and analysis. 
This virtual environment was beneficial as testing in a physical environment would have been 
time-consuming, and the ability to restart the machine in any failure situation allowed the 
experiment to be saved. This clarified the researcher’s purpose of distinguishing the system’s 
infected and uninfected zones. In addition, there were numerous precautions taken during the 
experiments. For instance, in scenarios in which malware was used, it could have acted 
differently if a virtual environment in the system were detected. Other issues arose in which the 
malware tried to trespass the virtual system to enter the base system; however, VirtualBox 
provided a useful tool in resolving these issues (Table 12). 
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Issue Positive  Negative  Comments 
System 
performance before 
infection 
  
 System performance was monitored and kept 
running to check its smoothness  
Malware infection  
  
 Sample malware execution files were deployed 
successfully for the experiment 
Malware penetration 
in the virtual system 
  
 The virtual system responded in a positive way, 
preventing malware from trespassing through the 
virtual system and safeguarding network assets 
System 
performance after 
infection 
        
  
It was difficult to run the prototype due to the high 
infection rate in the system from the sample 
malware 
Table 12: Issues Faced and Prevented During the Environmental Setup for the Toolkit 
7.3 Working Features of Toolkit 
A step-by-step explanation of the features and functionality of the Toolkit can be provided by 
illustrating the user interface of the system. Some of the screenshots are shown in detail in 
Appendix C.  
Running the Toolkit begins with a Login Page comprising an authentication process in the form 
of ID and password. Once the user is authentic on the basis of the access rights, he will be 
authorised to use the Toolkit. Some features after successful login are described as follows: 
a) Login Panel: This includes two user profiles, User Login and Admin Login. 
Authentication is described based on the rights given to the user type. The Super Admin 
 157 
can login through a default name and password, which will be created during 
development, and new users (investigators) can be added later by the Super Admin on a 
rights basis. Functions in report creations, such as read/write, can be used by the Super 
Admin, while only the read option is given to the user. This logs the users on, and their 
activity can be viewed by the Super Admin for analysis; 
b) Scan: This functionality will allow admin to start any investigation by selecting any 
particular category and respective tool to start the execution of the system. Once the 
software is executed and starts running, a new panel for capturing and recording the 
screen result will pop up. User/investigator can record the result at any time of 
investigation. Scanning cannot start without adding a title for the investigation. Captured 
screenshots will be automatically added to the investigation; 
c) Report: Once the scanning is done, a user can then create its own standard report. The 
report section will allow any user to view/edit reports. Edit will allow users to 
add/delete/modify the description and keywords with respective investigation (scanning). 
Super-admin can view/add/delete any user’s report while other users can view reports 
on the basis of access control; 
d) Manage Software: This functionality is only allowed to the Super Admin. Through this 
functionality, users can add/delete/edit any tool category and respective software. Users 
can also add/delete/modify the path for database storage; and  
e) Manage User: This functionality is only allowed to the Super Admin. Through this 
function, users can add any investigator or end user in the list of authentication. They 
can also activate or deactivate the respective user.  
7.4 Login as Super Admin 
After successful login to the Super Admin section using default passwords (which can be 
changed later), a user is then able to see a user interface, giving access to all the respective 
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functionalities mentioned above. It will show different sections (headers) at the top of the panel 
as shown in Figure 50.  
 
Figure 50: Screenshot of the Dashboard after Super Admin Login (Source: author) 
 
7.5 Collection of the Sample Malware 
Malware samples can be taken from various sources. Malware is available online on certain 
websites and samples can also be taken from educational institutes carrying authentication to 
provide the malware samples for academic purposes. The authenticity and validation of the 
sample malware was tested online using MD5 checksum, which although has vulnerabilities, is 
adequate for verifying data integrity against unintentional corruption (NASA, 2015). Some of the 
used online databases include popular websites, such as Virus Total and Malware Hash 
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Registry. It was important to complete all of the environmental containments before 
downloading or transferring any collections onto a system.  
To implement the abovementioned process, it was vital to design a framework to develop a 
toolkit for detecting and analysing malware files and network resources, acting as a prototype 
for digital forensics and security. The Toolkit is capable of carrying out processes that can assist 
in analysing the infected files and checking the optimisation of open source tools available 
worldwide. 
7.5.1 Obtaining and Installing the Sample Malware 
A process was developed based on work outlined by Zeltser (2015), which provided guidelines 
on how to safely install a malware sample for testing purposes.   
Running the prototype was only initialised when a working environment was ready with a 
proactive malware sample installed in it. Selecting sample malware was important for the testing 
environment. Sample malware was downloaded from trusted websites and other sources 
following ethical considerations. These sources carried malware samples intended only for 
research and investigative purposes. The following factors based on known best practices were 
considered before starting the investigation: 
a) Before downloading, it was vital to ensure the integrity of the virtual environment (safety) 
and to prevent spreading the infection to the base system or any other wired or wireless 
network nodes; 
b) Special consideration was taken to understand the nature of malware and the scope of 
infection, which assisted in selecting the relevant tool in the Toolkit for investigation; 
c) Special folders and sub-folders were created and marked to remember the location of 
the installed file; 
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d) After installation, processes were checked and monitored continuously to store 
knowledge and data on behaviour, which could later assist in determining the success 
rate of testing the desired tool in the Toolkit; 
e) The status of the system was recorded for comparison at a later stage with the status 
after the infection; 
f) Special consideration was made to turn off firewalls, anti-virus software, Windows 
Defender and any other commercial tool already installed on the system. This was done 
to prevent such programs from having any implications later during malware deployment 
and testing; and 
g) Network statistics, such as the IP address and subnet mask of the system, were 
recorded to distinguish between authorised and unauthorised sources in the 
experimental results.  
7.6 Testing the Prototype 
This prototype was developed with the objective of illustrating both theoretical and practical 
implications. The implementation is still in a raw stage and inevitably would need refinement and 
further testing prior to a finished product being finalised. However, this section illustrates and 
explains the testing done to date for the Toolkit, with descriptions of selected experiments 
carried out on certain tools with an analysis of raw malware sample files. Source coding of the 
Toolkit, sources of the malware and other testing screenshots are located in Appendix E and 
Appendix C.  
Testing the tool has its own importance. Testing was required to ensure correct and adequate 
operation was achievable. To accomplish this, three research experiments were conducted 
selecting the following tools: Process Hacker, SmartSniff and Wireshark. Considering any 
limitations (outlined in Section 6.7), the experiments were performed successfully, preventing 
 161 
any associated bottlenecks in terms of performance, flexibility, learning and adaptability of the 
system. Before testing of the system could begin, it was important to confirm the availability of a 
controlled environment detached from the existing network, also known as a base system. Once 
this virtualised environment was ready, the malware was installed. All installed folders were 
checked for appropriate malware and were run for the selected tool. The above process was 
followed and repeated for all respective tool categories. Selected screenshots for the 
experiments are shown from Figure 20 to Figure 30. 
7.7 Legal and Ethical Considerations 
It is important to consider legal and ethical issues during a malware investigation. From the 
perspective of legality, it is vital to ensure correct handling of malware samples, their 
preservation within the system, collecting evidence and presenting this evidence in safe 
custody. It also includes disclosure of private data (if any) recovered during the investigative 
operation. This private data may include IDs, passwords, personal credentials, such as phone 
numbers and email addresses, and financial data, such as credit and debit card information. 
Following ethical considerations confirms that the malware process has been undertaken in a 
secure and realistic manner and that all possible preventative steps have been taken to prevent 
stored malware from spreading. In addition, in a situation in which an investigator may find a 
new piece of malware, sharing the knowledge of the finding also falls under ethical 
considerations. Guidelines on ethical considerations are outlined in Dittrich and Bailey (2013) 
and followed as practically as possible for the completion of this work. 
7.8 Experiments on the Toolkit 
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Prior to the experiments, it is important to structure the actual inputs and the desired/expected 
outcomes. The inputs that were used during the study involved the use of malware samples with 
their distinctive characteristics, mentioned as follows: 
Table 13: The Sample Malware as Input with Respective Attributes  
Sample Malware 
(Input) 
Attributes of Malware after Infection (Output) Tool Used for 
Detection and 
Analysis 
 
Stuxnet (Worm) 
Tapas_6300.exe 
 Infected executable 
 Irrelevant CPU usage 
 Degrading system performance  
 Parasite component 
 Payloads 
 
Process Hacker 
 
Spyware 
Package 
 Unwanted usage of Port 80 
 Major unauthorised changes and sending system 
activities outside the network 
  Directly sending messages through unwanted TCP and 
UDP transmission 
 Using network resources 
 Anomalous packets on the system 
SmartSniff 
 
win32/polip.A 
 Three-way handshake with unwanted destinations 
 Unrecognised peer connection with external network 
 Malformed traffic from various unauthorised sources to 
the system 
 
Wireshark 
 
The following section details a series of experiments that were carried out on the Toolkit and the 
observations made by the author based on the performance and outcome. The experiments 
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were selected based on choosing different but potentially high-risk malware types to rigorously 
test the Toolkit and show its effectiveness in real-world situations by using actual malware. 
Experiment 1 
Name of the Packaged Malware: Stuxnet (computer worm), Tapas_6300.exe 
Type of infection: Infected executable files, irrelevant CPU consumption, performance 
degradation 
Targeted Category: Process monitoring 
Tool Used: Process Hacker 
Stuxnet malware is a packaged computer program that was installed intentionally with prior 
knowledge of its variable infections. Through this test, the system was scrutinised and recorded 
in the form of screenshots that were saved in a specific folder (as selected by Admin). Relevant 
screenshots related to the result are presented in  
Figure 51. 
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Figure 51 Screenshot Showing Infected Executable Files for Experiment 1 (Source: author) 
Observation 1: Various infected files can be seen in Figure 21. For instance, an executable file 
called ‘SoftwareCreate.xyz.exe’ was detected, which could be terminated if required by the 
investigator. According to white papers on spyware (Dizon et al., 2010), any executable file with 
a xyz.exe format initiates malicious processes, launching parasite components and payloads 
that are destructive in nature (Dizon et al., 2010). The presence of this file showed that the 
system was injected with a vicious threat. Files such as xyz.exe run silently in the background 
and can only be checked by investigators through tools such as Process Hacker. These files are 
difficult to delete by any anti-virus or anti-malware software; thus, manual deletion by an 
investigator is required to prevent any further loss. In Observation 1, the aim of the experiment 
was to capture the Protocol Hierarchy Statistics, which illustrate the total data usage by a 
particular IP address and the interaction of the system with unrecognised sources. 
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Figure 52: Screenshot of Injection on an Explorer.exe File in Experiment 1 (Source: author) 
Observation 2: Figure 22 shows a red line highlighting iexplorer.exe. If running in the 
background, iexplorer.exe shows symptoms related to a virus or malware injected on Microsoft 
Explorer. Although not critical to the health of the computer system, it can activate multiple 
explorers at the same time using CPU processes and bandwidth, causing delays for the user. 
The common problems and symptoms of this infection are as follows: 
a) Slow computer; 
b) Slow internet connection or working of Internet Explorer; 
c) Processes like ‘svhost’ consuming 100% of CPU; and 
d) Browser randomly crashing. 
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Figure 53: Result of Infection through Executable File 6300.exe in Experiment 1 (Source: 
author) 
 
Observation 3: The Process Hacker Toolkit screenshot in Figure 53 shows an infection by a 
6300.exe file. This is ransomware that can encrypt files on a system without prior permission. 
Once this program infects a system, it can lock several other programs on the infected computer 
and even if an investigator tries to restore files, he or she may still see files with a 6300.exe 
extension. Ransomware prevents users from accessing files on their system, typically until a 
ransom payment is made, hence the term ransomware. As a computer is essentially locked 
from the user and is of limited or no use, users may see no way of regaining access and 
succumb to the demands of the malware request for payment. 
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Experiment 2 
Target Category: Network analysis 
Target Malware: Suspicious malicious network traffic  
Tool Used: SmartSniff (open source) 
 
Figure 54: Results for SmartSniff after Sniffing Network Traffic in Experiment 2 (Source: author) 
 
Observation 1: Figure 54 shows some of the suspected traffic from spyware. For instance, 
websearch.goodforsearch.info is a hijacker that harms browsers. Once installed in a system, 
this malicious tool can harm the victimised system. The presence of this malicious spyware 
overtakes the current browser and replaces the homepage with websearch.goodforsearch.info. 
This activity can harm the system by making major unauthorised changes and sending system 
activities by directly sending messages through unwanted TCP and UDP transmissions. 
Attackers can easily manipulate systems by downloading and installing malware tools or 
programs and block users from accessing websites. This malware activity can flood a system 
with adware and popups resulting in more CPU usage and slowing the computer system. This 
tool has provided evidence to show the installation of websearch.goodforsearch.info malware 
 168 
and further action can then be taken to clean the infected system, highlighting the benefit and 
need for detection. 
 
Figure 55: The TCP Stream for Captured Packets in Experiment 2 (Source: author) 
 
Observation 2: By clicking on the TCP stream option in the tool or by double clicking, another 
panel appears, presenting more information as shown in Figure 55. It focuses on giving 
information on the protocol, its remote address and remote host information; this is vital 
information for an investigation. Here, the remote address is 162.210.192.5, which can be 
searched on IP tracer tools to obtain detailed information related to the geographical location of 
the hijacker.  
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Figure 56: Another Search for Suspected Unwanted Domain Access in Experiment 2 (Source: 
author) 
 
Observation 3: In this observation, the author found some of the changes in the system as 
shown in Figure 56. After the malware was successfully installed and spyware was detected, 
unwanted malicious traffic was detected by the SmartSniff tool; it was found to be turning the 
browser activity off completely. Focussing on the captured remote host information, there were 
multiple websites being accessed on UDP port 53 (DNS), resolving the IP address to the 
domain and vice versa, and sending messages to the servers without prior permission. 
Moreover, TCP port 443 (http) unsecured access was also observed. These statistics and 
captured anomalous packets show the presence of malware in the system. On further 
investigation, the author selected one IP address, 199.203.131.145, on an IP tracer, and found 
links to a server located in Israel without the website being accessed from the browser. This tool 
again highlights the importance of detection where unwanted, and possibly malicious, activity is 
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being forced upon a computer system without the user’s knowledge or intention. Identification is 
the first step before required cleaning takes place, and without this identification, unwanted 
activity would continue. 
Experiment 3 
Target Category: Network analysis 
Target Malware: win32/polip.A 
Target Tool: Wireshark 
 
Figure 57: Starting the Wireshark Tool in Experiment 3 (Source: author) 
 
The aim of this experiment was to exploit the presence of unwanted traffic patterns to the local 
node; that is, to track all packets from the external nodes, showing unwanted access to the 
system in a real-time scenario (RTS). In this experiment, there were two main nodes, of which 
the Toolkit was working on 192.168.10.129 along with Netmask 255.0.0.0. The target malware 
was downloaded and run for the experiment. Figure 57 shows the start-up screen of the 
Wireshark tool. The system was enhanced by a public network with anti-virus detection tools 
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deactivated to ensure any unwanted access would be granted to the system and ultimately 
demonstrate the effects. The following figures are some of the captured screenshots illustrating 
the anomalous behaviour in both incoming and outgoing streaming. 
 
Figure 58: Screenshot of Results with the Captured Packets from Wireshark in Experiment 3 
(Source: author) 
 
Observation 1: The captured packets showed the presence of unwanted packets from 
unwanted sources in Figure 58. At this time, all browser activity was halted. From a user 
perspective, this meant that the system was not involved in any IP interaction with any other 
machine. The presence of packets at the TCP port showed a three-way handshake with 
unwanted destinations. The red-coloured packet illustrates that it carried a serious threat, 
pointing to the presence of malformed traffic. This three-way handshake provides an opportunity 
for malicious servers to bypass security scanning on the networked devices and allow for further 
malicious attempts to occur. The presence of a TCP RTS packet was also observed, which 
meant the connection on which the previous IP was selected for sending data packets was no 
longer recognised. Moreover, this showed an ASK in a RST==0, which was attempting to 
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establish a peer connection that was unrecognised by the system. Such unwanted peer 
connections could be a source for malware and could host malicious content and, hence, would 
not be a welcomed system feature. 
 
 
Figure 59: Screenshot Displaying the Protocol Hierarchy in Wireshark in Experiment 3 (Source: 
author) 
 
Observation 2: The above screenshot (Figure 59) shows the protocol hierarchy for the 
captured packets in Wireshark. The presence of data (unrecognised packets) under the TCP 
hierarchy was analysed; statistically, these represented 22.77% of the total packets captured by 
the tool. This uncategorised data represented the presence of malware in the system, as 
Wireshark was not able to distinguish any other protocol.  
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Figure 60 Screenshot of TCP Port Filter in Experiment 3 (Source: author) 
 
The image in Figure 60 prominently shows details on uncategorised data packets under the 
TCP frame, carrying particular details concerning source and destination. These unrecognised 
packets could be further analysed based on the TCP stream. 
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Figure 61: Screenshot Displaying Captured TCP Packets in Experiment 3 (Source: author) 
 
Observation 3: The above screenshot (Figure 61) illustrates the packets in black with red text 
packets, which indicate bad TCP packets that were trying to connect with outer sources. This is 
indicative of malformed traffic from various unauthorised sources to the system. The intention of 
this malformed traffic is to disrupt services on the home network and possibly reveal availability 
of services to the unauthorised source, thus causing issues and possible harmful repercussions 
within the home network. 
The results observed from all three experiments were matched with the expected outcomes 
listed prior to the experiment (ref: Table 13), thus validating the results of the experiment.   
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7.9 Discussion and Implications 
This section focuses on implications associated with the Toolkit’s implementation and results of 
the experiments. The objective of deploying the prototype was to provide support for research 
conclusions to benefit digital forensics and security. The author’s intention was to conclude by 
illustrating facts based on the framework and link these to the selected problem statement. 
7.9.1 Theoretical Implications 
The tools involved in deployment were selected after extensive market analysis in which 
questionnaires were used to generate a unified result. The current investigation included 
manual operations and analysis using selected digital forensics tools. Information gathered 
during prototype implementation required detailed efforts of scrutinising and formulating an 
understanding of the conclusions. When presenting the information in a format to ensure 
understanding, the following were considered: prior knowledge and expertise before defining the 
input data was vital, as was keeping the artefact under the selected domain; and to help the 
understanding of how data could be manipulated and paired to form conclusions, pre-
processing of data and the use of link mining techniques were assessed.   
This research focussed on enhancing knowledge through identifying and detecting traces of 
malware in an infected system.  
7.9.2 Practical Implications 
The practical implementations of artefact deployment cover several necessities and aspects of 
digital forensics, providing solutions for all scenarios in digital security and investigation. None of 
the experiments conducted by the author were performed in a generic environment or condition. 
All testing and observations were carried out based on limited available resources at the time, 
specific configurations and computational power. Moreover, the Toolkit was developed for one-
tier systems and is not applicable for larger environments using multi-tier systems. However, its 
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performance could be enhanced in future works and reconfigured in accordance with the 
scenario and situation in which it is used. The system requirements, including technical 
requirements, would need to be changed for it to support a large-scale environment. This 
method needs to be considered by investigators and security experts regarding how it can be 
further improved and utilised. While the current version of the Toolkit is purely a desktop-based 
application, a web-based application can be a future option to eliminate computational and 
resource limitations. Other options could also be utilised to enhance the computational power, 
such as using a cloud-based infrastructure, which again would mitigate the risk of resource 
dependency. 
Performing experiments in a virtual environment provided various benefits. However, it also had 
some negative effects on the results. During the experiments, numerous VMware files were 
found on the machine in a cluster format and the functionalities of the Toolkit were unable to 
recognise them, contradicting the test outcome. In every experiment, consideration was given to 
files possessing VMware cluster formats; such files were ignored and removed from the 
observations. However, the whole process was manual and, therefore, it was unlikely for it to be 
100% reliable. Nevertheless, if malware sensitive to virtual environments was involved, it would 
be impractical to perform the experiment. In addition, the virtual environment results in 
clustering different machines together, creating a different environment for malware than a real 
compromised system, possibly affecting results. To this end, further testing within a real (non-
virtual) environment would be ideally sought to remove any of these highlighted concerns, and 
although this is largely impractical from a research viewpoint due to resources, it would prove its 
suitability beyond the conditions in this test.   
Another implication in the practical experiment was the way in which results were presented. 
The presentation in this scenario could be different from an actual investigation in a real 
scenario, where a tactical investigator would then evaluate the analysis. This investigator would 
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write reports in consultation with a legal practitioner before presenting them in court as 
evidence. In addition, presenting the results in a graphical format could have provided a 
different perspective in assembling the conclusion, which could have improved the results. 
7.10 User Experience Testing and Analysis   
To optimise the result on the system, a systematic and regulated approach to testing was 
conducted by seasoned specialists and those associated in the field of computer forensics, anti-
malware practices, information security and other related areas. The testing was based on the 
critical metrics (parameters) by using questionnaire-based prototype testing. User experience is 
the capability of the prototype to be understood by the user in a specified condition. It is also the 
extent to which a prototype can be tested by specified users to achieve results, effectiveness 
and rate of satisfaction.  
The test analysis was undertaken on the basis of reading scales based on the following five 
subscales: flexibility, usability, efficiency, learnability and helpfulness. These scales are based 
on the criteria outlined in the measure of software quality in its development (Bevan, 1995):  
 Flexibility – the degree to which the prototype can be modified on the basis of the needs 
and requirements of the user. It also shows the extent to which the prototype can be 
scalable; 
 Usability – a scale to check the ease of use of the prototype; 
 Efficiency – the degree to which a user can achieve his or her objective of working on 
the prototype in a direct and recorded time;  
 Learnability – the degree of learning and adapting new things, such as features, in the 
prototype and providing an affirmative reaction; and  
 Helpfulness – the degree to which the prototype assists the user with executing the 
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prototype in the most effective manner. 
A total of 30 respondents were called upon to evaluate the system. Their evaluation response 
was graded using a scale of 1 to 5. A rating of 5 was the most positive response and a rating of 
1 was the most negative response against the parameters as follows: 
5 strongly agree . . . 4 . . . 3 . . . 2 . . . 1 strongly disagree. 
An analysis was carried out on the responses to obtain the results. The results of the analysis 
are shown in Table 14:   
Parameter 
Rating 
5 4 3 2 1 
Flexibility 19 7 3 1 0 
Usability  13 9 5 2 1 
Efficiency 14 5 7 4 0 
Learnability 26 4 0 0 0 
Helpfulness  18 3 6 1 2 
Table 14: Results of User Experience Questionnaire on the Toolkit 
 
Observation and Analysis  
Flexibility – The majority of the respondents were in favour of flexibility of the system. The 
system provides a platform for users to perform dynamic scaling on the basis of their needs and 
requirements, which adds to the overall scope and flexibility of the Toolkit. Depending on the 
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investigative environment and the malware behaviour, users can select and modify the Toolkit 
to satisfy the environmental attributes. Respondents were pleased with how the Toolkit could 
adapt to their specific requirements, and if there was a change in their requirements, see how it 
would still meet their needs. This demonstrates how the tool would still serve its purpose in the 
respondents’ eyes, regardless of the application, thereby increasing its likelihood of being called 
upon as a tool.  
Usability – The majority of the respondents felt at ease while using the software navigation 
panel, which demonstrates the software’s user-friendliness. Therefore, it is more likely to be 
frequently used and by more users, if they find it something that is intuitive and easy to 
navigate. 
Efficiency – The majority of the respondents found the process of investigation efficient when 
using this tool. This was because the Toolkit comprises multiple tools on a single platform, 
making the switching of tools straightforward and easy. This feedback demonstrates how a 
single port of call, in this case the software under investigation, negates the need for different 
tools on different platforms. As a multitude of tools are available to the user and navigating to 
each tool was found to be easily done, time saving would be possible. It also highlights how the 
amalgamation of different tools in a single platform will remove the need for multiple tools 
across multiple platforms and, thus, in theory would save on outlay costs.   
Learnability – Of the respondents, 26 out of 30 strongly agreed that they picked up this system 
quickly without any trouble, indicating that it is adaptable and acceptable towards any new 
attribute. Quickly adapting to a new system that a person has not used before identifies it as 
something people are more likely to use in the future as no prior learning is required, allowing 
the user to simply get on with the task at hand. Systems that are complex or take time to learn 
will be seen as difficult and will most likely put off users in favour of easier and more intuitive 
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systems where time will be saved by not having to learn about them. 
Helpfulness – Of the respondents, 18 out 30 felt strongly that the system provided the 
expected results with the expected rationale. This showed that the system provided a toolset 
that was required by the users to carry out the intended job, thereby giving users access to what 
they expected and needed. The system, therefore, demonstrates how it serves its purpose 
when carrying out investigative procedures and ultimately has value. 
The results for the questionnaire were further analysed using percentages to better group the 
responses as either positive or negative factors. Any rate above 2 was considered positive while 
2 or less was negative. These results are detailed in Table 15 below with a graphical 
representation of the same data shown in Figure 32. 
Table 15: Statistical Results for User Experience Questionnaire  
Factor 
Parameter 
Flexibility Usability Efficiency Learnability Helpfulness 
Positive  97% 90% 87% 100% 90% 
Negative 3% 10% 13% 0% 10% 
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Figure 62: Statistical Results for User Experience Questionnaire 
From the results in Table 15, it can be concluded that there was general positive acceptability of 
the prototype. For flexibility, the input user group score was a 97% positive ratio result. The 
other factors also scored well in the positive factor ratio, with learnability (100%), efficiency 
(87%), usability (90%) and helpfulness (90%) all scoring high. Conversely, all negative ratios 
were relatively low with the highest negative score for efficiency at 13%, while the lowest was 
0% with no negative ratio for learnability. The results suggest that users learnt easily, found the 
experience intuitive and useful and, in general, were happy with the overall experience. The 
results also suggest that improvements could be made, although the amount of feedback was 
largely positive and did not highlight any significant negative areas.  
7.11 Training Needs Analysis   
A training needs analysis (TNA) is commonly undertaken by companies who recognise that 
training is required on a service or product, but needs to address the way in which it is applied. 
The release of a new software product will often require training for the end user to ensure the 
tool appropriately meets the users’ requirements, and they are comfortable and knowledgeable 
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about the product. 
The results outlined in the previous section showed that the user experience was well received 
with a high percentage of respondents determining the learnability and usability as positive. This 
suggests that the requirement for training is not considerable. However, it should be noted that 
the selected respondents were industry experts and familiar with existing tools and 
methodologies. It is feasible that some future users would not be experienced in their respective 
fields and, therefore, would be less familiar with similar software or the general processes 
involved in malware. Hence, a strategy should be adopted to include either instructor-based 
courses, web-based courses, or built-in tutorial guides to ensure the provision of adequate 
training. 
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CHAPTER 8 - CONCLUSION 
8.1 Overview 
Malware is a threat to all existing computer systems regardless of use and the level of security 
deployed on its network. As presented in the literature review (Chapter 2), malware has a global 
impact on the digital world, empowering different groups of individuals who pose dangers to 
financial services and engage in criminal activities. Thus, there is an urgent and ever-increasing 
need to carry out investigative processes and use specific procedures to implement preventive 
measures against malware. Various manual and automated techniques for malware detection 
and analysis are available, but they are often time-consuming and costly (see Section 2.8). 
When using such techniques, performance often deteriorates when investigations are carried 
out on large volumes of data. This is due to a lack of computer resources and inefficiencies in 
the detection software’s ability to handle vast amounts of data. There are also various other 
challenges associated with investigation, detection and analysis of malware (see Section 2.11). 
For example, variations in scanning for malicious programs can be a problem as malware can 
change its behaviour heuristics, making it too complex for fixed detection methods. In some 
situations, investigators are unable to create matching patterns that link previously recorded 
malware data with new ones to obtain results of existing infected files being corrupted by other 
malware, thereby generating inaccurate results and affecting future detections. Moreover, in 
some scenarios, the cost and skills related to existing malware detection create a challenge for 
investigators (see Section 2.11). Thus, there was a need to develop and deploy an effective 
system that can assist investigators in the accurate and complete detection and analysis of 
malware without compromising data integrity.  
To collect knowledge concerning a suitable solution for the threats and issues identified in the 
literature review (Chapter 2), a market analysis was conducted (Chapter 4) using industry-based 
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respondents to give opinions and considerations via a questionnaire and interviews. This 
analysis helped to identify a need for an encompassing system that can handle both the 
dynamic and static investigative methods. The analysis also showed that inadequacies in 
current software detection tools can produce inaccurate or incomplete results. Furthermore, the 
cost implications in the current use of multiple tools for a single investigation along with the 
man-hour requirements could well be reduced. Hence, the opportunity to establish a new 
framework to help investigators carry out effective and efficient malware detection while 
minimising costs was noted.   
In response to this opportunity, the author demonstrated a requirement and developed a new 
malware framework called TCMA (Chapter 5 & Chapter 6). This newly developed TCMA 
framework has three tiers, namely the malware acquisition function, detection and analysis, and 
the database operational function. Each tier was comprehensively discussed to justify its 
relevance to assist in an effective and efficient malware detection and analysis process. The 
current challenges and associated issues with present malware detection methods were 
highlighted and addressed through the development and implementation of the TCMA 
framework. 
Using the TCMA framework, the author subsequently developed a prototype Toolkit, 
representing a novel approach in digital forensics and malware detection methods (Chapter 6). 
Current tools and frameworks were shown to use either static or dynamic methods for malware 
detection, but the developed prototype Toolkit integrates a range of tools into a single software 
package; this is by using both static and dynamic analysis techniques in combination, which has 
not been systematically implemented before. For this Toolkit under test conditions, adopting this 
approach in malware has increased the accuracy rate and flexibility in the reporting structure 
over any individual static or dynamic method. Moreover, it readily accepts modifications to the 
source code using a range of programming languages, and enables reporting through various 
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outputs, thereby increasing usability over that of a single tool. Consideration has been given in 
development of the Toolkit by keeping in mind the end user, and to make the experience more 
intuitive and sufficiently dynamic to adapt to an individual’s requirements.   
As demonstrated in Chapter 7, the Toolkit underwent different phases of design, development, 
implementation, testing and finally assessment to demonstrate the need and result of this novel 
approach to malware detection. The Toolkit is simple in structure and was built using readily 
available open source software. It was developed to help investigators gain skills to critically 
respond to current and future cyber incidents and analysis. Added to this, it is capable of 
carrying out processes that assist in analysing infected files and checking the optimisation of 
available open source tools. As the Toolkit is an amalgamation and integration of various 
already proven open source tools, it eliminates the intention to develop a proprietary tool for 
malware detection. Thus, implementation focused on the development of a user-friendly 
solution, making the investigation process usable and scalable in any dynamic environment. 
Moreover, a rationale was designed on the basis of parameters to illustrate the Toolkit’s 
superiority over a single tool for malware investigation, which showed it is a valid solution for 
current digital forensics. The tool was also shown to decrease costs by eliminating the 
requirement of different tools for investigation, reducing the number of investigative cycles, 
decreasing the need for extra investigators carrying out similar work and streamlining tool usage 
during an investigation.  
The following are the primary benefits seen in the development of the TCMA framework and the 
Toolkit: 
a) Increased Reliability: Due to the presence of integrity constraints in the database, 
updating data on malware becomes reasonably manageable. Moreover, every report is 
provisioned with back up, for example, putting it into a different server and encrypting the 
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data, thus making it highly reliable when the detection is performed through pre-existing 
forensic tools, pre-defined malware detection systems and limited duration at a workstation; 
b) Increased Functionality: TCMA provides a platform where any new functionality can be 
added without losing the indispensable correlated evidence. Thus, the scope of the system 
can be modified with increased functionality; even in a situation where numerous systems 
or parties are involved in the same crime, it performs analysis independently and integrates 
the results to form decisions; 
c) Increased Accuracy: Using both static and dynamic methods for malware detection has 
given an advantage to our framework. The combination of this duo has already proven to 
be a method for improving accuracy, rather than using static or dynamic as a singular 
method. Moreover, by crafting correlations among multiple cases when the investigator 
uses numerous techniques, it is able to form conclusions in a more effective way; 
d) Reduced Costs: The proposed framework integrates highly scalable open source tools in a 
single package. This showed positive results in detecting and analysing large amounts of 
data, obfuscated malware or malicious codes, while minimising the investigative time and, 
consequently, costs, thereby creating scope for operational savings for the user; 
e) Reduced Investigation Complexity: The observations and results (in Chapter 7 & 
Appendix C) showed that implementation reduces complexity in the investigation, when an 
illegitimate activity is carried out through the use of sophisticated tools and methods; and 
f) Minimised Technique Complexity: Technique complexity occurs when a user needs to 
implement variable methods for malware detection or use differentiable techniques in a 
single investigation. The proposed framework, through using a single technique for every 
different environment, minimises the complications and methods associated with 
investigations, especially when the same data are present over a large network or in 
various computational systems. 
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The outcome of this work, the proposed artefact, is a single platform capable of multiple 
malware analyses that improves functionality and efficiency, while reducing costs and the time 
spent during an investigation. For instance, all experiments were performed with open source 
tools, where the results of multiple analyses were accumulated in a single user interface. 
Additionally, user testing showed results of better time management, as compared to previous 
tools used by the respondents.  
8.2 Addressing Research Objectives  
The goal of the research was to optimise the research paradigm for malware analysis and to 
improve the investigatory experience by employing an active approach to detect malware 
programs. With this in mind, the author divided the objectives into two phases: Phase 1 focused 
on developing a robust framework for malware analysis and detection, while Phase 2 involved 
developing an artefact as a prototype for an anti-malware Toolkit to assist investigators in 
systematic detection and analysis.  
The objectives in Phase 1 were addressed as follows: 
a) To conduct an extensive literature review of the different trials and techniques associated 
with malware detection and to identify the parameters for developing the most efficient 
tools for a live system: 
 A review and discussion of the literature took place, which justified the academic 
work undertaken by various authors in the field of malware, including methods of 
detection and analysis (ref: Chapter 2); and 
 The parameters were identified for developing the artefact by defining the 
malware detection architecture and detection techniques (ref: 2.9 The Malware 
Detection Architecture, 2.10 Malware Detection Techniques). 
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b) To conduct extensive market research to understand the precise nature of the 
software/system requirements:  
 Conceptual and contextual methods were used to gather information, followed by 
an extensive analysis of the report (ref: Chapter 3); 
 Based on the selected methodology discussed in Chapter 3, the author divided 
the market research into two phases: a questionnaire and an interview; and 
 The questionnaire was designed with a view to developing a new effective 
framework for malware detection and analysis, which involved a novel approach 
to digital forensics and research. The interview was conducted with a view to 
gathering results for developing an artefact. 
c) To generate a new, effective framework to analyse the behavioural characteristics of the 
malware family and the mechanics of its operation:  
 A new approach (model), called the triple-tier, centralised, online, real-time 
environment (tri-CORE) malware analysis (TCMA) method was developed (ref: 
Chapter 5). 
The objectives for Phase 2, developing a Toolkit, were as follows: 
a) To develop a malware detection Toolkit, representing a simple structural prototype built 
from open source software, to help investigators develop skills to critically respond to 
current cyber incidents and investigations. The development should be reflected by the 
information gathered from Phase 1: 
 A malware analysis Toolkit was developed, which was simple in structure yet 
sufficiently robust, using integrated open source malware detection software 
tools; and 
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 A rationale was designed based on certain parameters, illustrating the reasons 
for using the Toolkit over a single tool for malware investigation (ref: Table 9). 
b) To perform an extensive testing and recording of the Toolkit by experienced end users in 
order to gather real-time execution results: 
 Testing was divided into two phases: first, the experiments were performed in 
real time by the author (ref: 7.8 Experiments on the ), and second, the end users 
tested the prototype (ref: 7.10 User Experience Testing and Analysis). 
8.3 Research Implications 
The study was conducted through distinctive cross-referencing where all possibilities were 
gathered, studied and analysed critically to obtain an effective result. During development of the 
artefact, practical implications were addressed by author. The artefact was initiated, designed 
and implemented by keeping the proposed framework (TCMA) in mind. It is important to note 
that the proposed framework is a wider contribution compared to the artefact development and, 
thus, the artefact was developed as an academic prototype. In the context of this academic 
work, the artefact was used primarily as a method to validate the framework, although it also 
served to demonstrate how the author believed a new product could look and behave. The 
artefact could have been developed into a full commercial software package, but due to limited 
resources, financial restrictions and time period (during an academic session), the author has 
not developed a finalised product. Keeping such considerations in mind, the scope was limited 
to developing the artefact with a limited functionality but describing all the essential attributes of 
the proposed framework. Thus, a complete version could be considered using the proposed 
TCMA framework in future work. 
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8.4 Future Work 
The proposed prototype for malware detection and analysis, the Toolkit, is limited in its 
functionality. Due to theoretical and practical implications, progress can only be taken so far and 
further exploration and experimentation will need to be taken to finalise a product. The following 
are some notable features for future work: 
a) A new commercial version of the artefact using the system development lifecycle (SDLC), 
incorporating standard design, working environment, networking infrastructure and 
database; 
b) Conducting more experiments and investigations to detect malware in a real-time 
environment or on a live system to obtain more realistic results, rather than generic ones; 
c) The choice and quantity of the resources could be increased in the later stage to obtain 
more complete results for comparison and discussion; 
d) The current Toolkit is a desktop-based application; thus, a new web-based interface can be 
designed and developed for added flexibility; 
e) The experiment was carried out in a virtual environment, which has certain implications. For 
instance, malware could be inactive after virtual machines are detected, so the investigator 
must watch for the presence of virtual machines on the hardware in order to detect a virtual 
machine freely running inside the system. In addition, the process is time-consuming with 
the need to restart the machine in any failure, although this can be improved at a later stage; 
and 
f) The choice and number of sample malware can be increased to obtain a more 
comprehensive result for further analyses. 
The overall result of the study is multi-faceted, whereby the objective was to discuss various 
effective methods for the use of malware detection and analysis. By acknowledging faults and 
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bottlenecks in the existing system, a new framework (TCMA) was formulated. This was 
developed with the intention to overcome associated limitations and assist an investigator in 
obtaining effective results. The study contributes to the field of IT security with the aim of making 
the process of malware analysis and detection more flexible and robust.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A- Questionnaire for a New Framework  
Section A: Questions based on knowledge and opinions about malware  
1) How much experience do you have with modern malware? 
i. 0–1 year 
ii. 1–3 years 
iii. 3–5 years 
iv. 5–8 years 
v. More than 8 years 
2) How often have you seen changes in the malware landscape? 
i. Never 
ii. Seldom 
iii. Occasionally 
iv. Frequently 
3) Is your own organisation vulnerable to malware attacks? 
i. No 
ii. Yes 
iii. Not sure 
4) What is the situation with other non-technical employees? Are they capable of identifying a 
malware attack? 
i. No 
ii. Yes 
iii. Not sure 
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Section B: Questions based on various security processes, adopted technologies and 
gained skills in malware detection 
1) Do you have any expertise in the malware handling process? 
i. Yes 
ii. No 
iii. Don’t know 
2) How often do you receive case studies related to malware for investigation? 
i. < 5% 
ii. 5%–20% 
iii. 20%–50% 
iv. 50%–80% 
v. Above 80% 
3) How many of the above cases were solved with accurate results? 
i. < 5% 
ii. 5%–20% 
iii. 20%–50% 
iv. 50%–80% 
v. Above 80% 
4) What is your opinion on the level of skills and technological tools adopted in your company 
to carry out an investigation process on malware? 
i. Weak 
ii. Average 
iii. Strong 
5) What is the level of effectiveness in detection and response? 
i. Weak 
ii. Average 
iii. Strong 
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Section C: Questions based on malware detection tools and analysis 
1) In your opinion, what types of tools have been adopted in malware detection and analysis? 
i. Open source tools 
ii. Shareware 
iii. Commercial tools 
iv. Cannot say 
2) Do you think there is a need for a new customised tool for malware detection and analysis? 
i. Yes 
ii. No 
iii. Cannot say 
3) Do you think cost plays an important role in adopting an individual analysis tool? 
i. I agree 
ii. I do not agree 
iii. Cannot say 
4) In your opinion, which of the following methods is more viable and effective in analysing 
malware? 
i. Static analysis 
ii. Dynamic analysis 
iii. Other ___________________ 
5) A) If you selected static analysis, then please specify the core adopted method for 
operations _________________________________________________ 
5) B) If you selected dynamic analysis, then please specify the core adopted method for 
operations _________________________________________________ 
6) Is your tool equipped with a specific preloaded database for malware? 
i. Yes 
ii. No 
iii. Not sure 
7) If yes, then how frequently do you update the malware database? 
i. Every day 
ii. Weekly 
iii. Monthly 
iv. Annually 
v. Do not do updates at all 
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vi. Do not have any idea 
8) Can you list some of the adopted tools for malware detection in your organisation? 
_________________ 
 
Section D: Questions based on problems faced by investigators while conducting a 
malware analysis 
1) What is the core problem faced by the investigator during malware detection? 
i. Detecting the size 
ii. Analysing the behaviour 
iii. Detecting the level of infection 
iv. Proliferation 
v. Database updating 
vi. Other ____________________ 
2) What is the level of malware penetration in specific file processes? 
i. Critical 
ii. Complex 
iii. Complex and critical 
iv. Highly complex and critical 
3) On average, how many days does it take for an investigator to detect the presence of 
malware in a file? 
i. One week 
ii. Less than a month 
iii. Many months 
iv. Many years 
v. Cannot say 
4) What is an important parameter to look for during an investigation? 
i. A malware signature 
ii. Malware behaviour 
iii. The level of infection 
iv. All of the above 
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Appendix B- Interview Questions for Toolkit Market Analysis 
1 Could you explain the area of your expertise in the field of cyber forensics and investigation? 
2 Could you explain various categories of malware/malicious codes available in the area of 
information security?  
3 What are the threats posed by the presence of malware on the internet? 
4 Do you feel that an average user is more aware of different threats influenced by malicious 
code online, or is this counterpoise due to skilled malicious programmers and creators? 
5 How difficult is it for investigators to detect malware, especially when the programs are 
newly built and affect the user activity online? 
6 What sort of malware attacks are common on the internet these days? 
7 Have you heard about DDoS attacks? Could you give a basic overview on that and explain 
the effects of DDoS on user activity? 
8 Could you explain the importance of anti-malware tools? 
9 What sort of anti-malware tools would you prefer as an investigator? 
10 Which method of malware analysis is better – dynamic analysis or static analysis? 
11 Do you find it difficult to gather information and perform analyses for malware detection? 
12 What sort of emphasis should an investigator place on behavioural analysis of infected files 
in the system? Why is this important? 
13 What are the challenges an investigator faces during malware detection? 
14 Do you think we need a customised tool for detecting malware in the system? 
15 What kind of changes do you recommend in the scenario of malware detection tools? 
16 Do you think we need any changes in the reporting structure? 
17 Do you think collecting evidence on malware is challenging these days? 
18 What are the ideal attributes for developing an effective malware detection tool? 
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Appendix C- User Testing Program 
 
Serial No…………………     Date………………………. 
Name…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Note: Please read the following detailed parameters carefully and tick the appropriate 
option in the box on the next page. You have five options to define your experience with 
the system. 
Flexibility – degree to which the prototype can be modified on the basis of the needs and 
requirements of the user. It also shows the extent to which the prototype can be scalable. 
Usability – scale to check the ease of use of the prototype 
Efficiency – degree to which a user can achieve his or her objective of working on the 
prototype in a direct and record time.  
Learnability – degree of learning and adapting new things, such as features in the prototype, 
and providing an affirmative reaction.  
Helpfulness – degree to which the prototype assists the user with executing the prototype in 
the most effective manner. 
Please tick or cross the box  on the next page 
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Tick 5 (if strongly agree) ...4…3…2…1 (strongly disagree) 
Parameter 
Rating 
5 4 3 2 1 
Flexibility      
Usability       
Efficiency      
Learnability      
Helpfulness       
 
(Your feedback will only be used for academic purposes) 
Thank you for your valuable time 
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Appendix D- Screenshots of the Working Toolkit  
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Appendix E- Publication in the International Journal of Network Security and Its 
Application (IJNSA) 
Source URL: http://airccse.org/journal/nsa/6114nsa01.pdf 
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Appendix F- Source Code for the Toolkit 
User Creation 
private void btnSave_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
            UserComponent userComponent = new UserComponent(); 
            if (userComponent.IsUserNameExists(txtUserName.Text, 
StaticValues.UserEditId)) 
            { 
                lblMessage.Text = "Username already exists."; 
                return; 
            } 
            User usr = new User(); 
            usr.UserId = StaticValues.UserEditId; 
            usr.UserName = txtUserName.Text; 
            usr.Name = txtName.Text; 
            if (StaticValues.UserEditId == 0 || !string.IsNullOrEmpty(txtPassword.Text)) 
                usr.Password = Security.GenerateEncryptedPassword(txtPassword.Text); 
            usr.IsActive = chkIsActive.Checked; 
            usr.IsAdmin = chkIsAdmin.Checked; 
            usr.IsDeleted = false; 
            if (userComponent.Save(usr)) 
            { 
                System.IO.Directory.CreateDirectory(AppDomain.CurrentDomain.BaseDirectory 
+ "reports\\" + txtUserName.Text); 
                lblMessage.Text = "User saved successfully."; 
                Clear(); 
            } 
            else 
                lblMessage.Text = "Error while saving the record."; 
        } 
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Get Report 
private void GetScanDetail() 
        { 
            int left = 10; 
            ExecutionComponent executionComponent = new ExecutionComponent(); 
            ExecutionLog log = 
executionComponent.GetReportById(StaticValues.ExecutionLogId); 
            textBox1.Text = log.Title; 
            textBox2.Text = !string.IsNullOrEmpty(log.Content) ? log.Content : 
string.Empty; 
            textBox3.Text = 
executionComponent.GetKeywordsByExecutionLogId(StaticValues.ExecutionLogId); 
            foreach (var VARIABLE in log.ScanScreenShots) 
            { 
                PictureBox picture = new PictureBox(); 
                picture.ImageLocation = AppDomain.CurrentDomain.BaseDirectory + 
"reports\\" + StaticValues.UserName + "\\" + 
                                        log.Title + "\\" + VARIABLE.Image; 
                picture.Size = new Size(100, 100); 
                picture.Left = left; 
                picture.SizeMode = PictureBoxSizeMode.StretchImage; 
                picture.Click += new EventHandler(PictureClick); 
                panel2.Controls.Add(picture); 
                left = left + 110; 
            } 
        } 
 
Save Report Edit Changes 
private void button1_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
            ExecutionComponent executionComponent = new ExecutionComponent(); 
            if (executionComponent.Update(StaticValues.ExecutionLogId, textBox2.Text)) 
            { 
                executionComponent.DeleteKeywords(StaticValues.ExecutionLogId); 
                string[] keywords = textBox3.Text.Split(','); 
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                foreach (var keyword in keywords) 
                { 
                    ENTITIES.Keyword kw = new ENTITIES.Keyword(); 
                    kw.ExecutionLogId = StaticValues.ExecutionLogId; 
                    kw.Name = keyword; 
                    executionComponent.SaveKeyword(kw); 
                } 
                DialogResult result = MessageBox.Show("Record saved successfully.", 
"Saved", MessageBoxButtons.OK); 
                if (result == DialogResult.OK) 
                { 
                    this.Hide(); 
                    ViewReport viewReport = new ViewReport(); 
                    viewReport.Show(); 
                } 
            } 
            else 
                label3.Text = "Issue occurred while saving the record. Please try 
later."; 
        } 
 
Reporting Table 
private void GetListing() 
        { 
            grdReport.Columns.Clear(); 
            grdReport.Refresh(); 
 
            DateTime? nullDateTime = null; 
            int category = cbCategory.SelectedItem != null ? (cbCategory.SelectedItem as 
ComboBoxItem).Value : 0; 
            DateTime? fromDate = dtpFrom.Checked ? dtpFrom.Value : nullDateTime; 
            DateTime? toDate = dtpTo.Checked ? dtpTo.Value : nullDateTime; 
            List<ReportListing> listing = new 
ReportComponent().GetReportListings(category, 
                chkSelfScan.Checked, StaticValues.UserId, 
string.IsNullOrEmpty(textBox1.Text) ? null : textBox1.Text, 
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                string.IsNullOrEmpty(textBox2.Text) ? null : textBox2.Text, fromDate, 
toDate); 
            grdReport.DataSource = listing; 
            DataGridViewButtonColumn col = new DataGridViewButtonColumn(); 
            col.UseColumnTextForButtonValue = true; 
            col.Text = "View"; 
            col.Name = "Details"; 
            grdReport.Columns.Add(col); 
        } 
 
Start Execution of Software 
    private void button1_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
            if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(txtTitle.Text)) 
                return; 
            var software = new 
SoftwareComponent().GetSoftwarebyId(StaticValues.SelectedSoftwareId); 
            ENTITIES.ExecutionLog exe = new ENTITIES.ExecutionLog(); 
            exe.SoftwareId = StaticValues.SelectedSoftwareId; 
            exe.UserId = StaticValues.UserId; 
            exe.Startdate = DateTime.Now; 
            exe.Title = txtTitle.Text; 
            if (new ExecutionComponent().Save(exe)) 
            { 
                button2.Visible = button3.Visible = txtTitle.ReadOnly = true; 
                button1.Visible = false; 
                StaticValues.ExecutionLogId = exe.ExecutionLogId; 
                System.IO.Directory.CreateDirectory(AppDomain.CurrentDomain.BaseDirectory 
+ "reports\\" + StaticValues.UserName + "\\" + txtTitle.Text); 
                Process.Start(software.Location); 
            } 
        } 
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Taking Screenshots 
private void button2_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
            ScreenCapture sc = new ScreenCapture(); 
            // capture entire screen, and save it to a file 
            Image img = sc.CaptureScreen(); 
            Bitmap b = new Bitmap(img); 
            string filename = DateTime.Now.Year.ToString() + 
DateTime.Now.Month.ToString() + DateTime.Now.Day.ToString() + 
DateTime.Now.Hour.ToString() + 
                              DateTime.Now.Minute.ToString() + 
DateTime.Now.Second.ToString() + DateTime.Now.Millisecond.ToString() + ".jpg"; 
            b.Save(AppDomain.CurrentDomain.BaseDirectory + "reports\\" + 
StaticValues.UserName + "\\" + txtTitle.Text + "\\" + filename); 
            // capture this window, and save it - 
http://stackoverflow.com/questions/1163761/capture-screenshot-of-active-window 
            ENTITIES.ScanScreenShot sss = new ENTITIES.ScanScreenShot(); 
            sss.ExecutionLogId = StaticValues.ExecutionLogId; 
            sss.Image = filename; 
            sss.CreatedDate = DateTime.Now; 
            new ExecutionComponent().SaveScreenShot(sss); 
        } 
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Appendix G- User Manual (Super Admin) 
a) Login Panel: This includes two user profiles: User Login and Admin Login. 
Authentication is described based on the rights given to the user type. The Super Admin 
can login through a default name and password, which will be created during 
development, and new users (investigators) can be added later by the Super Admin on a 
rights basis. Functions in report creation, such as read/write, can be used by the Super 
Admin, while only the read option is given to the user. This logs the users on, and their 
activity can be viewed by the Super Admin for analysis: 
 
b) Scan: This functionality will allow Admin to start any investigation by selecting any 
particular category and respective tool to execute the system. Once the software is 
executed and starts running, a new panel for capturing and recording the screen result 
will pop up. The user/investigator can record the result at any time during the 
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investigation. Scanning cannot start without adding a title for the investigation. Captured 
screenshots will be automatically added to the investigation. 
c) Report: Once the scanning is done, a user can create his or her own standard report. 
The report section will allow any user to view/edit reports. Edit will allow users to 
add/delete/modify the description and keywords with the respective investigation 
(scanning). Super Admin can view/add/delete any user’s report while other users can 
view reports on the basis of access control. 
d) Manage Software: Super Admin is only allowed this functionality. Through this 
functionality, users can add/delete/edit any tool category and respective software. Users 
can also add/delete/modify the path for database storage.  
e) Manage User: Super Admin is only allowed this functionality. Through this function, 
users can add any investigator or end user to the list of authentication. They can also 
activate or deactivate the respective user.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
